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The genesis of this volume lies in consultations 1 had over lunch in Toronto 
with Professor Gerald Helleiner of the University of Toronto in October 
1995. Caroline Pestieau, the IDRC Vice-President for Programmes, had 
kindly offered to support my research in a form that would be mutually 
beneficial. So a modest grant was made available to commission a selected 
number of papers for this volume. 
While the issue of globalization is receiving considerable attention, not 
enough work is being done on the social costs involved (in terms of poverty, 
inequality, unemployment and exclusion) in the era of globalization, nor on 
the interrelationships between the information highway, the process of glo-
balization and the growing marginalization of people in poor developing 
countries. These topics were finally chosen in view of their particular interest 
to the IDRC and developing countries. Globalization and information tech-
nology may be having an adverse effect on poor developing countries with an 
inadequate national capacity. On the other hand, with the rapidly declining 
utilization cost of high technology, this technology is becoming more and 
more"àëeessible even to the poorer developing countries. However cost is not 
the only barrier to access to information technology and integration into the 
global economy. As this volume shows, institutional and infrastructure bar-
riers are equally if not more important. 
Globalization is defined in economic terms, that is, in terms of trade 
liberalization, including the breaking down of tariff and non-tariff barriers, 
and the freer flow of capital, technology, finance, goods and services across 
national boundaries. While the non-economic aspects of globalization are no 
doubt important, they are not considered here. We have opted for focus and 
depth rather than breadth of coverage. 
What is studied is the impact of globalization on growth and productivity, 
poverty, income distribution and unemployment. Apart from a global analy-
sis in Chapter 1, special emphasis is placed on the regional dimensions of this 
impact. Variations across different regions and subregions in terms of degree 
of integration into the global economy receive particular attention. Separate 
chapters are devoted to Africa, South Asia, East and South-East Asia and 
Latin America. 
1 owe a debt of gratitude to a number of people, notably Gerald Helleiner 
of the University of Toronto for suggesting the topic; Albert Berry of the 
University of Toronto, Ha-Joon Chang of the University of Cambridge and 
Azizur Rahman Khan of the University of California at Riverside for useful 
xi 
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comments on the research outline for the project; and Caroline Pestieau, Réal 
Lavergne and Rohinton Medhora of the IDRC and Professor Sir Hans Singer 
of the lnstitute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex for critical 
comments on selected chapters. Albert Berry's contribution to the volume is 
particularly significant: as well as his work in Chapters 3 and 7, he willingly 
and voluntarily offered constructive comments and suggestions on most of 
the chapters of the volume. For skilful editing of the various chapters, 1 am 
grateful to my wife Praveen Bhalla. Finally, 1 would like to express my 
appreciation to Eshete Hailu of the IDRC and Degol Hailu of the School 
of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) of the University of London for 
research assistance and data compilation. 
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Introduction 
A.S. Bhalla 
Globalization means different things to different people. The term, which is 
used to describe the shape of the world economy today, has become fashion-
able but its meaning and implications, particularly for developing countries, 
are far from clear. The phenomenon is not new since tracte and foreign direct 
investment (FDI), the most commonly used indicators of globalization, grew 
rapidly even in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The geographical 
dispersion of economic activitiy has been taking place for decades if not 
centuries. This volume therefore considers globalization as a continuum, 
with the latest phase (the 1980s and early 1990s) representing the acceleration 
of globalization (see Chapter 1 for a discussion of globalization in a historical 
perspective). 
If globalization is nota new phenomenon, does the current phase of global-
ization differ from the earlier phases? Today's information and communica-
tions technologies have led to an unprecedented growth of tracte in services and 
the replacement ofFordist mass production by flexible production systems or 
specialization (the new organizational innovations as distinct from technolo-
gical ones). These are the two distinguishing features of the present phase. 
Both the economic and the non-economic features of globalization are the 
subject of current debate. A part from the economic features in terms of growth 
in tracte, investment, finance and technology flows, growing uniformity in social 
values resulting in part from the standardization of consumer tastes and loss of 
national sovereignty are noted as some of the non-economic features. 
KEY FEATURES OF GLOBALIZATION 
Below we discuss five economic features and two non-economic features of 
globalization. 
Economie Features 
Growth in Trade 
World tracte has been expanding rapidly since the nineteenth century. As 
Chapter 1 by Streeten notes, world tracte increased 540-fold between 1820 
and 1992. During the pre-First World War period (1870-1913), the annual 
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percentage growth rate of world trade was about 3.5 per cent; this rate 
increased to 5.8 percent during the post-Second World War period (1950-
90). The period between the two World Wars witnessed a dip in the growth 
rate, as could be expected (see Kitson and Michie, 1995, p. 7). Trade as a 
share of GOP is a commonly used indicator of globalization. The growth in 
this ratio in the post-Second World War period has been significant, but as 
Chapter 1 shows it has not been higher than the pre-1914 values. 
What has been new in the postwar period (from the 1950s onwards) is a 
shift in the exports of developing countries from primary products to manu-
facturing, and faster growth of trade in services than in manufacturing. Trade 
in commercial services (transport, travel and other private services, including 
financial, communication, construction, information, professional and perso-
na! services) grew particularly rapidly in the 1980s and early 1990s. Between 
1980 and 1993 trade in these services grew at nearly 8 percent per annum, and 
trade in goods at about 5 percent (see Braga, 1996). 
Growth in trade is presented by the protagonists of globalization as an 
unmixed blessing. However, as Streeten (Chapter 1) and Berry (Chapter 3) 
warn us, laissez faire and free trade can be harmful at the country level. Rapid 
expansion of trade can expose countries to the vagaries of external shocks and 
competition, which may not always be desirable. Furthermore, benefits from 
exports may not be generalized if the elasticity of demand for the exports of 
developing countries is too low. Finally, these benefits may occur only after a 
long period of import-substitution policies, as shown by the record of East 
Asian economies (see Chaptcr 3). 
Growth in FDI and Capital Flows 
Growth in FOI has been much faster than both trade and output growth. 
According to the UNCTAD (1996), between 1980 and 1994 FOI stock to 
GOP doubled, FOI flows to domestic investment doubled and outflows of 
FOI to world GOP nearly doubled. FOI is the largest component of total 
resource flows, exceeding net private loans. 
But the importance of FOI is being overshadowed by the growth of 
portfolio investments. There is a growing shift from longer-term FOI to 
more short-term and volatile investments in stocks and bonds. In the past 
decade the composition and mix of resource flows (that is, FOI, commercial 
bank loans and equities and bonds) have been changing. Global firms require 
finance for production in different country locations, which has increased the 
importance of international finance. Between 1983 and 1993 the value of the 
cross-border assets of banks more than tripled; between 1986 and 1992 global 
foreign exchange transactions also tripled. The stock of global financial assets 
is equivalent to twice the GOP of the OECO countries (see Oman, 1996). lt 
has grown much more rapidly than world trade. 
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Financial globalization has been facilitated by the internationalization of 
production and the growth of global industries, the rapid pace of technolo-
gical change and financial deregulation by numerous countries. New inform-
ation technologies enable an around-the-clock, cross-border flow of financial 
data. The difficulty of controlling the flow of such information has led 
governments to lift restrictions and regulations on international financial 
flows (see Agosin and Tussie, 1993). New technology has also made many 
financial services more tradable across national boundaries. 
The consequence of this integration of financial markets is that trade, 
employment, production and national economic policies in general have 
become more exposed to volatile fluctuations in the financial market. Private 
capital flows generally respond to short-term interest rates and exchange rate 
changes, which may not be conducive to longer-term development. Instability 
in one country (for example the financial crisis in Mexico, Thailand and 
Indonesia and Clinton's failure to obtain fast-track authority from the US 
Congress for future trade negotiations) tend to spill over into neighbouring 
and distant countries alike when financial markets are internationalized. 
Writing on Latin America, Berry (Chapter 3) notes the negative effects of 
short-term flows in terms of macroeconomic instability, slowing down the 
rate of growth and inhibiting export production. 
Global Production and Consumption 
Another feature of globalization is the 'increasing internationalisation of the 
production, distribution and marketing of goods and services' (Harris, 1993). 
This is the result of the globalization of financial and capital markets, 
increased flows of FOI, the rapid diffusion of information by new commun-
ications technologies and the adoption by transnational enterprises of new 
organizational forms of production. Today these enterprises are a major 
driving force behind FOI in manufacturing and services. The trend towards 
downsizing by these enterprises has led to international subcontracting (for 
example IBM is subcontracting software tasks to firms in Bangalore, India), 
which is now part of the new globalization process. Similarly, industries 
linked to information technology lend themselves more easily to globalization 
than other industries (service industries or fonctions such as accounting, 
banking, insurance and so on are more easily relocated to low-wage eco-
nomies). In the case of textiles and garments, the miniaturization of informa-
tion technology (such as computer-aided design and manufacturing - CAO 
and CAM) and instantaneous transmission of design and marketing informa-
tion across the globe, have led to the fragmentation of production and 
distribution worldwide in order to cater to local tastes and preferences. 
The relocation of assembly production offshore, mainly by the 
United States, in the 1960s may be considered as the beginning of the 
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internationalization of production (Grunwald and Flamm, 1985). Developing 
countries with low labour costs became competitive in the production and 
exportation of labour-intensive manufactures. This increasing competition 
from developing countries led the industrialized countries to erect protection 
barriers, move out of the production of labour-intensive goods into the 
production of high-technology goods or shift to skill-intensive industries. 
Traditional labour-intensive, low-skill industries thus moved from the indus-
trialized countries to low-wage developing economies. Assembly production 
is generally concentrated in the electronics and garments industries, both of 
which are labour-intensive with high value-to-weight ratios (which keeps 
transportation costs low). 
The new international division of labour and the fragmentation of produc-
tion (its dispersal across national boundaries) was in part made possible by 
the developments in process technology. These developments made possible 
the fragmentation of tasks (Frôbel et al., 1980). This changing pattern of 
international comparative advantage promoted intra-industry trade among 
transnational firms. 
The globalization of production is increasingly being accompanied by the 
globalization of consumption, thanks to the convergence of consumer tastes 
in certain goods and services. The opening up of most developing economies 
today (see below) and the widespread use of information technology have 
contributed to the homogenization of demand. On the other hand the con-
vergence of consumer tastes across national boundaries may, in some 
instances, conflict with gains from trade. Bhagwati (1994, p. 239, note 12) 
notes that harmonization of consumer tastes (or endowments) 'reduces gains 
from trade by reducing the diversity that produces trade'. 
Global Competition 
Global production, discussed above, is accompanied by growing global com-
petition among the producers and suppliers of goods and services. By provid-
ing information to buyers and sellers worldwide, information technology has 
contributed to the globalization of demand, and as a consequence it has led to 
the globalization of competition (see Oman, 1994). 
The globalization of competition involves both the price and the quality of 
goods and services. Sorne firrns operate in markets where demand changes 
slowly and where price may be a more dominant factor than product diversi-
fication. James (1993, p. 419) raises a pertinent question about whether the 
new forms of global competition will erode the competitive advantage of 
those firms that 'cater primarily to markets in which demand changes relat-
ively slowly and in which price rather than product differentiation is domin-
ant'. Therefore it is useful to distinguish between specialized niche markets 
and standardized product markets. It is mainly in the former that quality is 
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more important than price (Perez, 1994). In high-volume standard products, 
delivery and price are likely to remain important factors. 
Transnational enterprises are under increasing pressure to capture increas-
ing shares of the global market in order to amortise fixed production costs 
over a shorter time period (shorter product cycles). Their responses to global 
competition include downsizing and increasing reliance on overseas suppliers, 
'strategic alliances' to spread the high costs of R&D and product develop-
ment, global advertising, and mergers and acquisitions. These new strategies 
of corporations are intended to create global competitive advantage, reap 
greater economies of scale in new technology development and reduce risk 
and uncertainty about market shares. 
Trade and Investment Liberalization Policies 
The GATT Uruguay Round accord, which bas been ratified by a large 
number of countries, bas led to a successive reduction of average tariffs in 
all OECD countries and many newly industrializing countries. The Uruguay 
Round brought the first multilateral trade negotiations on banking and 
financial services. Industrialized countries, particularly the United States 
and the United Kingdom, are urging the liberalization of trade in banking 
services within a multilateral framework. Presumably this is motivated by the 
two countries' belief that such liberalization will allow them to regain some of 
their lost competitiveness through their superiority in financial services (see 
Akyüz, 1995). The first ministerial meeting of the WTO, held in Singapore in 
December 1996, agreed on tariff reductions on information technology 
goods, and on negotiating the liberalization of telecommunications. Finally, 
the liberalization of FDI and an international investment code are being 
promoted within the framework of the OECD. These areas are also being 
addressed by various regional arrangements such as APEC, NAFTA and the 
EU. 
But the 1980s witnessed an increase in non-tariff barriers in agriculture, 
steel, electronics, footwear and textiles and clothing. Referring to developing 
countries, Agosin and Tussie (1993, p. 1) note that 'while they continued to 
espouse officially a free-trade doctrine, in practice the governments of devel-
oped countries ... continued to make use of non-tariff barriers to manage 
imports from developing countries'. The increasing application by industrial-
ized countries of antidumping measures against developing-country exports 
shows a clear trend in this direction. Although so far this has not retarded 
growth in world trade, in future it is possible that the effect of protectionist 
tendencies on trade will be negative. It is not clear whether this possible 
negative effect will more than offset the positive effect of lowering tariffs. 
The process of globalization bas also been accelerated by economic reforms 
and the liberalization of trade and investment policies, undertaken even by 
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developing countries. Most developing countries have replaced the old 
import-substitution policies by export promotion and openness. Both domes-
tic and international factors account for these changes. Domestic factors 
include the need to increase: exports to overcome a decline in domestic 
demand, to pay for debts and to ease balance of payments constraints. A 
UNU/WIDER study (Helleiner, 1995) shows that growth of exports was a 
major source of industrial growth in the l 980s in many developing countries, 
including Malaysia, Mexico, Turkey and possibly Brazil and Thailand. To the 
extent that developing countries unilaterally adopted these new export-
oriented policies, they could be considered to have induced the process of 
globalization, or at least its most recent phase. This is particularly true of the 
East and South-East Asian (ESEA) economies, which have been export-
oriented for much longer than many South Asian and Latin American eco-
nomies. International factors include the process of globalization already 
underway, which necessitated developing countries to open up their econo-
mies in order to take advantage of exports and inflows of FDI for upgrading 
technology, management and international competitiveness; and pressure 
from bilateral trading partners, aid donors or multilateral agencies such as 
the W orld Bank to introduce structural adjustment programmes, including 
trade, investment and financial liberalization. The UNU/WIDER study 
shows how FDI helped developing-country firms to overcome the problems 
of switching from domestic production to exports. 
But the convergence and harmonization of domestic policies is not yet 
complete. At the first ministerial meeting of the WTO in Singapore in 
December 1996, developing countries (supported by Germany and the UK) 
rejected such harmonization in the case of environmental and labour stand-
ards. These countries fear that 'fair trade' is an excuse for greater protection-
ism by the industrialized countries in sectors where they are unable to 
compete internationally, for example labour-intensive manufactures. 
Non-Economie Features 
Loss of National Sovereignty 
Besides economic transformation, globalization involves changes in the social 
and political structures and status of societies. Politically, globalization 
entails the loss of national sovereignty or, as some like to dramatize, the 
demise of the nation state. It is believed that in the global economy transna-
tional or global corporations are becoming all powerful. The state will play a 
lesser and different role in serving the business interests ofthese corporations. 
Hirst and Thompson (1996, p.176) note that 'the job of nation states is like 
that of municipalities within states heretofore: to provide the infrastructure 
and public goods that business needs at the lowest possible cost'. 
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Admittedly the role of the nation state is changing, and it is less autonom-
ous in the sense that national economic and monetary policies are also 
affected by what happens outside the national boundaries. Global competi-
tion is increasingly being governed by market forces rather than national 
governments. The policy autonomy of governments has been reduced by 
two important factors, namely the unprecedented and rapid cross-border 
flows of information and the global integration of financial markets, dis-
cussed above. While these phenomena reduce the autonomy of all national 
economies, the smaller, more open economies are likely to be worst hit since 
they are more vulnerable to external shocks. Global financial integration can 
improve the scope of the private sector to circumvent the various restrictions 
imposed by national monetary authorities. 
But even as the forces of globalization and international economy are 
eroding the unchallenged power of the state, the opposite tendencies -
nationalism, and ethnie and local loyalties - are also growing, as witnessed 
in Bosnia, in many of the former states of the Soviet Union and in Rwanda 
and Burundi. The experience of the European Union is a further reminder of 
nationalist resistance to the growth of supranational institutions in Europe. 
The implementation of the Maastricht Treaty, the creation of a European 
currency, Central Bank and so on are seen by many EU members as an 
unnecessary encroachment on national sovereignty. The resort to 'subsidiar-
ity' (decisions may be taken at the national and local levels where they can be 
best implemented) in the European Union was intended to pacify these 
nationalist and local sentiments. 
Standardization of Values and Cultures 
The new information technology and advances in telecommunications have 
tended to erode the heterogeneity of national life styles, social and economic 
values and even cultures. This is visible in the standardization of consumer 
tastes in favour of fastfoods (evidenced by the omnipresence of McDonald's 
and Coca Cola) and American films and soap operas. The promotion of 
consumerism through global marketing, the media and advertising is widely 
viewed as an inevitable accompaniment to global competition and the search 
for global markets. 
This phenomenon seems to be confined mainly to the expanding middle 
classes in most countries. With few exceptions, the so-called global 'products' 
are largely beyond the reach of the poor. 
The different dimensions of globalization discussed above may occur 
simultaneously or sequentially. For example export expansion and foreign 
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investment may go together, as shown by the recent experience of China. We 
argue below that the process of globalization is the result of an interplay of 
different forces. 
In the interest of coherence and focus, this volume is confined to the 
economic features of globalization. But this is in no way intended to belittle 
the relevance and importance of the non-economic and cultural implications 
of globalization. In this volume globalization is analysed in terms of export 
expansion, growth in foreign direct investment (FOI), and the trade and 
investment liberalization policies of developing countries. The focus is mainly 
on the impact of globalization on developing as opposed to the industrialized 
countries. To explore variations in the degree to which developing countries 
are becoming globally integrated, a regional rather than a country approach 
is adopted. 
The world of today is a very different place from the world of thirty 
years ago. Institutional and structural responses to the new phase of globa-
lization and management of the global economy according to new rules of 
the game are therefore essential to an equitable sharing of the fruits of 
globalization (see Chapter 1). This volume argues that free and unmanaged 
globalization can cause economic and social hardship by exacerbating pov-
erty and income inequalities (Chapters 1 and 3). 
WHAT DRIVES GLOBALIZATION? 
The seven features and forces of globalization discussed above show both 
complementarity and conflict. Sorne people believe that unilateral liberal-
ization of the developing countries' trade, investment and financial sectors 
has contributed strongly to the acceleration of globalization. In other words, 
the phenomenon is seen as endogenous. To others, the unprecedented pace of 
technological change and the: spread of new information technology and 
telecommunications are exogenous factors that are causing globalization. lt 
is difficult to disentangle the various forces at work, but it may be fair to say 
that both endogenous and exogenous factors have arole to play and that each 
influences the other. 
We believe that globalization is driven by the interaction of trade, FOI, 
technology and policies (that is, liberalization policies, particularly those of 
developing countries). Growth in trade alone induces less 'functional integra-
tion' than FOI and information technology. Since the reduction of tariff 
barriers under succi;ssive GATT rounds, 'tariff jumping' FOI has become 
much less important than FOI that complements trade. This is evident in the 
operations of transnationals in China and the rest of East Asia. Bhagwati 
(1978) argued that export-oriented countries attracted more FOI than others 
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since they catered for larger regional and international markets. A cross-
section study by Balasubramanyam et al., (1996) has provided some empirical 
support for this hypothesis. 
The current phase of globalization is induced by both technological change 
and organizational innovations such as flexible production systems (for a 
discussion of the interrelationship between the two, see James and Bhalla, 
1993). The new information and telecommunications technologies have 
'shrunk' the world and enabled 'functional integration' of transnational 
strategies of production, marketing, outsourcing and so on. The increase in 
intrafirm trade is a measure of this phenomenon. 
While the current phase of globalization is no doubt driven by the liberal-
ization of trade and investment policies, particularly by developing countries, 
it is not always clear whether such liberalization is the cause or the effect of 
globalization. If considered a cause of globalization, then one can argue that 
the process is endogenous to a particular country which can in principle, 
control the pace of globalization. 1 However, sin ce most countries have 
liberalized and opened up their economies, any country following the 
route of import substitution is likely to do so at its own peril (see Chapter 4 
for this argument). Thus some inevitability is attached to the need for 
con vergence. 
THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION 
In this volume, our main concern is to analyse the impact of globalization on 
(1) growth and productivity, (2) poverty and inequality, and (3) employment. 
Poverty and income distribution are given particular attention, since these 
aspects of globalization are relatively neglected in the current literature. The 
bulk of the literature on globalization is concerned with its growth implica-
tions. Yet for both industrial and developing countries alike, the other two 
aspects noted above are important. 
The impact of globalization is generally deemed to be positive since it is 
often assumed that economic liberalization will improve market efficiency and 
accelerate economic growth. We show in this volume that this did not happen 
in the 1980s and early 1990s. There are also costs involved in integrating into 
the global economy, and these need to be taken into account. Globalization 
may intensify existing uneven development within countries, between coun-
tries and between regions, particularly between low-wage assemblers in devel-
oping countries and high-skill producers in industrialized countries. 
The costs of globalization take several forms. At the global level, globaliza-
tion may reinforce or aggravate 'income gaps' and technology gaps between 
nations since not all countries are equally prepared or endowed to take 
advantage ofit. Also, during the late 1970s and early 1980s (before the latest 
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phase of globalization) the initial conditions were not equally favourable for 
all countries. ln industrialized countries the process of globalization, com-
bined with the emergence of an information and knowledge-based society, is 
likely to widen the gap between skilled and unskilled members of society (the 
so-called 'knowledge gap') and exacerbate wage and income inequalities. In 
developing countries too, the existing wage and income inequalities are likely 
to widen (see Chapters 3 and 4). Only the modern industrial sectors of these 
countries are likely to be able to integrate successfully into the global economy. 
The above social costs of globalization need to be weighed against the 
benefits in terms of higher growth and productivity. As several chapters in 
this volume show, the social costs are likely to be significant. However it is not 
clear whether the increase in wage and incomes inequality during the 1980s 
(particularly in South Asia and Latin America) was due to globalization or to 
the domestic policies of developing countries. 
THE STUDIES IN THE VOLUME 
This volume is divided into eight chapters, the first two of which are con-
ceptual analyses. Chapters 3 to 6 deal with the economic situation in four 
different regions (South Asia, East and South-East Asia, Latin America and 
Africa) during the 1980s and 1990s. Chapter 7 provides a regional overview of 
the impact of globalization and information technology on growth, inequality 
and employment. The final chapter outlines specific areas in which further 
research is needed before any definitive conclusions can be drawn about the 
positive or negative impact of globalization and the information highway. 
Chapter 1 examines globalization (defined in terms of an increase in the 
ratio of exports to GDP and foreign investment to GDP) in a historical 
perspective. It shows that while the process accelerated and became more 
multidimensional from the l 980s onwards, it started much earlier. The chap-
ter also examines the particular benefits and costs involved in the process of 
globalization. It identifies the winners and losers and outlines policies that 
may be required to minimize the costs. 
In tracing the influence of information technology on patterns of 
global integration, Chapter 2 examines trade-induced and foreign-
investment-induced mechanisms of technological influence. Three main 
types of information technology (IT) are considered: (1) IT in industrial 
production (computer-aided design, CAD, and computer numerically con-
trolled machine tools, NCMT), (2) telecommunications infrastructure, and 
(3) electronic communications technology (the Internet and electronic mail). 
Based on this information, a taxonomy is developed that combines the forms 
of IT with mechanisms of influence, and identifies firms in developing coun-
tries that are likely to benefit or suffer frotn the process of global integration. 
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The regional chapters (3-6) discuss problems of growth and productivity, 
inequality and employment generation during the process of globalization in 
the 1980s and 1990s. Chapter 7 presents a regional overview, drawing partly 
on the individual regional chapters. It notes that growth has been slow in all 
regions except ESEA, and tha_t poverty and income inequality have increased 
in all regions except ESEA. The employment situation is less clearcut. 
Employment expansion has taken place in ESEA, but there is no clear 
evidence of a net employment increase in Latin America during the 1980s 
and 1990s. In this region and in Africa, employment has shifted towards 
informai employment during periods of severe economic recession. In general 
employment has grown faster in countries where economic growth has been 
rapid. 
The global distribution of jobs between North and South in the era of 
globalization is also briefly discussed in Chapter 7. Despite the growing 
literature, it is still not clear whether the increase in unemployment of the 
unskilled in the North is trade- or technology-determined. Partial explana-
tions attributing the cause to a single factor are misleading. There is no 
clearcut evidence that either trade or technology is necessarily job-destroying. 
The experience of East and South-East Asia shows that rapid absorption of 
information technology can increase employment as well as competitiveness 
in conditions of rapid economic growth. Thus the problem of unskilled 
unemployment in the North may be due more to slow growth and lack of 
demand than to trade or technology. 
Policy and appropriate international action to manage globalization are 
discussed in Chapters 3-7. Depending on the circumstances, managed trade 
may be more beneficial to countries than free trade. Chapter 3, on Latin 
America, shows that complete trade liberalization, accompanied by over-
valued currencies (due to surges of capital inflows) can be harmful to small 
and medium firms, which employ a substantial proportion of the working 
population. Careful management of trade and capital flows is therefore neces-
sary to keep at bay the threats arising from glo balization. 
Chapters 4 and 5 underline the fact that appropriate incentive systems, 
infrastructure and human capital are vital to beneficial integration into the 
global economy. The East Asian experience shows that these important 
ingredients, plus good governance, have been lacking in other regions, parti-
cularly South Asia and Africa. 
Finally, Chapter 8 outlines areas for further research and policy analysis on 
the impact that globalization and information technology are having on 
growth, employment and income distribution. First, further work is needed 
on why globalization is not leading to faster growth in industrial and most 
developing countries, with the exception of those in East and South-East 
Asia. Second, what is the precise impact of globalization on inequality 
between nations and within nations? Third, the impact of globalization on 
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the non-trading sectors and on small and medium-size enterprises needs to be 
examined empiricaily. For example, what is the extent of the international 
competitiveness of these enterprises? What kinds of small enterprise have 
been most vulnerable to import surges under globalization during the 1980s 
and 1990s. Fourth, the relationship between globalization and the nature and 
location of innovations needs serious examination. For example is the global-
ization of production being accompanied by the globalization of technology? 
Finally, the part played by government in globalization is another fruitful 
area for further research. 
Note 
1. This point is due to Albert Berry of the University of Toronto. 
1 Globalization: Threat or 
Salvation? 
Paul Streeten 1 
Globalization is transforming trade, finance, employment, migration, tech-
nology, communications, the environment, social systems, ways of living, 
cultures and patterns of governance. The growth of technology and global-
ization mutually reinforce each other. Much of the process of globalization is 
historically not unprecedented, but the technology, the setting and certain 
features are new. International interdependence is growing, and to some 
extent, and partially, so is international integration. But it is accompanied 
by the disintegration and fragmentation of other parts. Is globalization a 
threat to humanity, or its salvation? Markets have to be embedded in a 
framework that enables their productive energies to flourish and to be used 
for socially and ecologically sustainable development. The reduced power of 
national governments combined with the spread of worldwide free markets 
and technological innovation without a corresponding authority to regulate 
them and hold them accountable has contributed to the marginalization of 
large regions and groups of people. Unemployment, poverty, inequality and 
alienation are increasing, partly (though not solely) as a result of this process. 
Crime, drugs, terrorism, violence, civil wars, diseases and environmental 
destruction are becoming globalized. Under international competition, cap-
ital, technology and advanced skills dominate the more readily dispensable 
factors: unskilled labour and the environment. Cost reductions are carried out 
and labour and nature suffer. 
This chapter analyses the implications of these trends for the international 
movement of ideas, technology, firms (small and large, national and multi-
national, public and private), money and people. The first section deals 
with the notions of integration and interdependence between nations. It 
briefly discusses the main aspects of globalization, namely trade, global 
financial flows, technology and transnationals, and the international conver-
gence of real wages. The second section is concerned with the beneficial and 
harmful aspects of globalization. It examines the impact of globalization on 
growth and productivity, unemployment, income distribution, technology 
and institutions. The third section deals with the role of government in the 
era of globalization. One generally expects the scope of government to be 
diminished as globalization proceeds. Instead 1 argue that globalization and 
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markets imply not less government but more. The fourth section warns 
against the dangers of laissez faire, and shows that adjustments to free trade 
and globalization are costly and may not always be desirable. The final 
section outlines the implications of globalization for research and analysis 
and for international action. 
INTEGRATION AND INTERDEPENDENCE 
We read everywhere that international integration is proceeding rapidly as the 
result of the increased flow of trade, capital, money, direct investment, 
technology, people, information and ideas across national boundaries. Inter-
national integration implies the adoption of policies by separate countries as 
if they were a single political unit. Measurement of the degree of integration is 
often based on whether interest rates, share prices or the prices of goods are 
the same in different national markets. Integration, however, can be a term 
loaded with positive connotations. Although there may be some objections to 
the unwanted imposition of uniformity, and although the disintegration of a 
pernicious system may be desirable, it is generally regarded as improper to 
advocate 'disintegration'. But it is possible for integration to be defined either 
with or without such value premises. The value premise can be that all 
members of the integrated area should be treated as equals, either with respect 
to certain opportunities, such as access to the law, jobs, trade, credit, capital 
flows and migration, or with respect to certain achievements, such as a 
minimum standard of life, of education and health services. ln this sense of 
integration, common taxation and social services are implied. If we omit this 
particular value premise and define integration as equal economic opportun-
ities, however unequal the initial endowment of members of the integrated 
area, the world was more integrated at the end of the nineteenth century than 
it is today.2 Although tariff barriers in countries other than the UK were 
higher then (20-40 percent compared with 5 percent in 1990), non-tariff 
barriers were much lower; capital and money movements were freer under the 
gold standard (that is, without the deterrent of variable exchange rates); and 
the movement of people was much freer; passports were rarely needed and 
citizenship was granted easily. Today, international migration is strictly con-
trolled. Between 1881 and 1890 the average annual rate of immigration into 
the United States was 9.2 per 1000 of the US population, reaching over 10 per 
1000 in the first decade of this century. Between 1981 and 1990 the average 
annual rate of immigration was 3.1 per 1000 of the US population (see US, 
1991, pp. 9, 54). 
The four components of an integrated international system to promote 
development are today fragmented (Streeten, 1989). These are (1) the genera-
tion of current account surpluses by the centre; (2) the financial institutions 
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that convert these surpluses into loans or investments; (3) the production and 
sale ofproducer goods and up-to-date technology; and (4) the military power 
to keep peace and enforce contracts. Before 1914 these came under the 
jurisdiction of the dominant power, Great Britain. Between the wars there 
was no international order, as Britain was no longer able and the United 
States not yet willing to take responsibility. For quarter of a century after the 
Second World War they were exercised and coordinated by the United States. 
But today we live in a schizophrenic, fragmented world, without coordina-
tion. Non-tariff barriers to trade, imposed by the OECD countries, and 
restrictions on international migration have prevented fuller global integra-
tion. The result has been deflation, unemployment and slow or negative 
growth in many countries of the South. 
Between 1870 and 1914 the world was integrated unwittingly. By imposing 
fewer objectives on government policy (for example, full employment, eco-
nomic growth, price stability and so on), and by accepting what in retrospect 
appear to be irrational constraints - such as the Gold Standard, and conse-
quently fixed exchange rates, the Jack of freedom to pursue expansionist 
monetary policies, and the constraint of balanced budgets - different coun-
tries were integrated into a single world economy dominated by one power, 
Great Britain. Domestic policies were severely constrained by the need to 
adhere to the gold standard. Integration, however, was no guarantee ofpeace. 
lt did not prevent the First World War. Today the constraints on national 
policies consist in the activities of multinational companies ànd banks. 
Later, many objectives of government policy were added to the nightwatch-
man state's duty to maintain law and order: among them full employment, 
economic growth, price stability, wage maintenance, reduced inequality in 
income distribution, regional balance, protection of the natural environment, 
greater opportunities for women and minorities and so on. The rejection of 
constraints on policy such as fixed exchange rates, and limits on discretionary 
monetary and fiscal policies, led to the greater integration of national eco-
nomies by permitting policies for full employment and the welfare state; but 
at the same time they led to international disintegration. Such disintegration 
was, however, entirely consistent with a high degree of international inter-
dependence. For interdependence exists when one country, by unilateral 
action, can inflict harm on other countries. Competitive protectionism, deva-
luation, deflation and pollution of the air and sea beyond national boundaries 
are instances. A nuclear war would be the ultimate form of interdependence 
resulting from international disintegration. Today global market forces can 
lead to conflict between states, which contributes to international disintegra-
tion and weakens governance. 
Interdependence is measured by the cost of severing the relationship. The 
higher the cost to one country, the greater the degree of dependence of that 
country. If a small country benefits more from the international division of 
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labour than a large country, its dependence is greater. If severing economic 
links results in high costs being incurred by both partners to the transaction, 
there is interdependence. 
It is quite possible to have extensive and rapidly growing international 
relations without a high degree of interdependence. This is the case if the 
relations can be aba.ndoned at low cost. There could, for example, be a large 
and rapidly growing trade in slightly different models ofmotor car, produced 
at similar costs, but there would be little deprivation or loss if buyers had to 
substitute home-produced models for imported ones. The index of inter-
dependence would be consumer and producer surpluses, not the volume, 
value or rate of growth of international trade. 
There is a different sense of 'interdependence', whereby 'dependence' 
merely means 'influenced by', and there are neither great benefits from main-
taining nor costs from severing the relationship. In this attenuated sense there 
can be interdependence even though the cost of cutting off relations is low or 
even negative. But this is not a useful sense for our purposes. 
Trade 
International trade is taken to be an indicator ofinterdependence, and its high 
and, with some interruptions, rapidly growing values are accepted as evid-
ence. Between 1820 and 1992 the world population increased fivefold, income 
per head eightfold, world income fortyfold and world trade 540-fold (Maddi-
son, 1995; Streeten, 1989; Wade, 1996b). But three important qualifications 
are necessary 
First, if we consider the ratio of international trade to national income, the 
rapid growth of the postwar decades can be seen as a return to pre-1914 
values after the interruptions of two world wars, the Great Depression and 
high protection. The share of world exports in world GDP rose from 6 per 
cent in 1950 to 16 per cent in 1992. For the industrial countries, the propor-
tion increased from 12 per cent in 1973 to 17 per cent in 1992. For 16 major 
industrial countries the share of exports in GDP rose from 18.2 per cent in 
1900 to 21.2 percent in 1913 (Bairoch, 1993; Maizels, 1963; Nayyar, 1995). 
This was largely the result of a dramatic reduction in transport costs and the 
ratios were very similar for particular countries.3 
The total ratios of trade to GDP are, however, misleading. Over the 
postwar decades the share of services, including government services, in 
GDP increased enormously. Many of these are, or were until recently, not 
tractable. If we were to take the ratio of international trade to the production 
of goods only, it would show a substantial increase not only compared with 
the interwar period, but also compared with the period before 1913. 
The second qualification to the notion that unprecedented globalization is 
now taking place is that the developing countries, and the groups within these 
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countries that have participated in the benefits from the growing trade (and 
also from foreign investment, which is highly concentrated among East Asia, 
Brazil, Mexico and now China) have been few, not more than a dozen, 
though their number bas grown. The large, poor masses of the Indian sub-
continent and Sub-Saharan Africa have (at least so far) not participated 
substantially in the benefits to be had from the growth of international 
trade and investment. In fact the bulk of the international flow of goods, 
services, direct investment and finance is between North America, Europe 
and Japan. The least developed countries accounted for only 0.1 per cent of 
total global investment inflows and for 0.7 percent ofinflows to all develop-
ing countries. Africa in particular bas been almost completely bypassed 
(OECD, 1992, p. 233). 
The third qualification is the abovementioned fact that it is not the volume, 
value or rate of growth of trade that should be accepted as an indicator of 
economic interdependence, but the damage that would be done by its 
elimination, that is, consumer and producer surpluses. These are difficult to 
measure. But we know that much trade is conducted in only slightly 
differentiated goods, which could readily be replaced by similar domestic 
products without great loss to buyers or great increases in costs. 
On the other band a small and slowly growing volume of trade could be of 
great importance and lead to substantial losses if it were eut off. Like a link in 
a bicycle chain, it could, though small itself, make a big difference to the 
working of the whole system. The United States, for example, depends heavily 
on quite small imports of manganese, tin and chromium. Before the First 
World War trade largely took the form of an exchange between raw materials 
and manufactured products, for which consumer and producer surpluses are 
large. Today the bulk of trade is intra-industry or even intrafirm trade in 
manufactured products, for which these surpluses are much smaller. 
The process of globalization, according to some definitions, means opening 
up to trade or liberalization. ln the past decade such liberalization bas mainly 
been followed by the ex-socialist countries, which have turned away from 
central planning in order to link up with the world economy, and by the 
developing countries, which have replaced import-substituting industrializa-
tion with export orientation accompanied by a partial dismantling of the 
state. This move bas not been entirely due to free choice, but partly a response 
to global forces and pressure by the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund in connection with their stabilization and structural adjust-
ment programmes. Additional influences have been the rich countries' words 
and doctrines of state minimalism, and the hope of benefiting from global 
gains. 
Sorne OECD countries, on the other band, have put up additional non-
tariff barriers, such as so-called voluntary export restraints, procedural pro-
tection, most notably in the form of antidumping actions, and specific 
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subsidies to exports of goods and services competing with imports. The 
Multifibre Arrangement and the Common Agricultural Policy of the Eur-
opean Union are blatant protectionist devices. Other barriers have been 
raised against steel, electronics and footwear. 
Trade is of course just one (and not the most important) of the many 
manifestations of economic interdependence, including the flow of factors 
of production, capital, technology, various types of labour and foreign 
exchange across frontiers. These factors are discussed below. 
Global Financial Flows 
Global financial flows have increased enormously, and on an average day 
they now amount to more than $1 trillion. This represents a ratio of foreign 
exchange dealings to world trade ofnearly 70:1 and equals the world's total 
official gold and foreign exchange reserves. In 1971 about 90 per cent of all 
foreign exchange transactions were to finance trade and long-term invest-
ment, and only 10 per cent were speculative. Today these percentages are 
reversed: well over 90 per cent of all transactions are speculative (Eatwell, 
1995, p. 277). The enormous growth ofthese flows is the result of the collapse 
in 1973 of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates combined with 
the deregulation and liberalization of capital flows, and the opportunities this 
has provided for speculation on variable exchange rates. 
The 24-hour international capital market has given rise to the fear that the 
international financial system is unstable. But the recent difficulties point to 
the strength, rather than the weakness, of the international system. The effects 
of the different crises the Latin American debt crisis, the US savings-
and-loan fiasco, the BCCI scandai, Mexico, Barings, Daiwa - did not spread 
internationally. Many individuals were hurt, including taxpayers, but these 
were mainly residents of the areas concerned and the rest of the world was 
sheltered. The system did not break down, but of course this does not mean 
that it cannot do so in the future. 
The globalization of financial flows, as of trade, has been partial: there 
are hardly any flows to low-income countries; and while private flows to 
middle-income developing countries have increased enormously, official 
development assistance has stagnated (Table 1.1). The bulk of the flows is 
between OECD countries; and there is some foreign investment in a selected 
group of developing countries, mostly in Latin America, East Asia and 
China. These intra-OECD flows contradict neoclassical theory, according to 
which capital should flow from capital-abundant to capital-scarce countries. 
In fact the United States, one of the richest of the capital-rich countries, has 
attracted the most capital. And among developing countries it is those 
with substantial human capital and good government policies that attract 
financial capital. 
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Table 1.1 Long-term financial flows to developing 
countries ($ billions) 
1987 1994 
Long-term aggregate net 
resource flows 68.5 227.3 
Private flows 25.1 172.9 
ofwhich: 
net private loans 9.8 55.6 
foreign direct investment 14.6 77.9 
portfolio equity investment 0.8 39.5 
Official development assistance 43.4 54.4 
ofwhich: 
official grants 16.9 30.5 
net official loans 26.4 23.9 
Source: World Bank (1995b) p. 214. 
19 
In the light ofthis large increase in financial flows, it is a puzzle to find that, 
in most countries, domestic savings and investment are more closely aligned 
than they were before 1914. This means that net flows are much smaller 
than gross flows. As we have seen, many explanations have been offered for 
this paradox, among them the possible obstacles that fluctuating exchange 
rates impose on long-term real investment. As we shall discuss below, dereg-
ulation and liberalization have not accelerated investment or growth, nor have 
they resulted in higher levels of employment, better income distribution or 
lower borrowing costs. They have also increased the volatility of asset prices. 
While they have brought some benefits, they have also led to greater risks for 
investors and the financial system. In the l 980s the task of stabilizing against 
high inflation, the debt crisis and structural adjustment preoccupied many 
governments. In the 1990s the problems associated with coping with rapid 
swings in capital flows have become more pressing, highlighted by Mexico's 
financial crisis in 1995. Suddenly government was called upon to bail out 
financiers who had previously preached the virtues offree markets. This raises 
the question ofwhether a return to control of capital markets is indicated. 
There is a need for the reregulation and harrnonization of legislation. The 
more free-enterprise-oriented a country is, the greater the need for official 
supervision. Deregulation has resulted in higher and Jess stable interest rates, 
Jess stable exchange rates, boom and slump in property prices, and gambling 
on asset values, interest and exchange rates. The danger of business failure is 
high. Ifwe wish not to have to bail out financial institutions, deregulation has 
to be supported by close and well-coordinated supervision. 
The Bretton Woods system was based on the premise that currency con-
vertibility, multilateral trade and stable exchange rates require constraints on 
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international capital mobility. Financial liberalization, carried too far, can 
damage the more important trade liberalization. For example when a country 
ought to devalue because its prices have risen more than foreign prices, it may 
be unable to do so because of speculative short-term capital inflows. Or 
changes in capital flows can produce large swings in the exchange rate, 
which are detrimental to trade. 
Technology 
In addition to economic interdependence (trade, finance, direct investment) 
technological impulses are being rapidly propagated throughout the world. 
When the global satellite communications system was established, instanta-
neous communication from any part of the world to any other became 
possible. Advances in technology such as the jet engine, telex, satellite TV, 
container ships, super tankers, super ore carriers and other technical progress 
in transport, travel and, above all, communication and information have 
shrunk the world. By reducing the cost of communication, technology has 
helped to globalize production and finance. In turn globalization has stimu-
lated technological progress by intensifying competition and competition has 
forced the introduction of new technology. Globalization has spread its 
results widely through foreign direct investment. The barriers erected by 
geography, if not eradicated, certainly matter less. And the interaction of 
technology and globalization has presented new problems. 
We hear much of the creation of a borderless world and the end of the 
nation state. It is true that satellites and the Internet have greatly increased 
the speed at which the communication of cultural and informational impulses 
is propagated throughout the globe. But here again, as in trade and invest-
ment, vast areas in the poor South are either being left out (subsistence 
farmers are not affected by global forces) or are suffering the backwash effects 
of globalization (for more details on information technology, see Chapters 2 
and 3). 
Transnationals 
Transnational corporations are said to be one of the main driving forces of 
globalization. Whereas at the end of the nineteenth century the main agents 
on the international scene were states, dominated by Britain until 1913 and by 
the United States for a quarter of a century after the Second World War, 
today transnational corporations and international banks have to some 
extent replaced states as the main agents. The world's 37 000 transnational 
corporations and their 20 0000 affiliates control 75 per cent of world trade. 
One-third of this trade is intrafirm (UNRISD, 1995, p. 27). The principle 
guiding their action is profit. At the same time, very few of these firms are 
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genuinely transnational or even international (Shell and Unilever are excep-
tions in that they are genuinely duo-national: British and Dutch). Most of the 
other companies that operate in many countries bear the stamp of the country 
of their headquarters. As we have seen, the prediction that sovereignty would 
be held at bay and that the nation state, confronted with ever larger and more 
powerful transnationals, would wither away, was, like the reports of Mark 
Twain's death, somewhat exaggerated. Many countries have successfully 
dealt with, regulated and taxed these firms. 
Transnationals are more domesticated than some observers suggest. Most 
of them hold most of their assets and have most of their employees in their 
home country and conduct the bulk of their R&D there. This is confirmed by 
the fact that in the second half of the l 980s 89 per cent of US patents taken 
out by 600 of the world's largest firms listed the inventor as a resident of the 
home base (Wade, 1996b). Hence strategic decisions and innovations corne 
from the home country. This may, however, be replaced by a wider global 
spread of R&D as a result of telematics, the convergence of computer, 
communication and control technology. 
Convergence of Real Wages 
The convergence of real wages in different countries is another aspect 
of globalization (see Williamson, 1995). Since the 1950s the gap between 
US and European wages has shrunk markedly. Similarly, in the second half 
of the nineteenth century European wages caught up with US ones. In 
Europe, some countries closed the gap with Britain, then the Continent's 
leader. Williamson (1996b) argues that economic integration (rather than, 
say, better education in the low-wage countries) was the main cause of this 
narrowing. As a result of the growth of international trade the prices of 
traded goods became more alike in different countries, and the relative prices 
of the abundant factors of production in each country rose (land in the 
United States, labour in Europe), while those of the relatively scarce factors 
fell (labour in the United States, land in Europe). A recent study by O'Rourke 
et al. (1996) confirms this. Emigration from Europe to the United States also 
helps to explain the rise in wages in Europe and their containment in the 
United States. 
Global Mobility 
Views differ on the benefits and costs of the global mobility of items such as 
trade, finance, technology, ideas and labour. In a much-quoted passage, 
Keynes wrote 'ldeas, knowledge, art, hospitality, travel - these are 
things which should of their nature be international. But let goods be home-
spun whenever it is reasonably and conveniently possible; and, above all, 
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let finance be primarily national' (Keynes, 1933; Collected Writings of 
John Maynard Keynes, 1982, p. 237). Today it is more fashionable to deplore 
'cultural imperialism' or the homogenization of television and the mass 
media and the global spread of mass culture, and to attempt to confine culture 
to local knowledge, activities and products, while advocating free trade 
in goods and services. Neoliberals advocate laissez faire but not the 
free movement of people, or laissez passer, perhaps because they fear it 
will accelerate population growth in low-income, emigration-oriented 
countries and therefore inhibit an increase in their welfare, or that it will 
interfere with economic objectives (especially the level and distribution of 
income), cultural values, social stability or security in countries receiving 
migrants. 
UNEVEN BENEFITS AND COSTS OF GLOBALIZATION 
Globalization has helped to create undreamed of opportunities for some 
people, groups and countries. Human indicators such as literacy, school 
enrolment, infant mortality and life expectancy have enormously improved 
in the last few decades. ln low- and middle-income countries life expectancy 
increased from 46 years in 1960 to 63 years in 1990; in the same period infant 
mortality per 1000 live births fell from 149 to 71; adult literacy rates rose from 
46 to 65 percent; and real GDP per head rose from $950 to $2170 (UNDP, 
1993, p. 143). The Cold War has ended and the prospect of peaceful settle-
ment of old disputes has improved from West Asia to South Africa and 
N orthern Ireland. Democracy has spread throughout the world and replaced 
autocratie regimes. Globalization has been particularly good for Asia, for the 
global growth of production, for profits and for the owners of capital and 
sophisticated skills (Table 1.2). 
At the same time the economic restructuring, liberalization, technological 
change and tierce competition - in both the goods market and the labour 
market - that went with globalization have contributed to increased impov-
erishment, inequality, work insecurity, a weakening of institutions and social 
support systems, and the erosion of established identities and values. Liberal-
ization and reduced agricultural protection, by reducing agricultural supplies, 
have raised the price of food (compared with what it would otherwise have 
been), and food-importing countries have suffered as a result. Globalization 
has been bad for most of Africa, and in many parts of the world for employ-
ment (see the later section on unemployment), for those without assets or with 
rigidly fixed, unadaptable skills. International competition for markets and 
jobs has forced governments to reduce taxation and with it the social services 
that had protected the poor, 4 and eut th ose public services and regulations that 
had protected the environment. Between 1972 and 1986, social expenditure 
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Table 1.2 Balance sheet of globalization (rough approximations) 
Goodfor 
Japan, Europe, North America 
East and South-East Asia 
Output 
People with assets 
Profits 
People with high skills 
The educated 











Sellers of technologically 
sophisticated products 
Bad/or 
Many developing countries 
Africa (exceptions: Botswana, 
Mauritius) 
Employment 
People without assets 
Wages 












Sellers ofprimary and standard 
manufactured products 
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as a proportion of total government expenditure for developing countries as a 
whole declined from 35 per cent to 29 per cent, and for industrial market 
economies, from 58 per cent to 56 per cent (see World Bank, 1988). ln the 
Philippines, between 1980 and 1993 health expenditure fell from 4. 5 per cent 
to 3.0 percent, and in Kenya from 7.8 percent to 5.4 percent (World Bank, 
l 995a). In Latin America, despite the recovery of social expenditure in 1991, 
per capita expenditure on health and education services was lower than in 
1980-81 (see IDB, 1996, p. 47). Globalization has also forced governments 
and firms to 'downsize', 'restructure' and 'reengineer' and has made necessary 
ail kinds of steps to ensure that the cost of labour is kept low. 5 Just as at the 
height of the welfare state in the quarter century after the Second World War, 
when it was thought that government could steer the economy towards full 
employment, national integration has been accompanied by international 
disintegration. Similarly, after the early l 970s (partial) international integra-
tion led to national disintegration. 
The share of developing countries in the global distribution of wealth has 
shrunk. UNDP data on the global distribution of wealth between industrial 
cÔuntries, developing countries and the former USSR and Eastern Europe 
(Table 1.3) show that wealth distribution has become more unequal. Between 
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Table 1.3 Global distribution ofwealth, 1960-94 (percentages) 
Indus trial Developing Former USSR & 
countries countries Eastern Europe 
1960 67.3 19.8 12.9 
1970 72.2 17.1 10.7 
1980 70.7 20.6 8.7 
1989 76.3 20.6 3.1 
1994 78.7 18.0 3.3 
Source: UNDP data base. 
1960 and 1994 the share of developing countries, and particularly that of the 
former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, shrank while that of 
Western industrial countries increased. 
In the poor countries, poverty, malnutrition and disease have increased, 
despite improvements in living conditions. Nearly one third of the popula-
tions of developing countries and more than one half of Africans live in 
absolute poverty. In 1992 six million children aged five or Jess died of 
pneumonia or diarrhoea; 23 million people are classified as refugees. The 
dissolution of the extended-family system, together with the increasing reli-
ance on market forces and the dismantling of state institutions, has left man y 
victims of the competitive struggle stranded and helpless. 
Globalization and the economic progress that goes with it have proceeded 
unevenly in time and in space. The rise in income per head has differed widely 
between countries and regions, so that income gaps have widened. Income 
disparities between rich and poor nations have doubled over the last thirty 
years. 
It does not follow that developing countries would have been better off if 
they had closed themselves off from the process of globalization and become 
autarkic. As Joan Robinson once said, there is only one thing that is worse 
than being exploited by capitalists, and that is not being exploited by them. 
The same goes for participation in globalization. Those with skills and assets 
open up to globalization, those without them get left behind. But there are 
better options than to allow these people to become the victims of the blind 
forces of globalization. Measures such as social safety nets, guaranteed 
employment schemes and training provisions to cushion poor people in 
low-income countries against being battered by these forces should be built 
into the system of international relations. This is necessary not only for 
political stability, but also for reasons of common humanity. 
Globalization can be considered in relation to its impact on various object-
ives. In the following section I shall analyse its impact on (1) growth and 
productivity, (2) employment and skills, (3) wages and inequality of income 
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and wealth (both within and between countries), and (4) technological and 
institutional innovations. 
Growth and Productivity 
Different countries have different growth rates with respect to income, pro-
ductivity and living standards. It is widely agreed that the rule of law and 
clearly defined property rights, large savings and investment in physical and 
human capital, good education, flexible labour markets, good macroeco-
nomic policies aimed at labour-intensive growth, and high levels of techno-
logy, management and infrastructure have important roles to play. Sorne 
would add the need to redistribute productive assets (particularly land) in 
countries where they are very unequally distributed. In brief, certain legal and 
political institutions and certain policies are more conducive to growth than 
others. Whether the openness of an economy to trade and investment is a 
cause of high growth and good export performance, or a consequence of 
them, or both, is controversial, but these factors are clearly linked. Most 
economists say that openness is an important cause of growth. 
Growing international competition is not solely the result of fewer barriers 
to trade. Another important cause is the accelerated pace of invention 
and innovation. As the ratio of GNP spent by high-income countries on 
R&D has risen from 2 percent to 3 percent and higher, social and techno-
logical change has accelerated in the last few decades. Today the time-lag 
between innovative ideas, inventions, engineering applications and commer-
cial exploitation is much shorter than it used to be. The time lag between the 
invention of the steam engine and the railway age, and between the invention 
of the internai combustion engine and the economic, social and cultural (not 
to mention sexual) revolution wrought by the motor car was measured in 
generations; while that between the invention of television, the microchip, the 
jet engine and even the zip fastener and their engineering and commercial 
application, with all the intellectual and cultural transformations that came in 
their train, can be measured in years. The application ofDNA to bioengineer-
ing took just ten years from the discovery of its structure. Faraday's law of 
electromagnetic induction was announced in the late nineteenth century, and 
gave birth to the first electric motor about forty years later. In contrast 
Bardeen and Brittain announced the laws governing semiconduction in the 
la te 1940s, and transistor application followed just five years la ter. The lag in 
the application of laser technology was even shorter. As Gore Vidal (1992) 
wrote, 'Thanks to modern technology ... history now cornes equipped with a 
fast-forward button.'6 
If the majority of economists are right, liberalization should lead to higher 
growth rates and more rapid improvements in living standards. Yet the 
evidence for this is slender if not absent. The annual per capita growth rate 
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of GDP in East and South-East Asia was 6-8 percent between 1986 and 1993; 
in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa in the same period it was only 
0.36--0.37 percent. Growth in these areas remained elusive. The exceptionally 
good performers were Chile and Costa Rica in Latin America, and Mauritius 
and Botswana in Africa. Comparing the annual growth rates of per capita 
GNP in the two periods 1965-80 and 1980-93, for all developing countries the 
rates were 4.6 percent and 4 percent and for the OECD countries 3.9 percent 
and 1.6 percent respectively (UNDP, 1995; World Bank, 1995a). Table 1.4 
shows the growth rates enjoyed by a number of countries in the period 
1972-81and1982-91 compared with the 1960-71 average. 
Even if it were true that liberalization leads to higher growth, one would 
have to examine the policies in the preceding period that laid the basis for the 
subsequent success. All the successful liberalizers pursued selective trade and 
industrial policies, laying the foundations for their subsequent good perform-
ance. 
There is, however, a puzzle. The introduction of information technology 
and the growth of new and more convenient services, particularly as a result 
of the computer revolution, have not shown up in correspondingly higher 
growth figures. If the figures are correct, they suggest growing inequality, as 
the benefits to the winners, some of them substantial, have been partly at the 
expense of the losers. 
Table 1.4 Growth rate of per capita GDP compared with 
the 1960-71 average 
1972--81 1982-91 
All countries (57) 
Decade ratio higher 18 10 
Decade ratio lower 39 47 
Ail non-oil exporting countries ( 48) 
Decade ratio higher 11 7 
Decade ratio lower 37 41 
OECD countries (20) 
Decade ratio higher 1 2 
Decade ratio lower 19 18 
Latin America (10) 
Decade ratio higher 4 1 
Decade ratio lower 6 9 
East and South-East Asia (7) 
Decade ratio higher 5 3 
Decade ratio lower 2 4 
Sources: Eatwell (1996); Felix (1995); World Bank, 
World Tables. 
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Many economists, including a panel of economists reporting to the US 
Congress,7 have recently reminded us that the official figures overstate infla-
tion and understate economic growth. Quality improvements (such as radial 
car tyres that are safer and last longer than the old ones), new products that 
did not exist 30 years ago (such as microwave ovens), new features of old 
products (such as colour TV with 50 channels and VCRs) and new services 
(such as the installation of more automatic teller machines in banks in out-
lying neighbourhoods) are not fully accounted for. Improvements in services 
are difficult to measure. Many non-market factors, for example a healthier 
environment, do not figure at ail. Computers have contributed to an improved 
quality of life, greater convenience and higher consumption, but not to 
markedly higher productivity. If they do eventually lead to higher productiv-
ity, the time span is likely to be long: we shall have to wait and see whether the 
computer skills acquired by the children of today will show up in higher 
productivity when they join the workforce. Absorbing the innovations to 
which the computer gives rise will also require many changes in work practices 
and behaviour. Another explanation is that computers represent only 2 per 
cent of US capital stock, and less in other OECD countries, whereas railways 
in their heyday represented more than 12 percent (Uchitelle, 1996). 
Unemployment 
Globalization requires firms to compete internationally, and international 
competition has reinforced globalization. Cost reductions, greater efficiency 
and higher incarnes have been achieved at the expense of growing uncertainty, 
unemployment and inequality. Globalization has reduced the ability of 
national govemments both to maintain full employment and to look after 
the victims of the competitive struggle. 
Persistent high unemployment in most OECD countries has been a leading 
policy issue in the last two decades. At first it was thought that the oil price 
rises in the l 970s and the deflationary policies pursued in response to them 
were the cause of the deterioration in employment. But as these high unem-
ployment levels persisted into the 1990s and as oil prices and other commod-
ity prices have fallen since 1986, this explanation has had to give way to 
others. Overvaluation of some exchange rates has contributed to high unem-
ployment. Sorne of the high unemployment has been attributed to globaliza-
tion and to the new information and communication technologies. Kurt 
Vonnegut, in his nove! Player Piano, describes a future nightmare society in 
which the divine right of machines, efficiency and organization has tri-
umphed. The large underclass of unemployed are handed plenty of goodies 
by a small group of affluent managers, but they lack what John Rawls regards 
as 'perhaps the most important primary good' - self-respect. Vonnegut's 
unemployed eventually revoit. 
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The concern in the advanced countries has become jobless growth. In fact 
economic growth, whether measured in terrns of overall productivity or 
productivity in manufacturing, has been considerably slower since 1981 
than in the 1960s, when growth was not accompanied by unemployment. 
Since the growth of productivity has been less than the growth of demand, 
one would have expected jobs to be created rather than destroyed (Eatwell, 
1995). 
There has been a slowing down of productivity growth and a growth of 
unemployment. An increase in the output of goods accompanied by more 
leisure, is to be welcomed. It is what we mean by saying productivity for 
worker has increased. While some authors today regard employment as a 
basic need, Sidney Webb, cofounder of the Fabian Society and the London 
School of Economies, more properly regarded leisure as a basic need. Mono-
tonous, dirty, hard or dangerous work is a burden, nota blessing. Increases in 
output per worker are to be welcomed. But this is only so as long as demand 
and/or output grow rapidly enough to absorb all those seeking work. There is 
no reason in theory why this should not be so. Although new technology 
displaces workers, it also lowers costs and therefore lowers prices or raises 
money wages or profits. In each case the demand for goods and services, and 
therefore for labour, is increased, though it will take time to retrain and 
relocate the labour. 
Alternatively the productivity gain can take the form of leisure or other 
satisfying activities. The reduced work load can be spread evenly, with equa!ly 
distributed rises in incomes. Various imaginative proposais have been made 
about flexible worktime, sabbaticals for workers, allocating time to high-tech 
self-provisioning, freeing time to do the things one really wants to do and so 
on. The main point is that the time- and labour-saving benefits of the new 
technologies should accrue to everyone, and not be maldistributed between an 
overworked group of workers and the unwanted unemployed. 
These two conditions, or at least the first, were met in the Keynesian golden 
age after the Second World War. But if, as has been the case in the OECD 
countries in the last decade, output grows insufficiently fast to generate 
employment for the whole workforce, and if the workload is unevenly dis-
tributed, with part of the workforce working hard and long hours while the 
rest are unemployed, we find ourselves in a society in which John Kenneth 
Galbraith's private affluence amid public squalor is joined by private afflu-
ence amid private squalor. Anyone walking through the streets of New York 
or London can witness the homeless sleeping in the open. Whether growing 
unemployment is caused by the globalization of econornic relations, inade-
quate growth of demand (due to government policy resulting from a fear of 
inflation and balance of payments crises), technological change that calls for 
new skills that are and perhaps will remain scarce, weaker trade unions, 
deregulation, or low-cost imports from developing countries, the unemployed 
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underclass does not even benefit from Vonnegut's handouts. They Jack both 
recognition and necessities. Doing 'more with Jess' (as a popular classic on 
reengineering puts it) is good for economic growth and for the economy as a 
whole, while people become superfluous. The market does not nurture the 
dignity of those who Jose their jobs or live under the threat of losing them. 
Jobless growth is not confined to the advanced countries. The Chinese 
economy has been enjoying spectacularly high growth rates, but unemploy-
ment, particularly urban unemployment, has become a major problem 
(Khan, 1996b). The pressures of globalization and foreign competition in 
the goods and labour markets have forced a eut in unit labour costs. Pre-
viously the state and collective firms practised a concealed system of unem-
ployment insurance, a kind of in-bouse unemployment relief. Ali members of 
the labour force were guaranteed employment, which meant the gross over-
manning of factories. When China began to integrate into the global economy 
it had to reduce its labour costs in order to become competitive and attract 
direct foreign investment. In 1986 a new regulation decreed that employment 
in state enterprises had to be based on fixed-term contracts of three to five 
years, and enterprises were granted the power to dismiss workers. In 1988 a 
State Bankruptcy Law was introduced that made it possible to liquidate or 
restructure state enterprises, with resulting reductions in employment. The 
decline in employment was sharpest in collective enterprises: 15 .5 per cent 
between 1991 and 1994. In the absence of unemployment insurance and 
alternative ways of earning a living, unemployment has contributed to an 
increase not only in inequality but also in growing poverty in the midst of 
spectacular, unprecedentedly high growth rates. However China's high eco-
nomic growth rate should ensure that most members of the workforce will be 
absorbed in due course. 
Similar unemployment growth has occurred in many of the ex-socialist 
countries. Though official unemployment figures for Russia are low, there 
has been substantial withdrawal from the labour force and non-registration of 
many of those thrown out of employment. 
Consumers' freedom to choose between different products has been rightly 
emphasized. But most people spend more time and have a greater stake in 
working and producing than consuming. Producer choice is therefore at least 
as important as consumer choice: the ability to choose between jobs and 
activities should be given at least the same weight as the ability to choose 
between different brands of detergent, different cars or different television 
channels. But general unemployment, combined with an inadequate number 
of vacancies, deprives workers of this choice, as well as of the means (earn-
ings) with which to exercise consumer choice. In order for people to exercise 
free choice as producers, a situation of 'over-full' employment is necessary, 
that is, there must be more vacancies than job-seekers, so that free choice in 
jobs can be exercised. Of course full employment and over-full employment 
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imply that the choices of the employers are reduced. This accounts for their 
opposition. But employers are fewer than workers. Full employment also 
means higher inflationary pressures, which accounts for the opposition of 
some electorates. And it is sometimes misinterpreted as the right to remain 
employed in any given job, which is a recipe for stagnation. 
Basic human needs are not confined to food, water, health, sanitation, 
shelter, transport, education and protection from harm and injury, but also 
include job security. Job security is as important as food security, both in 
itself and as a means of ensuring food security. If job security is to be achieved 
in a progressive economy, it cannot mean tenure in a given job - for this will 
change with technical progress, changing demand and trade liberalization -
but the option, if dismissed from one job, to enter a new job. 
Justification for the existence and tolerance of widespread unemployment 
differs among industrial, ex-socialist and developing countries. ln industrial 
countries it is fear of inflation and balance of payments difficulties that 
prevents the achievement of full employment. And inflation may severely 
hit the same groups of people who are hit by unemployment. The difficult 
and as yet largely unsolved task is to design a strategy that combines (1) full 
or over-full employment with (2) zero inflation and (3) free wage bargaining 
and democratic govemment. This happy triangle has so far been elusive. lt 
seems that a reserve army of unemployed or a less metaphorical army of 
police and soldiers have so far been the only options for avoiding inflation. 8 
The efficiency wage literature points out several reasons why the quality of 
labour and the efforts of those employed are improved as a result of the 
existence of unemployment (and the threat of it for those who have jobs). This 
justification of unemployment is quite distinct from and additional to that of 
avoiding inflation. An important forerunner with respect to this literature was 
Karl Marx, who wrote of the need for a reserve army of unemployed to make 
capitalism work. The recent literature has put new clothes on Marx's analysis 
and discusses it in terms of the principal-agent relationship, and the inability 
to monitor properly the effort every worker puts into his or her work. Unless 
workers fear unemployment, they will slacken their efforts. Wages that are 
higher than the market-clearing level have the function of disciplining the 
workers. 
Quite apart from the reduced opportunity to exercise free choice, unem-
ployment also reduces the incentive for those withjobs to accept new, labour-
saving innovations that are liable to cause them to lose their jobs. This effect 
seems to have been ignored by the efficiency wage literature. On the other 
hand, as the evidence from Eastern Europe shows, over-full employment can 
have a detrimental effect on product quality and variety, product and process 
innovation, and the discipline of workers and managers. 
Another approach, that of the insider-outsider model, cornes to similar 
conclusions. A small, élite mainly male, insider workforce coexists with 
Paul Streeten 31 
poorly paid, not fully recognised outsiders. One group of workers - the 
insiders - are not perfect substitutes for others, who may be unemployed -
the outsiders. They have more experience, are better motivated and more 
committed to the firm. Together with the capital and management of the firm 
they generate a rent, for part of which they bargain. Their higher wages, and 
their resistance to hiring outsiders, keep the outsiders out. Such polarization 
occurred in the United States until the second half of the l 980s. Since then 
there bas been a shift towards a reduction of insiders and an expansion of 
outsiders in the service of 'flexibility'. Europe, in contrast, throughout the 
postwar period bas shown greater job security, high wages and high social 
benefits, combined with a more rapid growth in unemployment. 
A third approach, suggested by Robert Solow (1990), is to analyse the 
labour market as a social institution, and to attach the notion of fairness to a 
higher wage than that which would equate total demand for and supply of 
labour. The unemployed do not underbid this wage, in their self-interest, 
because at some later date they expect to benefit from it. Were they to offer 
themselves at lower wages, all workers would be thereafter worse off. 
Although it would be in the interest of any worker to underbid, irrespective 
ofwhether others do the same or not, this would lead to a prisoner's dilemma 
outcome, with everyone being worse off than if they had refrained from 
underbidding. Repeated 'games', however, lead to adherence to the norm 
that prevents such mutually destructive and ultimately self-destructive out-
comes. 
The answer to the employment problems created by globalization lies in the 
right combination or package of government policies. Simple Keynesian 
remedies, such as expanding effective demand, no longer work. Many unem-
ployed are long-term unemployed. Expansion of demand would rapidly 
produce an excess demand for labour, since employers would reject the 
long-term unemployed as unsuitable. There would then be a rise in money 
wages and prices without a reduction in unemployment. Imports would grow 
(and jobs would be created abroad) without the ability to match them by 
exports. Among the additional measures usually mentioned are education and 
training programmes for workers (both to achieve higher productivity and to 
reduce unemployment), income support for low-paid workers, tax policies 
that create jobs and prevent environmental degradation, population controls, 
and social safety nets. 
On the other band there are those who say there is no need to fear inflation, 
that inflation is dead. Global competition and corporate restructuring will 
keep prices down while productivity gains will let growth flourish. 
What about those whose 'disabilities' (lack of learning ability, self-
confidence or self-discipline) in the light of globalization, the information 
and communication revolution, and rapid technological change render them 
unemployed and perhaps unemployable? This raises the set of problems that 
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used to be discussed apropos structural unemployment, marginalization 
(mainly in Latin America) and social exclusion.9 
The standard answers to the combination of skill shortages and surplus 
unskilled labour have been education, vocational training, adjustment assist-
ance and flexibility (as well as, of course, raising the total level of demand). 
Experience has shown that these have worked for the bright and well-
motivated; but for the not-so-bright and those not committed to the work 
ethic they have reinforced a sense of failure. As Ronald Dore (1996) has said, 
'Vocational training is an area where Say's law does not operate; supply 
emphatically does not create its own demand'.10 The new technologies in 
information and communication and their global spread have brought with 
them learning-ability-related inequality. The new underclass, consisting of the 
least educated, older workers and some women, should be our concern out of 
sympathy and social solidarity, and because of the threat that their condition 
may exacerbate social problems: crime, drug use and so on. The human costs 
of long-tenu unemployment go beyond the loss of incarne and production, 
and include lack of recognition, divorce, mental illness, violence in the home, 
suicide and other social costs. 
There is also unemployment caused by low-cost imports from the low-
income countries. Even though the percentage of these imports is small, 
they occur in the labour-intensive sectors, and firms often displace labour 
by capital in order to remain competitive. 
To sum up, the causes of unemployment in the OECD countries are global 
competition in the form of imports from low-wage countries and the exporta-
tion of jobs, lack of skills in an age of sophisticated and rapidly advancing 
technology, slow growth of demand, immigrant workers and the entry of 
women into the workforce. 
Even though few would maintain today that a higher level of effective 
demand (for example through public investment), even if buttressed with 
an incarnes policy to keep inflation under control, is the whole answer 
to 'structural unemployment', it would surely make a contribution to redu-
cing unemployment as part of a package. And it is not at all clear that 
our society cannot use plenty of health workers, nurses, child rearers, garden-
ers, plumbers, sweepers, protectors and restorers of the environment and 
other service workers who do not need the high and scarce skills demanded 
by modern technology and whose services cannot be replaced by 
either computers or imported low-cost goods from low-income countries 
(though imported low-cost labour from poor countries should be welcomed). 
Many of these jobs are, however, in the currently despised or neglected 
public sector and may call for even more despised higher taxation. They are 
also often ill-paid and not recognised as valuable. We need to change our 
valuation of such work and should guarantee minimum standards of reward 
for them. 
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In ex-socialist countries the reason for unemployment is the need to close 
down inefficient, overmanned public enterprises and those that produced for 
the military, and to relocate labour to more efficient activities and the pro-
duction of goods in demand. The breakdown of institutions is largely respon-
sible for the large amount of unemployment, which is often not registered as 
such. 
In developing countries there are many causes of unemployment, mainly 
the following: 
• The absence of factors such as capital, materials, management, infrastruc-
ture, and so on. 
• The absence of institutions such as labour exchanges, credit banks, training 
schemes, security of land tenure, and systems of widespread land owner-
ship. 
• Employment aspirations or inhibitions that prevent some workers from 
accepting certain jobs, so that unemployment is accompanied by labour 
shortages. 
• Barriers to work that result from low levels of living, such as inadequate 
nutrition, health and education. 
• The low level of demand in industrial countries for the exports of develop-
ing countries, a result partly of slow growth, partly of technical progress 
and partly of trade barriers. 
• Policies of developing countries that overprice labour, underprice capital 
and overvalue exchange rates. These policies stand in the way of full and 
efficient labour utilisation.11 
Also prevalent in many low-income countries is the existence of conditions 
where higher wages enable workers to be better nourished and therefore to 
become more productive. Freedom from malnutrition increases their alert-
ness and their physical strength, and reduces absenteeism due to illness. 
Individual firms are not in a position to decide to pay these higher wages, 
partly because they might not be able to hold on to their more productive 
workers (who may leave the firm for all sorts of reasons other than pay) and 
might only be financing the profits of others, and partly because they may not 
recognise the profit opportunities and the economy of high wages. When 
factory legislation was introduced in England in the nineteenth century, 
English industrialists predicted that the higher costs would ruin British 
industry. In fact it flourished. 
Income Distribution 
How does globalization affect income distribution within rich and poor 
countries and between them? 
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Theoretical arguments suggest that increased North-South tracte in manu-
factured goods and services reduces inequality between skilled workers and 
semi-skilled workers (with primary and some secondary education) in the 
South, while increasing such inequality in the North (Wood, 1994). This is so 
because exporting more from the South raises the demand for and the wages 
of workers with basic education relative to those with higher skills in the 
South. (The exception to this is where the abandonment of minimum wage 
legislation and the weakening of tracte unions and colonially inherited wage 
levels as a result of international competition lowers the wages of factory 
workers and public employees.) The reverse is true in the North, where skill 
differentials in wages can be expected to widen and semi-skilled workers to 
suffer a relative reduction in wages, and with sticky wages, unemployment 
among the semi-skilled can be expected to grow. The relatively abundant 
factor gains from opening up tracte, the relatively scarce factor loses. 
Empirical evidence confirms growing wage inequality in the North. Tracte 
liberalization raises the wages of skilled workers in rich countries, where they 
are relatively abundant, and lowers those of unskilled workers. But the 
prediction does not seem to hold for the South. Changes similar to those 
observed in the North appear to have occurred in some developing countries. 
In Mexico, for example, the difference between a typical university-educated 
worker's pay and that of an unskilled worker rose by a third between 1987 
and 1993. Similar differentials can be observed in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, 
Uruguay, Colombia, Costa Rica, Thailand and the Philippines (The Econo-
mist, 7 December 1996, p. 74; Robbins, 1996). 
There are several possible explanations for this. First, factors other than 
tracte liberalization have influenced wage differentials, among them economic 
growth, capital accumulation, new technologies, inflation, recession, inflows 
of foreign capital and so on. Second, the theory assumes that the same 
technological production functions exist in all countries and that there is an 
absence of capital mobility. In fact reduced tracte barriers may bring in more 
new capital equipment and new technology, which tends to raise the demand 
for skilled workers. Third, some developing countries, particularly the more 
advanced ones, have much larger skilled workforces than others. The impact 
that tracte liberalization has on them will therefore be similar to that on the 
rich countries of the North. With China and other large low-income countries 
entering world markets for labour-intensive products, the comparative 
advantage of the middle-income countries has shifted to goods requiring 
intermediate skills. Unfortunately, only a few countries collect figures on 
wage differentials so it is not possible to make these comparisons over a 
wide range. 
The rise in demand for skilled labour in the North is only parti y due to 
increased manufactured imports or the threat of this from foreign countries. 
Another important reason is technical progress, which saves semi-skilled 
Paul Streeten 35 
labour. To some extent the two are interdependent. In order to meet foreign 
competition, firms have to introduce new technology that improves their 
ability to compete. But a large part of technical progress is independent of 
trade. Cheap energy and the first wave of automation eliminated a large 
proportion of manual jobs. Electronics is now eliminating routine white-
collar jobs. But technical progress also saves some types of skilled, even highly 
skilled, labour, as 'Deep Blue', IBM's chess-playing super-computer demon-
strates. It proved itself a fair match for Garry Kasparov. Activities that can be 
reduced to simple rules, even if these may give rise to apparently infinite 
possibilities, are targets for automation (Kolata, 1996). 
The income differentials between semi-skilled and unskilled workers are 
expected to widen in the South, but unskilled workers are to be found mainly 
in agriculture, not in manufacturing, which requires a minimum of skills. 
Where unskilled workers are plentiful, the country does not export many 
manufactures. The situation in countries that export primary goods, often 
among the poorest, is different (Bourgignon and Morrisson, 1989, pp. 273-81, 
Wood, 1994, p. 244). Minerai exports tend to increase inequality because they 
require little unskilled labour and the ownership of minerais is usually highly 
concentrated. Reductions in inequality depend on the government capturing a 
large share of the rent of the mining companies and spending it on the poor. 
The effect of agricultural exports on distribution depends on the pattern of 
land ownership. Where exports are produced on plantations or by privately 
owned large farms, their expansion will tend to increase inequality unless the 
workers are organised into powerful trade unions. If the increased exports are 
produced on small farms that are worked by the owners and their families, 
inequality will tend to be reduced. 
This analysis has several limitations. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem pre-
dicts that the absolute reward of the scarce factor will fall under free trade. 
In the present context the absolute real wages of unskilled and semi-skilled 
workers in the North would fall. But the areas in which the theorem is true 
are very restrictive. It may be more realistic to assume that relative wages 
fall. We are then concerned with inequality - which many would regard as 
an evil - rather than with absolute poverty, which the same people and many 
more would regard as a greater evil. In an expanding economy it would not 
be surprising to find that some groups move ahead of others; but this would 
not matter, indeed should be welcomed, as long as there is not an increase 
in absolute poverty, and as long as those left behind eventually catch up with 
or overtake those ahead. Development means a shift in the structure of 
production. Employment in industry and services increases, while that in 
agriculture drops both relatively and, beyond a certain point, absolutely. 
Wages in industry and services are higher than incomes in agriculture. The 
result is an increase in inequality, but most workers are better off and no one 
is worse off. 
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Another limitation of the analysis is that it is concerned only with different 
kinds of wages and not with other types of income, such as profits and rents 
(apart from a brief discussion of exporters of primary goods). There is much 
evidence that globalization has led to growing inequality between income 
gained from labour and that from capital. 
So far we have considered the impact of globalization on domestic income 
distribution. One can approach international income distribution between 
countries by examining the impact of multinational corporations, whose 
role in the globalization process has enormously increased. Foreign capital, 
know-how, enterprise, management and marketing are highly mobile inter-
nationally and are combined with the plentiful but internationally much less 
mobile domestic semi-skilled labour. The supply of one set of factors (enter-
prise, management, knowledge and capital) is relatively inelastic in total, but 
if these factors are not dependent on local natural capital such as mines or 
plantations, they are easily moved around the world in response to small 
differential rewards. Their supply, therefore, is highly elastic to any particular 
country. The suppl y of the other factor, labour, is highly elastic domestically, 
but relatively immobile across frontiers. The situation is aggravated by the 
fact that if the workers produce manufactured goods that can be produced 
anywhere in the world, demand for their labour is also elastic, so that raising 
their wages would lead only to unemployment. The situation is equivalent to 
one in which the plentiful supply of semi-skilled labour, rather than the 
product of labour, is exported. The surplus of the product of labour over 
the wage, resulting from the cooperation of other, less elastic factors, accrues 
to foreigners. The differential international and internai elasticities of supply 
in response to differential rewards, and the monopoly rents entering the 
reward of these factors, have important implications for the international 
distribution of gains from investment. 
Since the firms operate in oligopolistic and oligopsonistic markets, cost 
advantages are not necessarily passed on to consumers in lower prices or to 
workers in higher wages, and the profits then accrue to the parent firms. The 
operation of this type of international specialization depends upon the con-
tinuation of substantial wage differentials (hence trade unions must be weak 
in the host country so that low wage costs are maintained), continuing access 
to the markets of the parent companies (hence stronger political pressure 
from importing interests than from domestic producers displaced by the low-
cost components and processes, including trade unions in the rich importing 
countries) and continuing permission by host countries to operate with mini-
mum taxes, tariffs and bureaucratie regulation. 
The packaged or complete nature of the contribution of the transnational 
enterprise, usually claimed as its characteristic blessing, is then the cause of 
the unequal international division of gains. If the package were to break or 
leak, some of the rents and monopoly rewards would spill over into the host 
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country. But if it is secured tightly, only the least scarce and weakest factor in 
the host country derives a limited income from the operations of the transna-
tional firm. 
These tendencies can be and have been offset in some cases by several 
factors. The developing country can use its bargaining power to extract a 
share of these rents (though taxation of footloose transnationals suffers from 
the prisoner's dilemma discussed above) and apply them to social services or 
public works for the poor; or investment in human capital can create domes-
tically some of the scarce factors and skim off some of the rents. Indeed, this 
has occurred in the more successful developing countries. Indeed, this is what 
development is about. As the developing country increases the domestic 
value-added in its exports, its growth rate rises. This is one of the forces 
that make for globalization. It also shows the limits of the conventional 
distinction between import substitution and export orientation. For increased 
domestic value-added is a form of import substitution, while at the same time 
increased exports represent export orientation. 
Now assume that the package can be unbundled and that some of its 
components, such as high skills, can be transferred to the developing country. 
Consider a model in which two types of service have to be combined, one 
highly skilled, the other less skilled, such as air transport. The providers of the 
skilled service, say pilots, are in relatively scarce total supply, but highly 
mobile between countries in response to financial incentives. On a clear day 
an airline pilot can see the world, while the people who clean the ashtrays and 
remove rubbish from the aeroplanes on the ground are wholly earth-bound. 
Supply of the semi-skilled factor, ground personnel, is highly elastic locally 
but immobile between countries. Other examples are transnational advertis-
ing, hotel chains, tourist enclaves and so on. The result is that pilots earn large 
rents, while ground personnel get the bare minimum wage. Any country, even 
a very poor one, wishing to have an airline will have to pay its pilots not much 
less than the high international salaries or it will lose them. An egalitarian 
domestic incomes policy will be impossible if trained professional manpower 
is not to be lost. Both international and domestic inequalities will have to be 
large. Once again, partial international integration (that of skilled and profes-
sional people) leads to national disintegration. Increasingly there are First 
Worlds to be found within Third World countries: Belgiums within Indias, or 
Belindias as this situation has been called. 
Technology and Institutions 
Institutions are lagging behind technology. The revolutions in the technolo-
gies of transport, travel, communications and information have unified and 
shrunk the globe, 12 but our organization into nation states dates back to the 
Peace of Westphalia in 1648, to the American constitution and the French 
38 Globalization: Threat or Salvation? 
Revolution in 1789, to the nineteenth century when Germany and Italy were 
unified, and to the break-up of empires into nation states after the First 
World War. And while tecbnology marches on to organize the world into a 
single unit, nations are becoming more numerous and more acutely self-
aware. Or to put it in Marxian terms, there is a contradiction between the 
forces of production, which have been globalized, and the relations of pro-
duction, which reflect the nation states. 
Biotechnology and materials technology offer considerable promise, but it is 
the microelectronic revolution in information and communication technology 
that is most relevant to globalization. Few manufacturing and service indus-
tries have remained untouched by the application of the microprocessor to 
new products and processes (Oman, 1996). Communication, information and 
the media have been transformed by it. Advances in telecommunications and 
information technology are expanding the boundaries oftradability in services 
- the fastest-growing component of trade and foreign direct investment. 
When the nation states were founded, the city states and the feudalism that 
preceded them had become too small for the scale of operations required by 
the Industrial Revolution. The political institution therefore was adapted to 
the new industrial technology, to the roads, railways and canais. The nation 
state was then a progressive institution. But I am not a technological deter-
minist. The adaptation of institutions to technology is not an inevitable 
process. By the Middle Ages, for example, the Roman technology behind 
roads, baths, aqueducts and amphitheatres had been lost and they were 
allowed to fall into disrepair. But now the nation state, with its insistence 
on full sovereignty, has become, at least in certain respects, an obstacle to 
further progress. It has landed us in several prisoners' dilemma situations: 
each nation acts in its own perceived rational self-interest, and the result is 
that every country is worse off. It pays each nation to pursue this mutually 
destructive course, whether others do likewise or not. Overcoming such 
destructive outcomes calls for a high degree of trust, moral motivation 
(even if, as in the case of the prisoners' dilemma, it is honour among thieves), 
cooperation or compulsion. 
At the international level, prisoners' dilemma outcomes move the world 
economy away from a more to a less efficient allocation of resources. There-
fore potential gains are to be had by moving back to more efficient alloca-
tions. According to Coase's theorem, in the absence of transaction costs 
and with full information, a legal framework and well-defined property 
rights, it pays each state to reach agreements with other states to avoid, by 
compensation payments, this damage, and make them all better off than 
they would have been in the outcome of the prisoners' dilemma. 13 For 
example the United States emits acid rain that falls on Canada. If the damage 
to Canada is greater than the benefits to the United States, Canada could 
offer compensation to the United States for relinquishing its right to emit 
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sulphur dioxide, the chief component of acid rain, and still be better off than 
it would be in accepting the acid rain; or if the benefits are greater than the 
damage, the United States could offer compensation to Canada for accepting 
the acid rain and still be better off than it would have been if it had been 
prevented from inflicting the damage. But as we all know to our regret, we are 
far from the outcomes of Coase's theorem, although we are not always at the 
other end of the spectrum, the prisoners' dilemma. Coase's theorem remains 
useful, in spi te of its unrealistic assumptions, in drawing our attention to the 
fact that there are unexploited mutual profit opportunities when prisoners' 
dilemma situations arise. 1 obviously do not wish to say that compensation 
always, or even often, ought to be paid. The lasers, such as the English 
landlords after the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846, may not deserve to be 
compensated; or even if they do deserve it, the administrative costs and the 
lasses from imposing taxes to finance the compensation may be so large as to 
make the compensation uneconomic. But the fact that it could be paid draws 
our attention to potential unexploited gains. 
Add to the prisoners' dilemma the free-rider problem, according to which 
each country relies on others to bear the costs of arrangements that benefit 
everybody. As a result public goods such as peace, an open trading system, 
common standards of weights and measures, freedom of the seas, well 
defined-property rights, international stability, a working monetary system 
or conservation of the global environment are undersupplied, while public 
bads such as wars, pollution and poverty are oversupplied. The situation has 
been described in parables and similes such as the tragedy of the commons, 
social traps, the isolation paradox and so on. 
Under the present system there are apparent gains to uncoordinated action. 
lt pays any one country to put up protectionist barriers, whether others do so 
or not; building up its arms supply promises security to any one country, 
whether others do so or not; any one country can, if it is to its advantage, 
pollute the air and the oceans, whether others do so or not; it pays any one 
country to attract capital from abroad by tax incentives, whether others do so 
or not, thereby eroding the tax bases of all countries. In the absence of self-
restraint, these mutually damaging and ultimately self-damaging and possibly 
self-destructive actions can be avoided, only by a dominant world power 
imposing the restraints, or by cooperation or, most effectively of all, by 
delegating of some decisions to a supranational authority with the power to 
enforce restraint or contributions. 
The ranking of preferences with respect to, say, contributing to a common 
public good by each country is the following: 
1. My country does not contribute while others do (free rider, defection of 
one). 
2. My country contributes together with others (cooperation). 
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3. No country contributes (prisoners' dilemma outcome). 
4. My country contributes while no other country does (sucker). 
Behaviour by each according to 1, or the fear of 4, leads to outcome 3. 
Although 2 is preferred to 3, we end up with the Jess preferred situation, 
3, unless either rewards and penalties or autonomous cooperative motivations 
lead to 2. lncentives and expectations must be such as to rule out outcomes 4 
and !, so that ifl (or you) contribute, 1 (or you) will not end up a sucker. ln 
the absence of such motivations, such public goods as peace, monetary 
stability, absence of inflation, expansion of output and employment, an 
open world economy, environmental protection, debt relief, raw material 
conservation, poverty reduction and world development will be undersup-
plied. 
It has been shown that iterative games of the prisoners' dilemma type lead 
to non-destructive outcomes (Axelrod, 1984). The partners learn and adopt 
mutually beneficial strategies. 1 have already said that we find ourselves in 
between the two extremes of prisoners' dilemmas and Coase's outcomes. For 
several reasons it is harder to reach cooperative agreements in international 
transactions than in transactions where mutual trust and a sense of duty play 
stronger parts. The world now has many states, nearly 200, and large numbers 
make agreements more difficult and defection more likely. We do not have a 
world government or a global police force that could enforce agreements. 
Change is rapid, which undermines the basis of stability on which agreements 
are based. The absence of a hegemonic power also removes the sanctions 
against breaking the agreement. Ali these factors prevent trust from being 
built up, and trust is an essential prerequisite for international agreements. 
Examples of prisoners' dilemma on the global scale are ubiquitous. Above 
all there was the arms race, which, although a major nuclear war was avoided, 
has contributed to hundreds ofminor wars, mostly in the Third World. Then 
there is competitive protectionism, through which each country casts its 
unemployment onto others; competitive exchange rate movements, by 
which unemployment or inflation are exported; investment wars in which 
countries forgo taxation to attract a limited amount of investment; research 
and development wars and the resulting technological nightmares; the denial 
of debt relief by banks and of guarantees by governments; environmental 
pollution; competitive interest rate increases; overfishing, the depletion of 
ocean reserves and the destruction of species. These are just some of the 
areas in which battles are now being fought. 
This problem applies not only to government policies but also to those of 
firms. ln the field of technology there is a tendency for firms (and countries) 
to move away from basic research with long-term results that are not easily 
appropriated and benefit other firms and other countries, to short-term, 
commercial research, the results of which show up quickly in profits to the 
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firm. For example basic research into the new, high-yielding varieties ofwheat 
and rice that gave rise to the Green Revolution in the l 960s was financed 
neither by private finns nor by national governments but had to rely on the 
philanthropie Ford and Rockefeller Foundations. Their resources are clearly 
inadequate to fund research into the modern high-technology problems that 
will drive globalization in the next century. 
To avoid these traps, coordination, cooperation and enforcement of poli-
cies are needed. But coordination means that each country has to do things it 
does not want to do. The United States has to balance its budget in order to 
lower world interest rates; Germany has to grow faster, but it does not want 
to suck in guest workers from Turkey and Yugoslavia; many say Japan 
should import more, but it does not want to hurt its domestic industries. 
And so on. 
The challenge is to replace the past international orders based on dom-
inance and dependence, for example Pax Britannica and Pax Americana, or 
the disorders that showed fragmentation and lack of coordination, by a new 
pluralistic global order built on equality and fairness. 
GOVERNMENT AND OPEN ECONOMIES 
Most economists expect globalization to go hand in hand with a shrinkage of 
government - that is, the more open the economy, the smaller the govern-
ment. 14 This is so for two reasons. First, liberal trade policies tend to reflect a 
preference for markets, and therefore less government. Second, globalization 
has made government monetary and fiscal policies less effective. This could be 
expected to lead to smaller government. Yet Rodrik (1996) has shown that the 
scope of government has been larger, not smaller, in economies that have 
taken greater advantage of world markets. There is a positive correlation 
between openness, as measured by the share of trade in GDP, and the scope 
of government, as measured by the share of government expenditure in GDP. 
Small, open economies such as Sweden, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, Lux-
embourg and the Netherlands have large governments. Rodrik suggests that 
the explanation is to be found in the role of government as an insulator 
against external shocks, as a kind of insurance against external risk, a way 
of alleviating market dislocations. He proposes two measures of external risk: 
the volatility of the terms of trade and the concentration by products of 
exports (that is, the ratio of the value of one or two products to the total 
value of exports). According to the 'new' growth theory it could also be 
argued that, challenged by fiercer competition, governments spend more on 
public goods such as education, R&D and infrastructure. 
Rodrik's hypothesis depends on three assumptions: (1) that increases in 
trade lead to greater external risk; (2) that increases in external risk lead to 
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greater income volatility; and (3) that a larger share of government purchases 
in GDP reduces income volatility. The first assumption is subject to doubt. 
Diversified international trade (diversified by goods, services, countries of 
origin and countries of destination) can be a good way of insuring against 
risks. For example a country depending wholly on domestic food production 
is in great trouble if its domestic harvest fails; or one depending on domestic 
coal for energy is in great trouble if its miners go on strike. If coal mining is in 
the public sector, government ownership presents greater risks than a diversi-
fied policy of importing fuel. Self-reliance is sometimes confused with self-
sufficiency, but the latter can be at the expense of the former. But it is true 
that certain shocks, such as that of the oil price increases in the l 970s, are the 
result of international trade. 
Rodrik eliminates other possible explanations of the positive link between 
openness and government, for example that small countries are both more 
open and tend to have higher government expenditures, and that European 
countries have larger government sectors but are more open because of their 
membership of the European Union. His conclusion that globalization may 
well require big, not small, government is in line with my argument elsewhere 
that markets and pricism do not call for state minimalism, but for an active, 
interventionist state (see Streeten, 1993). 
Views on globalization versus separatism and government versus non-
intervention can be put into four rubrics: 
Separatism Globalization 
Government intervention Nationalistic dirigistes This chapter's position 
(national and global) 
Laissez faire Nationalistic (classical) Global (classical) liberals 
liberals 
THE CASE FOR A QUIETER LIFE 
Sir John Hicks said that the best reward of a monopolist is often a quiet life. 
The effort to maximize profits by equating marginal returns is itself subject to 
diminishing marginal psychic returns. The free trade gospel, based on the 
doctrine of comparative advantage, bids us always to strive for higher 
incomes from the international division of labour. Information technology, 
it has been said, brings us nearer to the textbook model of economics: it 
provides more information, reduces transaction costs, and removes barriers 
to entry. 'Computers and advanced telecommunications help to make these 
assumptions [of perfect knowledge, zero transaction cost and absence of 
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barriers to entry] less far-fetched' (Woodall, 1996, p. 46). But adjustments in 
response to changing comparative advantage are costly, and the need for 
these adjustments has been speeded up by the new technologies. In an inter-
national environment in which comparative advantage changes rapidly, trade 
policy can, as we have seen, become a policy for tramps: it imposes the 
imperative to move from one occupation to another, from one residence to 
another, not once or twice, but continually. The citizens of an already fairly 
rich country, or a like-minded group of such countries, may say: we already 
enjoy many earthly goods. We wish to forgo some extra incarne from inter-
national trade for the sake of a quieter life; for not having to learn a new 
trade, for not being uprooted from our community. There is nothing irra-
tional or 'non-economic' in such a choice. 15 
It will of course depend upon how important international trade is in the 
economy of the country. It must avoid suffering reductions in incarne result-
ing from having opted out, even if only at the margin, of remaining inter-
nationally competitive. It will also depend on not permitting those who will 
benefit from the protection (including capitalists and managers, as well as 
workers) to become so powerful as to drive the economy beyond the point 
where forgone incarne from international specialization just balances the 
benefits of a somewhat less disruptive life. It is probably true that many 
countries have sought protection beyond this optimum point, and the real 
costs to the community of keeping workers employed in industries that really 
should be shrunk greatly exceeds the benefits that could be reaped by a 
redeployment of labour. 
The qualification introduced above for countries heavily dependent on 
international trade will, in turn, have to be qualified if international coopera-
tion is to be implemented at the optimum rate of technical progress, where 
such progress involves disruption. In most lines of advance we accept the 
application of some form of benefit/cost calculus, but where advances in 
knowledge and its technical and commercial application are concerned we 
do not ask questions about its social and human costs. When technological 
progress in synthetics knocks out the lines of raw material ex ports upon which 
a country is heavily dependent for foreign exchange, the costs of adjustment 
of the exporting country may greatly exceed the benefits to buyers in the 
importing countries, quite apart from the distributional impact. It would then 
be reasonable either to ask for some form of international agreement to slow 
down the pace of scientific and technological progress, or to contract out of 
the international competitive race. The issue here is not the forgoing of some 
incarne for the sake of a quiet life, but, by international cooperation, the 
a voidance of impoverishment that results from deteriorating terms of trade or 
growing unemployment. 
There is a body of literature on the so-called 'non-economic' objectives of 
policy makers, such as the desire to maintain a large agricultural sector 
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(or industrial sector) as an end in itself, and on how to modify free tracte 
policy to accommodate them. 16 But my point is not to introduce non-
economic objectives. Leisure is a conventional economic objective, as is 
avoiding the psychological and financial costs of disruption: the costs of 
resettlement, rehousing, retraining and so on. These benefits and costs are 
entirely within the domain normally surveyed by economists. In the context of 
international tracte they have, however, been largely ignored. If taken into 
account, they modify the conclusions of the doctrine of free tracte and justify 
some protection. 
ln the European Union, people's preferences include greater leisure, longer 
holidays, more generous social security provisions, higher minimum wages 
and greater worker participation in the management of firms. Insofar as these 
preferences do not interfere with the ability to maintain high rates of growth, 
free tracte can be pursued. But in so far as they are bought at the cost of 
economic growth and therefore some reduction in income compared with free 
tracte, some closing off and some management of tracte relations is legitimate 
if such closing off can prevent or reduce the losses from and the continuing 
costs of free tracte. Private benefits and private costs may diverge from social 
benefits and social costs; an example of excess social costs would be the relief 
of the unemployed, the destruction of whole communities or the harm done to 
the environment as a result of a shift in technology. 
It could be that the social harmony and homogeneity achieved by main-
taining similar values adds to efficiency and makes for higher economic 
growth. If so, tracte interventions that lead to the formation of Orwellian 
trading blocs could lead to a higher volume of trade between the blocs. The 
ratio of tracte to national income would be reduced, but as a result of higher 
incomes there would be more tracte. 
CONCLUSIONS 
ln this chapter 1 have tried to show that international integration can lead to 
national disintegration. National disintegration may manifest itself in grow-
ing unemployment, poverty, exclusion or marginalization. 
The power of national govemments and their ability to make national 
policies and pay for social services has been reduced without a corresponding 
increase in supranational govemment or effective international cooperation. 
Welfare expenditures on and subsidies for the poor have been eut or privat-
ized, so that those who cannot afford to pay have to do without. The result of 
political institutions lagging behind globalizing technology, deregulation and 
liberalization is a deterioration of the capacity to govem. Karl Polanyi (1944) 
wrote that the national market is embedded in society and the state, but no 
such authority govems the international market. 17 The state promotes the 
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public good of the market while combating the public ills that it entails. But 
we do not have the global equivalent; at the global level the market reigns 
supreme. There are few global regulations, policies, protection or safeguards. 
National governments are in retreat, reducing social services, tax bases and 
safety nets, though the rhetoric is ahead of actual actions. 
Global forces reduce the power of people to influence policy democratically 
at the national level. At the same time, at the global level there are no 
democratic institutions to enable people to control or even influence their 
destin y. 
These developments have implications for analysis and policy. The first 
task is to explore the ways in which different regions, countries, sectors and 
groups are affected by globalization, who gains and who !oses (absolutely and 
relatively), and the manner in which ways to protect the weak, the poor and 
the excluded can be built into the globalization process from the beginning. 
Strategies should aim to select the positive impulses of globalization and 
encourage them, while minimizing the impact of negative impulses, or cush-
ioning the losers against them. This cannot be done by combining globaliza-
tion with laissez faire. 
There is both an obligation and a prudent need (in order to avoid a 
protectionist backlash) to look after the victims of the competitive struggle 
and the groups that are hurt by it. How to reduce the heightened insecurity in 
people's lives that has resulted from a combination of unemployment, job 
insecurity, poverty, inequality, marginalization and exclusion; how to match 
economic globalization with social globalization; how to embed globalization 
in socially responsive institutions - all these imply two things. First, the speed 
of progress towards globalization has to be determined. A slower pace gives 
more scope for adjustment. Second, where globalization and the liberalization 
of trade and finance have caused unemployment, poverty, exclusion and 
marginalization, the state should provide various kinds of safety nets and 
social insurance, including public works programmes, education and retrain-
ing facilities, a programme for changing attitudes and motivation, and so on. 
The answer to the detrimental impact of globalization is not to stop the 
process but to take action against the harmful effects, ideally at the global 
level, but until then at the national level. Since globalization reduces available 
public resources global taxes should be considered. 
At the level of policy and action there is the need for both transnational and 
global (or regional) - not just international - institutions as well as for local 
ones. I have argued that technology has moved ahead of institutions. Revolu-
tions in transport, travel, communication and information have (partially) 
unified the world. But institutionally we are stuck with the nation state. The 
nation state has usurped too many functions, which it can no longer carry out 
efficiently or humanely. Sorne of these should be delegated upwards, others 
downwards. Upward delegation is necessary because technology and private 
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enterprise have become global, while their supervision and regulation have 
remained national. A global antimonopoly, anticartel and antirestrictive-
practices policy, for example, would bring international policies in line with 
national ones. As things are, American companies are prohibited from col-
luding and forming cartels in the home market but are encouraged by the 
Webb Pomerane Act to do so against foreign countries. Japanese companies' 
distribution networks are barriers to trade. Many Japanese firms rely exclus-
ively on local component suppliers. The World Trade Organization should, in 
principle, be able to take on these issues. Now only price discrimination in 
international trade is ruled out by permitting antidumping duties to be 
imposed. But these are used by most governments as protectionist devices, 
not to promote competition but to thwart it. Clearly a competition policy is a 
task for a supranational institution, for national governments would be 
tempted to tailor them to the advantage of their national firms. At the same 
time, reduced monopoly power will reduce incentives and ability to conduct 
basic research, increasingly the most important engine of growth in our high-
technology age. This may have to be taken over by supranational agencies or 
by international research consortia. Research is needed on whether this is 
necessary, and if so, how it should be done. 
Finally, the interaction of policies and institutions at five levels should be 
explored: the micro-micro level (what goes on inside the firm, farm, house-
hold), the micro level, the meso level (the impact of policies and institutions 
on different groups and regions) the macro level and the macro-macro or 
global level; and the division of duties at each of these levels between private, 
public (national, international and global) and voluntary agencies. 
Notes 
1. 1 arn grateful to Ajit Bhalla, Albert Berry, Louis Emmerij, Réal Lavergne and 
Hans Singer for helpful comments on earlier drafts. 
2. lt is the non-historical touting of the current trend towards globalization that has 
led the cri tics to call it globaloney. 
3. This increase in the trade/GDP ratios occurred in spite of a general increase 
in tariff protection between 1870 and 1913. It was therefore not the result 
of trade liberalization. In the pre-1913 period of globalization the role of the 
state increased rather than declined (see Bairoch and Kozul-Wright, 1996, p. 113). 
4. But see the section on government and open economies in which a positive 
relation between the size of government and public expenditure ratios is sug-
gested. Also, social expenditure (on education, health and so on) has made a 
recovery in Latin America since 1993 (see IDB, 1996). This could be the result of 
pressure to compensate those adversely affected by globalization. 
5. It should, however, be remembered that downsizing in companies such as 
AT&T, Nynex, Sears, Philip Morris and Delta Airlines cannot be attributed to 
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international competition. Businessmen like to blame global forces for actions 
for which they should bear responsibility. 
6. Ronald Dore (1996) has argued that technological change has been more 
important than globalization in promoting competition and changing the char-
acter of our societies. 
7. The Congressional Advisory Commission on the Consumer Price Index, whose 
chairman was Professer Michael Boskin. 
8. Hans Singer has pointed out that the Golden Age of the Keynesian consensus of 
the 1950s and 1960s proved that this happy triangle is in fact possible if the 
necessary mild controls of inflationary pressures are accepted. Critics would 
reply that it took two decades for the workers to see through the money illusion. 
9. Dore (1996) has written illuminatingly about these problems. See for example 
his comments on Lord Dahrendorfs lecture (mimeo). 
10. Ibid. 
11. Card and Krueger (1995) have found that for some fast food restaurants in New 
Jersey and neighbouring Pennsylvania (as a control group) higher minimum 
wages have led to higher employment. These findings led to considerable con-
troversy. 
12. This does not mean that people have necessarily benefited from this technolo-
gical globalization. Economie and technical progress translates into human well 
being even Jess automatically at the global level than at the national level. 
13. I am indebted to Michael Lipton's analysis of the relation between the prisoners' 
dilemma and Coase's theorem in a different context (see Lipton, 1985). Farrell 
(1987) has shown that the Coase theorem, according to which individuals can 
resolve problems of externalities and public goods as well as governments 
provided that property rights are assigned, is not correct (see pp. 113-29). 
14. This section draws on Rodrik (1996). See also Garrett and Lange (1995) and 
Garrett (1995). I am grateful to James Robinson for having drawn my attention 
to these articles. 
15. Another option would be to train a force ofworkers who must be ready to move 
to new places and learn new skills in response to the changing international 
scene. These 'commandos' would enjoy higher pay and better conditions. The 
life might appeal to young bachelors or people keen on frequent change. But as 
Dore (1996) has pointed out, with the reduced importance ofunskilled and semi-
skilled labour, and the growing importance of highly skilled people, retraining is 
difficult or impossible. 
16. Among the contributors to this literature in the 1950s and 1960s were Jagdish 
Bhagwati, Max Corden, Harry Johnson and T.N. Srinivasan. 
17. I owe this argument to Mohan Rao. See also Rao (1995). The expression 
'embedded liberalism' for the postwar bargain between trade liberalization 
and social government policies is due to Ruggie (1995, pp. 507-26). 
2 Information Technology, 
Globalization and 
Marginalization 
Jeffrey James 1 
Globalization is an undeniably real phenomenon defined in terms of 
increased flows of trade and investment between countries regardless of 
however meaningful it may or may not be according to various other defini-
tions. Over the ten-year period from 1985 to 1994, for example, the ratio 
ofworld trade to GDP rose more than three times more rapidly than during 
the ten previous years, while the ratio of foreign investment to GDP doubled 
(W orld Bank, l 996b ). In this sense globalization is just as meaningful a 
notion from the standpoint of developing countries as it is for the world 
economy as a whole. For not only did the overall ratio of trade to GDP in 
those countries increase by 1.2 per cent per annum over the decade, but they 
also registered a rising share of total foreign investment (to more than one 
third) (ibid.) 
When they are disaggregated, however, these data indicate that developing 
countries are not participating equally in the process of global integration. On 
the contrary, a recent W orld Bank study depicts a disturbingly unequal 
pattern of integration (ibid.) For example the wide variance around the 
average increase in the ratio of trade to GDP for the developing world as a 
whole is reflected in the fact that that ratio actually fell in 44 of 93 developing 
countries, while of the total direct foreign investment going to those countries 
some two-thirds was concentrated among only eight of them (ibid.) The 
purpose of this chapter is to examine the role played by the new information 
technologies in these divergent global integration patterns, which, as the 
following section demonstrates, point firmly to the marginalization of a 
large number of developing countries. 
PATTERNS OF GLOBAL INTEGRATION 
The main finding of the World Bank (ibid) on the economic prospects 
of developing countries is that their integration into the global economy 
in recent years has been a highly uneven process. Table 2.1 shows the extent 
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of that unevenness. In particular it shows that some parts of the developing 
world - notably East Asia, South Asia and Latin America - have experienced 
substantial integration (as measured by the growth of exports and 
foreign direct investment), while other regions - the Middle East and 
Africa - are integrating much more slowly. Table 2.1 also reveals a clear 
correlation between degree of integration and rate of economic growth: that 
is, the regions that integrated most intensively grew the fastest, whereas the 
slowest integrating economies exhibited the least rapid rates of ecônomic 
growth. 
Other data from the World Bank report can be used to focus more 
closely on the process of global marginalization; that is, the process whereby 
some countries are experiencing a decline in the ratio of (1) trade and 
(2) foreign direct investment to GDP. With regard to the former ratio, 
the World Bank data indicate a decline in 44 of the 93 developing countries, 
'representing more than one billion people, or 26 per cent of the 
sample population'(ibid., p. 21). The majority of those 44 countries are 
in the Middle East and Africa. Similarly, 'Over the past decade ratios of 
FDI to GDP fell in thirty-seven of the ninety-three countries studied' (ibid., 
p. 22). Of these, 20 were in Sub-Saharan Africa, nine were in Latin 
America and the Caribbean and seven were in the Middle East and North 
Africa. 
Generally speaking, therefore, marginalization seems to be most pro-
nounced on the African continent (see Chapter 6). Indeed the conclusion of 
one recent article on the subject is that 'Africa is currently more marginalized 
within the world economy than at any time in the past half century. Its shares 
of world trade, investment and output have declined to negligible propor-
tions' (Collier, 1995, p. 556). 
Table 2. I Uneven integration of developing countries into the global economy 
(percent) 
Real GDP Export growth FDl inflows as a 
growth per per capita, share of GDP, 
Region capita, 1991-95 1991-95 1993-95 
East Asia 8.0 14.l 3.1 
SouthAsia 2.2 8.4 0.3 
Latin America and the 1.1 7.2 1.1 
Caribbean 
Middle East and North -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 
Africa 
Sub-Saharan Africa -1.5 -1.6 -0.9 
Source: World Bank (1996b). 
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Alternative Explanations 
There are undoubtedly many reasons for these divergent patterns of global 
integration, perhaps the most obvious of them being intercountry differences 
in macroeconomic, trade and industrial policies. It is often argued for exam-
ple that the Asian newly industrializing economies have adopted far more 
outward-looking trade and industrial policies than other developing countries 
in general and those in Sub-Saharan Africain particular. Another frequently 
heard explanation is that some regions are far more prone to political risk and 
uncertainty than others (with Africa again featuring prominently in the latter 
category). It is not our intention to minimise the importance of arguments 
such as these, rather that the influence of information technology has not yet 
received the attention it deserves in this context. There are, we will show, a 
variety of different mechanisms through which information technologies 
influence the process of globalization. And in each case the nature of this 
influence tends to correspond in a broad way to the patterns of globalization 
that have just been described. What will also become apparent is that these 
same influences also tend to increase the extent of globalization itself. Thus 
the relationship between information technology and globalization is one of 
mutual causation rather than unidirectionality. 
THE INFLUENCE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ON 
PATTERNS OF GLOBAL INTEGRATION 
Because we have defined globalization and marginalization in terms of for-
eign trade and investment flows, it is in relation to these same variables that 
the role played by the new information technologies needs to be examined. 
Let us therefore turn first to the foreign-trade-induced mechanisms of tech-
nological influence. 
Trade-Induced Mechanisms of Technological Influence 
Information technology influences not only the extent of international trade 
but also the degree to which different countries (and firms in those countries) 
benefit from the relationships thus induced. In turn these technological influ-
ences are exerted through two ditferent mechanisms. One of them has to do 
with the adoption and diffusion of information technologies across countries 
and among firms in those countries. By reducing production or communica-
tion costs and improving product quality, these technologies tend to create 
new trade opportunities for adopting units;2 non-adopters, however, may find 
themselves at a competitive disadvantage, which over time may result in their 
becoming increasingly marginalized. The second mechanism has more to do 
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with the production than the adoption of information technology. In particular 
the rapid growth in demand for electronic products affords valuable export 
opportunities to firms and countries that can sell those products on interna-
tional markets. 
Let us consider each of these mechanisms in turn, although before so doing 
we should take note of a possibly important connection between them, 
namely that the user skills required for successful adoption of the new 
technologies may also be necessary for the skills needed to produce them. 
The underlying argument is that technological capabilities tend to be sequen-
tially acquired, beginning with the capability to use imported machinery 
efficiently, a stage that is usually followed by repair and maintenance cap-
abilities and ultimately by the ability to produce and export the machinery 
itself. Thus user and producer capabilities can not be separated from new 
technology in general or information technology in particular. Indeed 'The 
experience of OECD countries suggests that intensive users of information 
technology (IT) often become competitive suppliers of information systems in 
their own industries, such as banking and airline services' (Hanna and 
Dugonjic, 1995, p. 38). 
The Adoption of Information Technology and International Trade 
We begin this section with telecommunications not just because this form of 
information technology influences the extent to which certain new industrial 
technologies can be adopted (for example in the garments and textiles indus-
tries) (Mody and Dahlman, 1992), but aJso because many observers initially 
saw in electronic switching technology an especially favourable opportunity 
for developing countries to engage in technological leapfrogging, that is, to 
assimilate that technology even more rapidly than the industrialized coun-
tries. By expanding their main telephone lines and reducing their comparative 
transport and communication costs, developing countries would be able to 
compete more effectively in international markets for goods .and services. 
(Electronic or digital switching involves the use ofmicroelectronics to connect 
terminais and coordinate the entire telecommunications network as opposed 
to the use of electromechanical parts. The former type of switching tends to be 
cheaper than the latter and it also requires less maintenance because it 
involves no moving parts.) 
The Adoption of Advanced Telecommunications Technology 
The possibility of leapfrogging by means of electronic switching technology 
arises because (1) this technology is cheaper and less complex to install from 
scratch than when it has to be added to an existing electromechanical net-
work, and (2) it is developed rather than developing countries that tend to 
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have large existing networks of this kind. The latter countries 'thus had a 
remarkable opportunity to completely leapfrog the electromechanical tech-
nology, avoiding the expense of replacing obsolete (though young in age) 
capital stock and problems of technological cumulativity, and start their 
telecommunications infrastructure from scratch' (Antonelli, 1991, p. 71). 
Not all developing countries, however, were well placed to take advantage 
of the opportunity thus presented, and while some were indeed able to 
assimilate the new switching technology more rapidly than the developed 
countries, others lagged far behind. Table 2.2 shows that most of the fastest 
adopting countries (as defined by the ratio of electronic lines to total switch-
ing capacity) were first- and second-tier newly industrializing countries in the 
Far East that enjoyed high rates of investment, technical skills and other 
attributes. 
To the extent that these countries generally achieved more rapid rates of 
penetration than the developed countries, technological leapfrogging has 
indeed taken place (ibid.) On the other hand, many of the developing coun-
tries, especially but not only in Sub-Saharan Africa, that lack these features 
seem to have achieved very low or non-existent rates of adoption, a consid-
eration that helps explain why the total number and quality of lines remains 
so low in that region compared with other parts of the developing world. 'For 
example, there are only 0.3 telephones per 100 people in Sub-Saharan Africa. 



















1. Countries whose ratio of electronic lines to total switching capacity was greater 
than 50 percent in 1987. 
2. Countries whose ratio of electronic lines to total switching capacity was 35-50 
per cent in 1987. 
Source: Antonelli (1991), p. 50. 
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The figure is twice as great in Asia ( excluding Japan), 16 times greater in 
Latin America, and 60 times higher in the industrialized countries of Europe' 
(Moussa and Schware, 1992, p. 1738). In addition, 
subscriber equipment is often out of service for long periods, in particular 
due to cable faults. Lines are noisy: new connections are limited, and long 
waiting lists exist: tariffs are high; new services are not readily provided, 
and what service is available is often limited to the larger urban areas. The 
international service is often better than the national service (Winsbury, 
1995, pp. 233-4).3 
Inasmuch as the differential rates of digital switching technology vary directly 
with per capita income levels, and because this technology has fostered 
additional trade and growth among the adopting countries, it seems to 
have exerted an inegalitarian influence on the global distribution of income. 
Moreover, according to some observers, the distributional impact may 
have been negative within the adopting countries themselves. For example 
in Table 2.2 the Philippines is listed as a 'fast follower' country, but the 
growth that took place there has apparently benefited foreign rather than 
locally-owned enterprises, urban rather than rural areas and those who make 
long-distance rather than local telephone calls (Sussman, 1991; see also 
O'Siochru, 1993). 
The Adoption of New Industrial Technology and International Trade 
Although much more research needs to be done on the diffusion of new 
industrial technologies in developing countries (for example computer-aided 
design, CAO, and computer numerically controlled machine tools, 
CNCMTs), two broad tendencies are already apparent. One is that, because 
they are skill- and infrastructure-intensive and tend to be associated with 
sophisticated 'high-income' products, the new industrial technologies are 
being adopted primarily in the more industrialized of the developing countries 
(especially, but not exclusively, in Asia).4 The second tendency is that, for 
similar reasons, these technologies tend to be adopted by relatively large-
scale, export-oriented and often foreign-owned enterprises in the countries 
concerned. 5 
What is less clear, however, is how these differential patterns of adoption 
influence the competitive position of firms and countries vis-à-vis non-
adopters. That is, to what extent is the competitive position of the latter 
being undermined - or marginalized - by the technological behaviour of the 
former? The problem in addressing this question is that within broad product 
categories, such as textiles and footwear, some goods are close substitutes for 
one another, while others are entirely non-competitive (as may be the case, for 
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example, with products embodying essential and luxury characteristics in very 
different proportions). Technical change that affects one product (when, say, 
it is produced by CNCMT) will thus tend to have a very different impact on 
the other products in a given category, depending on the closeness of the 
substitutes they represent. Consider in this regard the situation portrayed in 
Figure 2.1, where three different products, A, B and C, embody two char-
acteristics in different proportions. 
In the initial situation (prior to technical change) we assume that the prices 
of the goods and available income are such that the efficiency frontier is 
represented by OPQ. Depending on their preferences, consumers will choose 
a particular point on this frontier. For example where preference is re-
presented by /02, a point between 0 and P will be selected, whereas the 
consumer with the indifference curve /C1 will be best off consuming good C. 
One can usefully conceive of these two indifference maps as representing two 
different markets, one with a distinct preference for one combination of 
characteristics and the other with an equally distinct preference for an entirely 
different combination of characteristics. Assume now that technical change 
endows good A with more ofboth characteristics than before, so that the new 
efficiency frontier becomes, say, 0 1 PQ (with a given income, that is, the 
consumer derives more characteristics from the same product). As one 
would expect, the technical change thus specified improves the competitive 




Figure 2.1 Adoption of new technology and product competitiveness 
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one would expect that the successful developing-country exporters are also 
among its most intensive (per capita) users. 
Table 2.3 tends to confirm this expectation for it shows that, over a range of 
different subsectors of the electronics industry, exports are concentrated 
among a narrow group of newly industrializing countries, mainly but 
not exclusively in the East Asia region. lndeed for a number of these coun-
tries, these exports account for a sizeable proportion ofmanufactured exports 
as a whole, for example, 45 per cent and 50 per cent for Singapore and 
Malaysia respectively (UNCTAD, 1995a). At the other extreme, one can 
also see from Table 2.3 that the Africa region has barely participated in the 
international market for electronics products. This region's share of the total 
market is in fact even less than its export share of manufactures as a whole,8 
suggesting that it is more difficult to compete in electronics than in manufac-
turing more generally. 
To a large extent the export of electronics by developing countries has been 
generated by foreign direct investment, and hence one needs to look to the 
factors that determine the location of such investment in order to explain the 
Table 2.3 Developing-country exports of selected electronics, 1993 
Electronic Diodes, ADP 
micro-circuits transistors, etc. peripherals* Digital computers 
%of %of %of %of 
Major world Major world Major world Major world 
exporters market export ers market export ers market export ers market 
Rep. of 9.5 Malaysia 8.6 Singapore 27.2 Singapore 24.0 
Korea 
Singapore 7.6 Hong Kong 6.3 Rep. of Korea 6.1 Mexico 3.2 
Malaysia 7.5 Singapore 6.0 Malaysia 2.6 Rep. of Korea 3.1 
Hong Kong 4.3 Rep. of Korea 4.7 China 1.5 Hong Kong 0.6 
Thailand 1.6 Mexico 2.6 Hong Kong 1.4 Malaysia 0.4 
Philippines 0.9 Philippines 2.1 Mexico 0.7 China 0.3 
Total 31.4 30.3 39.5 31.6 
Exports from 0.0 Exports from 0.4 Exports from 0.0 Exports from 0.0 
Africa Africa Africa Africa 
Exports from 0.0 Exports from 0.4 Exports from 0.0 Exports from 0.0 
N. Africa N. Africa N. Africa N. Africa 
Exports from 0.5 Exports from 2.7 Exports from 0.9 Exports from 3.3 
Latin Latin Latin Latin 
American American American American 
Integration Integration Integration Integration 
Association Association Association Association 
* ADP stands for automatic data processing. 
Source: UN (1993). 
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and C however are not at all the same, because while A and B are relatively 
close substitutes for one another, A and C are not. Thus in a market where 
A and B compete, the latter loses out to the former in the new situation 
because the consumer moves to point 0 1. The consumer of good C, on 
the other band, remains entirely unaffected by the technical change and 
remains in his or ber initial position at Q (as might be the case in practice, 
for example, with the consumer of a highly standardized, price-sensitive item 
of clothing in the face of technical change at the more design-intensive end 
of the spectrum). 
It follows from this analysis that the degree to which different developing 
countries are actually made worse off when new industrial technologies are 
adopted by developed and newly industrializing countries will need to be 
determined on a case-by-case basis using a considerable amount of highly 
disaggregated information about particular product categories. The current 
four-digit classification of trade data is far too aggregated to be useful in this 
regard. 
The Adoption of Electronic Communication Technology and International 
Trade 
In addition to the industrial technologies that have just been described, firms 
in developing countries may also adopt electronic communications techno-
logy such as the Internet and e-mail. These latter technologies may enhance 
the competitive standing of adopting firms by providing them, among other 
things, with information about prices and markets and by enabling them to 
place orders more rapidly. To the extent that installation and use of electronic 
communications technology is simpler and less expensive than the new indus-
trial technologies, one could expect a more even diffusion of the former 
among firms of all sizes. As yet, however, there are no data that can be 
used to test this hypothesis. 
The Production of New Technology and International Trade 
As noted above, information technology affords developing countries the 
chance to become more actively involved in the international trading eco-
nomy not only through the technology-adoption behaviour of firms, but also 
because of the opportunity to produce and export the new technologies. The 
latter is made all the more attractive by very rapid growth in the global 
demand for many of the products that together constitute the electronics 
sector. 7 Which developing countries, then, have best been able to meet this 
rapidly growing demand? 
To the probably substantial extent that production and export capabilities 
presuppose the prior acquisition ofuser capabilities in information technology, 
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patterns summarized in Table 2.3. In the 1960s and 1970s overseas investors 
in semiconductor production, for example, were attracted not only by the 
availability of cheap unskilled labour in East Asia, but also by the political 
stability, open financial systems and excellent telecommunication facilities 
that that region generally offered (Henderson, 1989). Subsequently, as the 
production of electronics products became more automated, those same firms 
were attracted instead by the availability of low-cost skilled and semi-skilled 
labour in first- and second-tier newly industrializing countries in East Asia. 
Regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa, in contrast, tend to Jack the factors that 
have just been cited and consequently they have failed to attract foreign 
investment in the electronics industry. One exception in the African context, 
however, is Mauritius which has managed to enter the export market for 
electronics partly on the basis of foreign investment (Moyo, 1996). This can 
be attributed in large measure to the fact that Mauritius has the only success-
ful export-processing zone in the region. 
Foreign-Investment-Induced Mechanisms of Technological Influence 
The trade-induced mechanisms described above have implications for foreign 
investment behaviour in developing countries, and hence for the differing 
degrees of global integration exhibited by those countries. The reason is that 
tracte tends to promote economic growth (recall the correlation between these 
variables, as shown in Table 2.1) and ra pi dl y growing economies generally 
attract more foreign investment than economies that are not growing or 
growing relatively slowly. Because of agglomeration economies (Wheeler 
and Mody, 1988), moreover, the additional foreign investment that thus 
accrues tends to attract further foreign capital and so on, in a cycle of 
cumulative causation. Inasmuch as it helps to determine the patterns of 
international tracte that give rise to this cumulative outcome, information 
technology may thus be said to exert an indirect influence on foreign invest-
ment behaviour. But there are also several direct mechanisms of technological 
influence, and it is to these that we now turn. 
As it happens, these mechanisms exert two fundamentally opposing influ-
ences on the transnational corporation: whereas one of them induces the 
corporation to disperse its activities ever more widely across developing 
countries, the other has just the opposite effect of inducing a geographical 
concentration of foreign investment in a relatively narrow group of countries 
(OECD, 1993). The first of these tendencies is driven mainly by traditional 
supply or cost considerations, while the second has more to do with demand-
side factors, especially those that are related to the so-called 'new competi-
tion' (see below). ln both cases, though, it seems that once again the more 
advanced developing countries stand to benefit, rather than - or at the 
expense of - the least developed. 
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Dispersion 
In so far as they reduce the costs of intrafirm communication, coordination 
and control,9 the new technologies make it feasible and potentially attractive 
for the multinational corporation to engage in a more geoiraphically dis-
persed pattern of economic activity. As applied to production, this 'distance 
shrinking' effect of information technology affords firms the opportunity to 
reduce costs in a number of different industries, especially those where pro-
duction is based.on distinct components and operations that can be physically 
separated (ibid.) In the clothing industry, for example, 
One vital contribution a [computer-aided design] CAD system interfaced 
with a modern telecommunications network can make is its ability to 
separate human capital-intensive activities from the locations where the 
purely labour-intensive production activities can take place, without sacri-
ficing necessary information linkages .... Given that the labour-intensive 
core of the clothing manufacturing process has remained widely unaffected 
by the introduction of microelectronics, a microelectronic/telecommunica-
tions revolution can accelerate a migration of clothing industries to low 
labour cost areas by reducing natural (that is, communication) barriers to 
trade (Spinanger, 1992, p. 99). 
Computer software is another industry where spatial production possibilities 
are being altered by information technology in a direction that favours certain 
developing countries. Already apparent, for example, is a tendency for rou-
tine data-processing activities to be relocated from the United States to the 
Caribbean, as advanced telecommunications facilities and a plentiful supply 
of skilled operators can be found at a relatively low cost in countries such as 
Barbados and Jamaica.10 
When applied to research and development (R&D), information techno-
logy permits multinational corporations to undertake 'self-contained divisible 
activities that can take place in geographically separate locations, to be 
subsequently integrated, and they also allow, where needed, R&D activities 
that are undertaken on an integrated, on-line manner across borders' (UN, 
1995, p.151). Texas Instruments, for example, 
has been able to perform geographically dispersed, but globally integrated, 
R&D activities because of information and communication technologies 
that allow the exchange of detailed integrated chip designs and scientific 
simulations across the world without a time delay. Texas Instruments 
(India) has the latest HP and Sun workstations and a variety of computers 
that are interconnected by a Local Area Network, which in turn is con-
nected to Texas Instruments' worldwide data communications network. 
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Texas Instruments (India) is connected toit on a 'real-time' basis through a 
dedicated 128 KB link, enabling the company to send and receive the latest 
support information, design technology and applications information for 
its products and services (ibid., p. 153). 
Although it is difficult to assess the extent to which individual developing 
countries are currently involved in examples of this kind, early data for the 
period 1982-89 (Table 2.4) indicate that the increased R&D spending by US 
transnational corporations in the Third World is concentrated mainly in Asia, 
and especially in India and Hong Kong. Thus whereas R&D in direct product 
design and development tends to favour the first-tier newly industializing 
countries (NICs), which have a sophisticated technology base (accompanied 
by a relatively limited science base), R&D into generic and disembodied 
technology favours 'advanced' developing countries that are strong in science 
relative to technology (Reddy and Sigurdson, 1994). India in particular has 
become a prominent recipient of this type of R&D, offering as it does an 
especially large pool of skilled research personnel. 
Although the degree to which it is taking place is as yet limited (ibid.), the 
emerging pattern ofR&D dispersion across the developing world represents a 
fundamental departure from the traditional product cycle mode! of interna-
tional investment behaviour. lt will be recalled that, in the traditional mode!, 
foreign R&D activities are undertaken only when a new product or process 
has matured to the point where production is located abroad. Such overseas 
Table 2.4 Research and development expenditure of US majority-owned 
affiliates as a percentage of sales, by developing regions and countries 
Developing region!country 1982 1989 
Latin America 0.20 0.20 
Argentina 0.40 0.25 
Brazil 0.40 0.30 
Mexico 0.30 0.20 
Africa 0.01 0.02 
Asia and the Pacifie 0.04 0.20 
Hong Kong n.a 0.10 
In dia 0.50 0.60 
Indonesia 0.02 0.03 
Republic of Korea n.a 0.30 
Malaysia n.a 0.10 
Singapore n.a 0.30 
Thailand 0.03 0.02 
Taiwan 0.30 0.40 
Note: n.a == data not available. 
Source: UN (1992). 
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R&D is 'mainly concerned with adapting the products (for example, to account 
for differences in consumer tas tes) and the production processes (for example, 
to account for differences in the labour market) to suit the local market 
conditions' (Patel, 1995, p. 172). Inasmuch as it gives rise to products and 
processes that benefit the majority of the population, this adaptive type of 
research can be described as appropriate to developing-country circumstances. 
The newly emerging forms ofR&D, on the other band, tend to be driven by 
very different considerations, with possibly important consequences for the 
nature of the resulting innovations and the distribution of the benefits of 
those innovations between and within countries. For one thing it is supply 
rather than demand-side factors that now dominate the location decision of 
transnational corporations. 
Thus firms are now assumed to assess a wide range of different geographic 
locations purely in terms of the strength of their science and technology 
base and the availability of adequately qualified scientists and engineers. In 
such a scenario the home country of the firm is assessed on the same basis 
as all other potential locations (ibid., p. 153). 
A related distinction is that foreign R&D is now designed not so much to 
produce locally-oriented products and processes as to generate technologies 
that can be used internationally throughout the transnational corporation. In 
the previously cited case of the Texas Instruments Corporation, for example, 
all the innovations developed by the Indian affiliate are exported by satellite 
to the US parent firm for distribution throughout the corporation as a whole 
(UNCTAD, 1995a). By the same token, the Indian affiliate benefits from the 
information that flows from other R&D centres within the corporate com-
munication network. 'In this respect', writes Cantwell (1995, p.172), 'innova-
tion in the leading transnationals (TNCs) is now more genuinely international 
or, in the terminology used here, it has become "globalised". 
However R&D is not the only mechanism through which the new informa-
tion technologies are promoting the globalization of activities conducted 
by transnational corporations. On the contrary, an important line of recent 
research has revealed a wide variety of additional mechanisms such as 
joint research ventures, technological exchanges and unidirectional technol-
ogy flows that are collectively referred to as international strategic technology 
alliances (Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1993). Indeed the growth of 
· those alliances 'is considered by many observers as one of the major char-
acteristics of economic globalisation' (Freeman and Hagedoorn, 1995, p. 41), 
and most ofthat growth, as shown in Table 2.5, has been concentrated in the 
new information technologies themselves. 
As can also be seen from Table 2.5, however, apart from the NICs, devel-
oping countries have been almost entirely excluded from such arrangements, 
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Table 2.5 International distribution of strategic technology alliances in 
information technology, 1980-9 
%for %for %for 
No. of developed %for triad/ triadl 
61 
alliances economies triad NI Cs LDCs Other 
Computers 199 98.0 96.0 1.5 0.5 
Industrial automation 281 96.l 95.0 2.1 1.8 
Microelectronics 387 95.9 95.1 3.6 0.5 
Software 346 99.1 96.2 0.6 0.3 
Telecommunications 368 97.5 92.1 1.6 0.3 0.5 
Mise. IT 148 93.3 92.6 5.4 0.7 0.7 
Heavy electronics 141 96.5 92.2 1.4 2.1 
Source: Freeman and Hagedoorn (1995), p. 44. 
which are overwhelmingly concluded between firms from the 'Triad' region 
(Europe, Japan and the United States). When it is combined with the evidence 
shown in Table 2.4 conceming the emerging distribution of global R&D 
investment, this pattern of technological relationship only seems to underline 
what some authors rightly refer to as a 'divergence of technological develop-
ment on a world scale' (ibid., p. 55). 
Concentration 
Whereas the supply-side mechanisms described in the previous section facil-
itate the dispersion of economic activities by transnational corporations, the 
demand-side aspects of information technology give rise to just the opposite 
tendency. That is, when they are broadly defined to include organizational 
changes, those technologies offer firms the opportunity to engage in what 
Best (1990 p. 144) refers to as 'the new competition'. By this he means that a 
new competitive paradigm is emerging that 'is not about maximizing profits 
for a given material, product, process, and organizational method, but about 
seeking a competitive advantage by continuously upgrading product, process 
and organization'. 
In this emerging competitive process, success depends not on being the 
lowest-cost producer (as in the supply-side type of situation described in the 
previous section), but rather 'upon the minimization of product development 
and product changeover times' (ibid., p.14). 
A key element of this 'new competition' is the use of new organizational 
practices - often in combination with information technology - that are 
variously referred to as 'post-Fordist', 'Jean' or 'flexible' production systems. 
By means of techniques such as 'just-in-time production' and 'quality circles', 
firms that adopt the new organizational practices tend to be better able to 
compete successfully in the 'new competition', mainly because they can 
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usually respond more flexibly than non-adopting firms to changes in demand. 
The spatial implication of the new technology in this case, however, is con-
centration rather than dispersion. In particular, transnational firms that are 
engaged in this form ofnon-price competition on the basis of flexible produc-
tion systems are likely to concentrate their investment activities in developing 
(and developed) countries that are physically close to their major markets. 
Such proximity matters 
because one of the keys to the competitive strength ofpost-Fordist produc-
tion is its flexibility and continuous innovation, which depend heavily on 
close 'synergistic' relations between firms and their suppliers, and the just-
in-time system. Proximity to customers is also important for establishing 
the continuous two-way information flows that allow producers to adapt 
quickly to changing market demands and consumer preferences .... The 
importance of proximity, for a given production unit, in turn militates 
against global sourcing, that is, against the use of suppliers scattered 
around the globe .... It militates in favour of the constitution of production 
networks in each of the world's major markets: Europe, North America, 
and Pacifie Asia (Oman, 1994, p. 90). 
Textiles and cars are two sectors that are especially subject to the 'new 
competition', and for the reasons just mentioned one does indeed find that 
foreign investment tends to be concentrated near the largest markets for those 
products (UNCTAD, 1995a). In the case of the United States for example, 
Mexico and the Caribbean are major recipients of foreign investment in cars 
and textiles respectively, while the recent decision by General Motors to 
establish a full-scale assembly plant in Thailand or the Philippines attests to 
the growing importance of the Asian market for cars (The International 
Herald Tribune, 29 May 1996). 
Summary of the Technological Influences on Patterns of Globalization 
It is useful at this point to summarize the numerous trade and foreign 
investment-induced mechanisms of technological influence as they involve 
different forms of information technology and benefit different groups of 
developing countries (Table 2.6). In fact, our analysis has identified four 
separate groups of developing countries that benefit from at least one of the 
mechanisms shown in Table 2.6, namely the first-tier NICs (such as Korea 
and Taiwan), the second-tier NICs (such as Malaysia and the Philippines), 
large developing countries with an advanced scientific or technological base 
(such as India and Brazil) and countries in close proximity to major markets, 
which by virtue of their particular competencies are able to participa te in the 
'new competition'. Sorne of these country groups, particularly the first-tier 
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NICs, tend to benefit from almost all the mechanisms while other groups 
benefit from only a few of them. If one looks at the country groups least likely 
to benefit from the mechanisms described in Table 2.6, Sub-Saharan Africa is 
the obvious choice because the necessary technological capabilities are con-
spicuously absent. Indeed the absence of such capabilities means that African 
countries may even have become worse off as a result of the adoption else-
where of information technologies in the manner described earlier in relation 
to Figure 2.1 (see also 'Implications for Research and Policy Formulation' 
below). 
Our conclusion is thus that the unequal patterns of global integration 
shown in Table 2.1 - and especially the extreme experiences of East Asia on 
the one band and Sub-Saharan Africa on the other - are to some extent an 
outcome of the influence exerted by information technology.11 Sorne of the 
en tries in Table 2.6, moreover, sugge&t that a parallel type of influence may be 
at work within countries, where the gainers tend to be large-scale, foreign-
owned, urban-based firms, rather than - or at the expense of - small-scale 
rural enterprises. In this respect information technology may also have con-
tributed to income inequality within the developing countries themselves. One 
should note, however, that the relationship between firms is only one com-
ponent of the total effect that technical change bas on inequality within a 
country. What also needs to be considered is the question of how new 
technology influences the dispersion ofwages within that country. This ques-
tion mainly relates to the skill intensity of technical change, and in particular 
whether that change primarily concerns skilled or unskilled labour. If, as is 
widely believed, information technology tends to increase the relative demand 
for skilled labour, then the wages of this group will rise relative to those of 
workers in the unskilled category. lndeed one comprehensive study of wage 
dispersion trends in the United States 'points toward skill-biased technical 
change as the major driving force behind rising wage inequality' (Davis and 
Haltiwanger, 1991, p. 174). 
This particular feature of information technology may also help explain the 
sharp rise in wage inequality in certain Latin American countries, for example 
Mexico and Chile (World Bank, 1995a), though reliable empirical evidence of 
this bas yet to be gathered. Research is also lacking on yet another way in 
which information technology may affect inequality within a developing 
country. Apart from its influence on firms and workers, this technology 
also affects those consumers who are able to benefit from product improve-
ments (with regard to say durability) and price reductions. What one needs to 
know in this regard is whether the beneficiaries are based in rural or urban 
areas and whether they have relatively high or low incomes. 
So far our conclusions have been based on a consideration of each of the 
separate mechanisms shown in Table 2.6. These conclusions are reinforced if 
one also looks at the relations between the mechanisms rather than just at 
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Table 2.6 Summary of trade and foreign-investment-induced mechanisms of 
technological influence on globalization 
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each individual mechanism on its own. The reason is that there is considerable 
degree of cumulativeness in the technological processes that underlie the 
integration of developing c'ountries into the global economy. This is partly a 
question of the synergy between the various information technologies them-
selves, as is the case for example with the integration of computers, telecom-
munications and office automation into an integrated services digital network 
(ISDN). But it also has a great deal to do with the Myrdalian notion of 
cumulative causation, which envisages a widening rather than a narrowing of 
the initial gap between competitors of unequal strength. We have already 
suggested, for example, that foreign investment is more likely to accrue to 
rapidly growing than to slowly growing economies, and it is also more likely 
to flow in the direction of those developing countries whose initial conditions 
include a well-developed telecommunications infrastructure. Or again, those 
countries or firms that at a given point in time are capable of using informa-
tion technology effectively are also more likely to benefit from the production 
and export opportunities afforded by such technology. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH AND PO LICY FORMULATION 
The implications for further research revolve around the mechanisms of 
technological influence on recent patterns of globalization that have formed 
the main part of this chapter and were presented in summary form in Table 
2.6. First of all, we feel that there is a need for a better understanding of some 
of those mechanisms. For example we have suggested that the manner in 
which information technology influences the pattern of gains and losses is 
more complex than is usually thought. In particular we have argued that the 
effect that the adoption of certain information technologies has on non-
adopting firms and countries depends crucially on the characteristics of the 
products made by the competing units. These demand-side relationships need 
to be examined empirically on the basis of far more disaggregated data than is 
now available in international trade statistics. Sorne of the other mechanisms 
require further research because they have only begun to emerge relatively 
recently. We are referring here especially to the way in which information 
technology is enabling transnational corporations to disperse their economic 
activities more widely than has hitherto been possible. Among the issues that 
need to be researched in connection with this emerging phenomenon, is the 
question of how it will alter the nature of innovations generated by transna-
tionals in developing countries. For whereas at least part of that investment 
used to be undertaken for the purpose of adapting products and processes to 
host-country conditions, the R&D that is now being undertaken in develop-
ing countries on the basis of advanced information technologies appears to be 
directed towards more 'global' products that can be used throughout the 
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corporation, rather than towards local adaptations. To the extent that this 
switch in the focus of R&D does occur, it raises the disturbing possibility that 
the technical changes arising out of direct foreign investment will be even less 
appropriate to the needs of the majority of those living in the Third World 
than is currently the case. This possibility deserves to be investigated theor-
etically as well as empirically, and the research could perhaps best be set in the 
broader context of finding alternatives to the product cycle as a model of 
foreign investment in the era of information technology. 12 
The second main area where further research is needed has to do with the 
role of government policy in the process by which information technology 
causes some developing countries to become increasingly marginalized over 
time. For while it is true that these technologies possess characteristics - such 
as skill intensity and a tendency to be associated with sophisticated high-
income products - that make them more accessible to relatively advanced 
developing countries, it is also true that accessibility is influenced to an 
important extent by government policy. We know, for example, that OECD 
countries have used a variety of national policies to maximize the diffusion of 
information technology and it is more than likely that those policies have 
improved the ability of OECD countries to compete effectively on world 
markets. 13 We also know a good deal about the policies towards information 
technology that have been pursued in the NICs and in large industrially 
advanced developing countries such as lndia, Brazil and China. 14 We know 
very much less, however, about policies in those countries that have integ-
rated least successfully into the global economy in the past decade. lt is 
therefore difficult to assess the extent to which that lack of integration can 
be ascribed to the governments of those countries, important though this issue 
obviously is. 
Then there is the closely related normative question of how the margin-
alized countries (located mainly but not exclusively in Sub-Saharan Africa), 
could make better use of information technology in their relations with other 
countries. What seems most crucial in this regard is the formulation of a 
national information technology strategy 
to address the systemic constraints to the effective use and wide diffusion of 
IT. This involves organizational adjustments and coordinated actions at 
the firm, industry and national levels, with investments in management 
skills and restructuring. A long-term perspective and a coherent framework 
are needed to identify economy-wide information and communication 
needs, to target large-scale application areas for strategic impact and 
demonstration effects, and to create the funding mechanisms, policy envir-
onment and common services necessary to support a combination of top-
down/bottom-up initiatives and pilot projects, accelerate learning and meet 
the needs of smaller organizations (Hanna and Dugonjic, 1995, p. 36). 
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Such a framework seems particularly necessary for small and low-income 
countries (for example in Sub-Saharan Africa) that depend heavily on foreign 
donors for information technology. The problem is that these interventions 
are frequently uncoordinated and are made in response to events rather than 
conforming to a coherent policy framework. 
By no means the least important purpose of a national information tech-
nology strategy is the setting of certain policy priorities, since it is unrealistic 
to conceive ofprogress being made simultaneously along all the technological 
dimensions that influence a country's degree of integration into the global 
economy (unfortunately much of the policy ad vice that is given to developing 
countries in this as in other areas fails to recognize this need). What probably 
warrants particular attention in this regard is the telecommunications infra-
structure because, among other reasons, of the powerful influence this vari-
able exerts on not just one, but on several of the other mechanisms that are 
summarized in Table 2.6 above. Not only does it affect trade-induced 
mechanisms of technological influence (via, for example, an enhanced cap-
ability to adopt industrial information technologies), but also the mechanisms 
that operate through foreign investment (through, for example, an enhanced 
capacity to attract dispersed data-processing activities). 
Two types of electronic communication systems appear especially promis-
ing in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa and other marginalized regions of 
the Third World. One of them, called 'FidoNet', 
is a low-cost method of linking together computer bulletin board systems 
through ordinary phone lines. Its virtue - and its usefulness in developing 
countries - lies in its ability to overcome the limitations of inadequate 
phone systems. FidoNet systems automatically contact each other at 
night - when phone rates are low - to exchange conference postings and 
electronic mail messages. They keep dialing until they make a connection, 
and do not stop transmitting until assured by the machine at the other end 
that all messages have been received free of errors. Regular connections, 
called gateways, between FidoNet computers and other systems such as the 
Internet and the Association for Progressive Communications (APC) net-
works, allow FidoNet users to communicate with virtually anyone with an 
electronic mail address, with most messages reaching their destination 
within 24 hours (Young, 1993, p. 33). 
FidoNet computers are able to operate even without a telephone system by 
means of so-called 'packet radio' sets, which are small devices attached to 
computers in much the same way as a modem and allow e-mail and other data 
to be exchanged automatically. 
The second type of communications system that seems especially well suited 
to African conditions makes use of (relatively inexpensive) low-Earth-orbit 
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satellite technology rather than the telephone network. While in orbit the 
satellite passes every point on Earth at least twice a day and during each 'pass' 
data can be up- or downloaded to other parts of the world using packet radio 
technology. One low-Earth satellite already forms the basis of an important 
medical network in Africa. It serves thousands of physicians and health-care 
workers by enabling them to communicate with colleagues elsewhere in the 
world and by providing them with recent medical information in electronic 
form (The New York Times, 22 January, 1996). 
Notes 
1. I am indebted to Ajit Bhalla, Paul Streeten and the IDRC for comments on an 
earlier draft of this chapter. 
2. For a detailed description ofthese changes see James (1985). 
3. Winsbury (1995, p. 234) reports that 'low income countries still have less than a 
5 per cent share of global telephone main lines although they have 55 percent of 
the world's population'. 
4. According to Watanabe (1995, p. 345), for example, 'The use of microelectronic 
industrial machinery in the Third World is heavily concentrated in a small 
number of economies. Most of them have already been classified as "high 
income economies" by the World Bank (Singapore and Hong Kong), or are 
preparing to join the "rich men's club" (The Republic of Korea and Taiwan 
Province of China). Apart from these, ... the diffusion of the new technology is 
marginal.' 
5. Bhalla (1996) provides some evidence in support of this assertion. 
6. Evidence that the adoption of information technology enhances international 
competitiveness takes different forms. On the one hand there are econometric 
estimates of the relationship between country export performance and rates of 
technological diffusion. Antonelli et al. (1992), for example, find that interna-
tional competitiveness in the market for cotton fabrics is 'strongly and positively 
influenced' by the rate of adoption of shuttleless looms. On the other hand there 
is case study evidence based on surveys of individual firms. See, for example the 
series of country case studies conducted by the International Labour Office 
(ILO) referred to in James (1994). 
7. The value ofworld trade in electronic microcircuits, for example, grew by almost 
7 percent between 1989 and 1993. Diodes and transistors recorded a similar rate 
of growth over this period (see UN, 1993). The rapid growth in world demand 
for electronics and the central role played in that growth by the East Asian NI Cs 
is emphasized by Freeman et al. (1995). 
8. Africa's share of world manufactured exports during the period from 1970-90 
was 0.4 percent (see UNCTAD, 1995b). 
9. UN (1992) notes that 'recent developments in information technologies tend 
to increase the internationalisation advantages of Transnational Corpora-
tions'. 
10. For details see Rowland (1995) and Schware and Hume (1995). 
11. A similar conclusion was reached by Castells and Tyson (1988) for the period 
before the l 980s and l 990s. 
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12. Recent literature on the changing relevance of the product cycle mode) includes 
Patel (1995) and Cantwell (1995). 
13. See, for example, Hanna et al. (1995). 
14. See the studies on these countries reviewed in James (1994) and the various 
chapters in Brundenius and Goransson (1993). 
3 The Impact of Globalization 
and the Information 
Revolution on Latin America 
Albert Berry 
Two of the outstanding phenomena of the last couple of decades are 'global-
ization' and the 'information revolution' upon which the so-called 'informa-
tion highway' has been built. The current information revolution, like its 
predecessor, has created man y jobs while destroying many others, thus leading 
to change and uncertainty in both the labour market and society. The same 
may be said of globalization. It remains to be seen what their longer-tenn 
impact on average incomes, income distribution, poverty and marginalization 
will be; and until this becomes clearer it is natural that many fears and 
uncertainties will accompany the hopes and expectations these phenomena 
create. Given the turbulent economic trends in Latin America over the last 
two decades, it is natural that such mixed feelings are common in that region. 
DEFINITIONS, APPROACHES AND BACKGROUND 
Concern about globalization is partly based on the idea that the gains in 
national income it may produce are closely connected to cost cutting via 
employment reductions ('downsizing'), streamlining government in order 
not to hamstring firms by high taxation, vigorous pressure to raise worker 
productivity, and pushing down wages or slowing their increase. Such fears 
are heightened by the doubts that developing countries often harbour about 
their ability to compete in open markets, in which case they worry that the 
pain will yield little gain. Ironically and unfortunately, the focus on national 
competitiveness via productivity and cost cutting (each of which does or can 
bring benefits of its own) is somewhat misguided. In implicitly rejecting the 
theory of comparative advantage it reflects a basic misunderstanding of how a 
country benefits from international trade (Berry, 1997c). 
An important aspect of the background to these issues in Latin America is 
the high level of inequality, currently closely related to the unequal distribu-
tion of education or more generally of human capital, and historically to the 
concentration ofland. These and other determinants ofinequality and hence 
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ofpoverty must be borne in mind, both when assessing the mechanisms linking 
globalization and information technology (IT) to poverty (whether positively 
or negatively) and when considering how policy may improve those effects. 
Globalization and the information revolution are linked in various ways, as 
discussed by Streeten in Chapter 1. The focus of this chapter is the way in 
which these two phenomena, separately and together, are affecting and will 
affect the social and economic evolution of the countries of Latin America, in 
particular the levels of poverty and marginalization in that part of the world. 1 
Much of the extensive literature on marginalization in Latin America has 
pointed to economic processes that bring benefits to some groups but leave 
others behind. In varying degrees the concept can refer to countries, regions, 
occupational categories and individuals. 
Ex ports 
In Latin America and the Caribbean the ratio of exports to GDP (measured in 
constant 1980 prices) averaged around 14 percent in the 1970s; since then it 
has shown a continuous upward drift to over 23 percent in 1994 (Table 3.1 ). In 
current price terms,2 however, the story is quite different. World Bank (l 996a, 
p. 213) figures indicate that the ratio fell from 16 percent in 1980 to 15 percent 
in 1994. The difference between these two patterns reflects the large negative 
terms of tracte effect estimated by UNECLAC ( l 995a ), equal to 5. 7 per cent of 
GDP in 1994 (vis-à-vis 1980) or about 30 per cent of the value of imports in 
that year. The ratio of imports to GDP (again using constant 1980 prices) 
averaged around 14 percent during the l 970s, peaked at around 16 percent in 
1980-81, and fell to a low of Jess than 11 percent in 1984--85, since which time 
it has risen systematically. Because, by the early l 990s, the terms of tracte effect 
had grown to a large negative number of around 6 percent of GDP, it was only 
in 1992 that the constant price import ratio surpassed that of 1980-81. 
Between 1980 and 1994 the share of manufactures in the region's merchan-
dise exports rose from 17.4 percent to about 50 percent (Table 3.2), partly, 
it should be noted, as a result of the falling prices of primary exports. The 
share of manufactures in total exports rose for all groups of trading partners 
(Table 3.3), and most notably for the industrialized countries, where the 
figure was still low in 1980 (7 .7 per cent) but then rose sharply to nearly 27 
per cent by 1991 and has presumably risen further since then. 
Capital Inflows 
The net inflow of capital, which was low throughout the l 980s except for 1980-
81 (it peaked at $40.1 billion in 1981), rose sharply in 1991-92 and exceeded 
$60 billion in 1992 and 1993 (Table 3.4). As a result the net resource transfer 
(which also includes the net current payments to factors of production), 
Table 3.l Rel(1.tive shares of the components ofGDP and gross na~ional income: Latin America and the Caribbean (at market 
-.1 
N 
pricesI, GDP = 100) 
Total final Grossfixed Exports of lmports of Net factor Real gross 
consumption capital Domestic goods and goods and Terms-of- payments to national 
expenditure2 formation demand services services trade effect rest of world income 
1980 78.2 23.5 101.7 14.l 15.8 2.6 97.6 
1981 77.9 23.3 101.2 15.0 16.2 -0.8 3.7 95.7 
1982 77.2 20.7 97.9 15.5 13.3 -2.4 5.l 92.7 
1983 76.2 17.2 93.4 17.l 10.5 -2.7 4.9 92.6 
1984 76.3 16.6 92.9 17.9 10.8 -2.3 5.2 92.8 
1985 76.3 16.6 93.0 17.6 10.6 -3.0 4.9 92.5 
1986 76.9 17.2 94.l 16.8 11.0 -4.l 4.5 91.8 
1987 76.4 17.2 93.6 17.5 11.2 -4.2 3.9 92.3 
1988 76.2 17.0 93.2 18.9 12.l -4.4 4.l 91.9 
1989 76.l 16.3 92.4 19.8 12.2 -4.7 4.3 91.5 
1990 76.6 15.9 92.5 20.7 13.2 -5.0 3.7 92.0 
1991 77.4 16.4 93.8 20.9 14.7 -5.5 3.4 91.9 
1992 78.0 17.5 95.5 21.6 17.l -5.6 3.l 92.2 
1993 77.6 18.l 95.7 22.4 18. l -6.0 3.2 91.5 
19943 77.2 19.0 96.l 23.2 19.3 -5.7 3.l 92.l 
Notes: 
l. Official figures converted into dollars at constant 1980 prices. Nineteen countries. 
2. Includes variation in stocks. 
3. Preliminary figures. 
Source: UNECLAC (1995b, p. 62). 
Albert Berry 73 
Table 3.2 Exports of manufactured products from Latin America, by country 
(percentages) 
1970 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Argentina 13.9 23.l 20.8 29.1 28.2 26.3 31.9 32.7 
Barbados 25.3 52.5 83.8 43.3 58.7 54.7 61.7 n.a. 
Belize n.a. 17.6 24.9 15.4 n.a. 18.2 20.6 17.0 
Bolivia 3.2 2.9 0.4 4.7 3.8 12.5 17.0 22.2 
Brazil 13.4 37.1 43.7 51.9 54.8 56.9 58.8 54.8 
Chile 4.8 11.3 6.7 10.9 12.7 13.2 16.1 16.4 
Co!ombia 9.0 19.7 16.9 25.1 33.3 31.8 39.9 36.9 
Costa Rica 18.7 29.8 22.3 27.4 24.5 25.6 n.a. n.a. 
Ecuador 1.8 3.0 0.8 2.3 2.4 4.0 7.1 7.4 
El Salvador 28.7 35.4 25.7 35.5 40.6 47.8 46.1 44.7 
Guatemala 28.1 24.4 20.2 24.5 27.9 29.9 30.7 31.3 
Honduras 8.2 12.8 4.0 9.5 11.6 12.9 12.8 15.0 
Mexico 33.3 12.1 20.6 43.31 50.81 71.12 74.62 77.42 
NiCaragua 17.8 18.1 8.9 8.2 9.1 7.0 9.4 13.1 
Panama 3.53 8.9 12.8 17.0 20.8 16.7 16.4 17.7 
Paraguay 9.0 11.8 5.5 9.9 11.3 15.2 16.7 21.3 
Peru 1.8 16.9 11.8 18.4 22.6 16.71 15.8 13.9 
Trinidad & Tobago 12.8 5.0 18.2 26.7 28.5 29.9 34.2 42.5 
Uruguay 17.6 38.2 35.0 38.5 40.1 40.8 42.2 42.9 
Venezuela 1.0 1.5 10.0 10.9 9.6 11.0 13.3 13.8 
Regional Total 10.84 17.4 23.4 32.8 36.44 45.8 50.1 5 50.06 
Notes: 
1. Preliminary figure. 
2. Includes goods for processing (maquila). 
3. Does not include the canal zone. 
4. Does not include Belize. 
5. Does not include Costa Rica. 
6. Does not include Barbados and Costa Rica. 
Source: UNECLAC (1995a), p.111. 
which had been negative over the period 1982-90, became positive and was 
around 20 percent of the value of ex ports in 1992 and 1993, around the level of 
1980-81. This transfer was, however, small again in 1994 (Table 3.2). Foreign 
direct investment (FDI) also jumped in the early l 990s, from $6-7 billion a year 
in 1989-90 to an estimated $18 billion in 1994 (Table 3.5). 
Information Technology 
The impact of the information technology revolution and of increased integ-
ration into the world economy began to be felt in Latin America at a time 
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Table 3.3 Direction and composition of trade of Latin American countries 
Latin Other 
World Developed1 Developing America2 developing 
Absolute values in $ billion: 
1970 17.5 14.l 3.4 3.0 0.4 
1980 107.9 79.0 28.9 23.0 5.9 
1991 136.6 103.7 32.9 23.l 9.8 
Percentages: 
1970 1.86 1.04 0.82 0.76 0.06 
1980 15.86 7.68 8.18 6.98 1.20 
1991 42.63 26.94 15.69 11.60 4.09 
Notes: 
1. Including the countries of Eastern Europe and the communist countries of 
Asia (the latter of which do very little trade with Latin America). 
2. Includes exports from each country of Latin America to the other countries of 
the region. 
Source: UNCTAD (1993). 
when most of these countries were in the throes of, or just emerging from, the 
macroeconomic downturn of the 1980s, brought on by the debt crisis. In the 
wake of that crisis most countries adopted a market-friendly set of policies 
that represented a marked change from the past, and they have now 
integrated or are integrating rapidly into the world economy. The absolute 
levels of trade, capital flows and foreign direct investment have all increased 
sharply over the last decade, the combined result of recovery from the depths 
of the recession induced by the debt crisis, of policy liberalization and of the 
more general process of globalization, with the associated decline in transport 
and communications costs, the formation of trade blocs and the reduction of 
tariffs via the Uruguay round of the GATT negotiations. 
The extent of diffusion and use of IT in Latin America is harder to assess 
quantitatively. The telecommunications networks in this region have lost 
ground relative to many parts of the world over the last couple of decades 
due to the slow economic growth associated with the debt crisis. In countries 
such as Argentina and Venezuela extremely inefficient public sector enter-
prises have also accounted for part of the lag. Mexico, Brazil and Argentina 
participate as exporters of electronics items, with Mexico in particular show-
ing dynamism during the l 990s, largely through the maquiladores, one pre-
sumes. lndependent technological capacity has been limited by the fact that 
the region's expenditure on R&D as a share of GDP has remained low, 
having fallen further behind the LOC average since 1970, when the two 
figures were about equal at 0.3 (see Chapter 7, Table 7.9). 
Table 3.4 Net capital inflows and resource transfers: Latin America and the Caribbean ($billions and percentages) 1 
Effective net Net payments Export of 
inflow of Unregistered Net inflow of of profits and Resource transfers goods and 
capitat2 transactions3 capital ( 1 + 2) 2/1 interest (J -5) (3 - 5) services 618 718 
_2) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (JO) ---($billions) (%) ( $ billions) (%) (%) 
1980 33.6 -2.3 31.3 -6.8 18.8 14.8 12.5 101.6 14.6 12.3 
1981 51.8 -11.7 40.1 -22.6 28.9 22.9 11.2 109.6 20.9 10.2 
1982 32.7 -13.l 19.6 -40.1 38.8 -6.1 -19.2 99.6 -6.1 -19.3 
1983 6.8 -4.l 2.7 -60.3 34.8 -28.0 -32.1 99.5 -28.1 -32.2 
1984 13.6 -3.l 10.5 -22.8 37.5 -23.9 -27.0 110.8 -21.6 -24.4 
1985 8.5 -4.9 3.6 -57.0 35.7 -27.2 -32.1 105.6 -25.8 -30.4 
1986 11.0 -1.3 9.7 -11.8 32.4 -21.4 -22.7 91.3 -23.4 -24.9 
1987 13.6 1.6 15.2 11.8 31.1 -17.5 -15.9 104.1 -16.8 -15.3 
1988 7.9 -2.0 5.9 -25.3 34.3 -26.4 -28.4 119.4 -22.1 -23.8 
1989 7.6 4.5 12.l 60.0 38.3 -30.7 -26.2 132.7 -23.1 -19.7 
1990 17.8 0.1 17.9 0.6 33.8 -16.0 -15.9 146.0 -11.0 
1991 37.0 0.4 37.4 1.1 31.0 6.0 6.4 146.0 4.1 4.4 
1992 59.8 1.5 61.3 2.5 30.9 28.9 30.4 154.5 18.7 19.7 
1993 66.5 0.2 66.7 0.3 33.0 33.5 33.7 164.9 20.3 20.4 
19944 43.3 34.2 9.1 189.2 4.8 
Notes: 
1. Covers 16 Spanish-speaking countries (Cuba and Panama are not included), plus Brazil and Haïti. 
2. Equal to net inflow of capital minus unregistered transactions. 
3. Corresponds to the errors and omissions entry on the balance of payments. 
4. Preliminary estimates. 
Source: UNECLAC (1995b), p. 106. 
-..} 
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Table 3.5 Sources of external financing: Latin America and the Caribbean 
($million) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 19941 
Debt: 
Bonds2 833 2 760 7 242 14 018 24 404 19 866 
Banks3 -6 497 5 559 6 800 10 943 1 636 3 200 
Commercial paper 127 1 212 840 315 400 
Certificates of deposit 670 1 100 65 
Investment: 
Direct4 6 134 6 728 10 830 12 727 13 805 18 057 
ADR/GDR5 98 4 120 4 063 5 726 4 689 
External funds6 416 575 727 293 10 5657 
Notes: 
1. Preliminary estimates. 
2. Gross value. 
3. Net, short- and medium-term. 
4. lncludes reinvestment of profits. 
5. ADR - American depository receipts; GDR = global depository receipts. 
6. Close-ended funds; initial capital. 
7. First six months. 
Source: UNECLAC(l995b), p. 104. 
The overall impact of globalization and IT on marginalization/poverty can 
be thought of as a combination of their impact on growth and on distribu-
tion,3 in particular the income share of the group in or near the poverty 
category (at present most studies suggest that about a third of the population 
of the region is in poverty). ln the case of the poorer countries, growth is 
especially important as a major contributing factor to poverty alleviation. If 
its impact on material poverty is positive enough, it could offset any effects 
from an increase in inequality. From a policy perspective, it is not so much the 
overall impact of globalization and IT on poverty that matters as (1) the effect 
that policy bas on the advance of these phenomena, and (2) how, given the 
extent of globalization and dissemination of IT, which is either desirable or 
inevitable, policy can affect its impact on poverty. The main policies that 
affect the rate and pattern of globalization are those that affect trade flows, 
direct foreign investment and the flows of financial capital. The main influ-
ences on the evolution of IT, while harder to identify with any confidence, 
clearly include the country's R&D policy as well as the pace and pattern of 
human capital formation. 
For neither globalization nor IT can the impact on Latin American society 
be more than crudely guessed at this time. The attempt to identify those 
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effects is at an early stage. But both phenomena warrant an increasing effort 
in that direction because the effects could be large, they could go in either 
direction, and it is possible that policy could affect them significantly . . 
The next section looks at the nature of the processes of globalization and 
technology change in the information area and their possible effects. A second 
point of departure, the focus of another section, is a review of a number of 
outcomes in the region - rates of growth, levels of employment/unemploy-
ment, and income distribution. These outcomes provide another test of any 
predictions made, and allow one to try to 'work back' from the outcomes to 
identify the mechanisms that are most likely to have been responsible for 
them. The distribution of income became more concentrated in most Latin 
American countries at around the time the economic reforms were intro-
duced, one of which was a reduction in trade barriers, leading to more open 
economies and higher trading ratios. It is possible that the technological 
changes have had an impact in this direction as well. 
All of the standard arguments in support of the view that international 
integration and new technologies will bring benefits are potentially valid (see 
Streeten, Chapter 1), but there are serious grounds for concern that expecta-
tions may have been overblown. Thus far the empirical record is ambiguous, 
but the post-crisis, post-reform outcomes in the Latin American region are 
worrisome on both the growth and the distribution front. 
THE EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZA TION AND INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY 
As noted above, both technological change (of which the new information-
related technologies are the most prominent component) and integration into 
international markets are likely to affect the region's growth and distribution 
performance in significant ways. 
The 'Dependency' Critique of Latin America's Earlier Experience of 
International Integration: its Relations to Marginalization 
During the early postwar decades much concern was expressed about the 
dependency of the Latin American economies on the indus trial powers. Frank 
(1969) presented a classic Marxist interpretation. Sunkel's non-Marxist views 
constituted one of several strands of postwar thinking on the need to inter-
vene in markets, following a pattern of thought set in motion by Prebisch 
(1950) and his fears that primary goods exporters such as Latin America 
would fare badly over time due to a secular decline in the terms of trade for 
such goods. Sunkel (1973) argued that Latin America ran the risk of being 
trapped into continuing dependence, and that income and productivity gaps 
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might widen as backwash effects outweighed the spread effects of economic 
growth in the Centre countries. He associated this outcome with the increased 
difficulty of gaining access to the elements of the 'development package', 
because such access was becoming increasingly dependent on purchasing the 
complete package at a high price from transnationals {TNCs), which were 
taking advantage of the protection of the local market under import-substi-
tuting industrialization (ISI) to get good returns on their investments while 
centralizing all the R&D in their own countries and keeping their technical 
knowledge close to their chests. Very high estimates by Vaitsos (1974) of the 
returns achieved - through transfer pricing, among other mechanisms - by 
foreign pharmaceutical companies in Colombia underlined such worries. 
Meanwhile the literature on marginality debated the extent to which the 
blame for the mushrooming urban squatter settlements (and poverty more 
generally) lay with the process of capitalist accumulation and growth in these 
dependent economies.4 
Neither subsequent events nor the accumulation of research have con-
firmed the more pessimistic views expressed on the effects of dependency 
and on the trends in marginality, unless one interprets the economic crisis 
of the 1980s as a natural outcome of the mechanisms described by these 
authors rather than as a mainly chance historical event afflicting the region. 
Although growth varied markedly across countries, it was generally good 
until the crisis arrived in the early 1980s, averaging 5.5 percent per year for 
the region from 1950-80, a 'performance not significantly surpassed by any 
other group of countries, either developed or developing' {Teitel, 1992, p. 356). 
Sorne countries did especially well, including Brazil and Mexico. Manufactur-
ing exports expanded significantly, albeit from a fairly small base. There was 
no systematic evidence of a technological 'slipping behind' of the sort that 
exercised the dependency theorists. 5 For most countries of the region income 
distribution did not change markedly over this period; to the extent that there 
was some worsening (for example Brazil in the 1960s) it was not large enough 
to significantly offset the positive effects of growth. Employment generation 
occurred at a pace sufficient to raise the share of the labour force in the 
modern sector, with its relatively high labour productivity, and to bring about 
a continuous decrease (for the region as a whole) in the share of the popula-
tion living in conditions ofpoverty. In other words, the decades leading up to 
1980 saw a quite important degree of 'trickle down'. With the region's per 
capita income rising by about 3 percent per year from 1950-80, the incidence 
of poverty - using Altimir's poverty line (Altimir, 1982) - fell quickly from 
around 65 per cent in 1950, 38 per cent in 1970 to about 25 per cent in 1980 
(Berry, 1997a). 
All too soon, however, the worries of the dependistas with respect to the 
region's inability to control its own fate and break out of the older modes of 
interaction with the industrialized countries were replaced by the trauma of 
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the debt crisis, during which an excessive presence of TNCs or FOI was the 
least of region's worries. Foreign capital withdrew rather than knocking on 
the door. Serious recessions hit ail the major countries except Colombia, 
unemployment rose and most countries suffered serious bouts of inflation. 
Meanwhile the policy preference switched to 'outward orientation', with its 
strongest proponents arguing that the import-substituting industrialization 
(ISI) strategy was misguided and had contributed both to slow growth and to 
unnecessarily high income concentration (Corbo, 1988). The new view, like 
the dependista one, needs to be viewed with caution; the creditable growth 
performance and the essentially stable income distribution during the ISI 
phase seem to contradict them both (Berry et al., 1997). Now that the region 
is reentering world markets and capital is again flowing in, the roles of foreign 
trade, foreign capital and the TNCs need to be reassessed. 
Though the worst fears of earlier times were exaggerated, up to a point 
some of the concerns were no doubt justified - for example the long-standing 
contention that technological change was a key factor underlying the inability 
of Latin America's growth to generate the desired amount of employment 
and hence reduce the concentration of income. Pinto (1965) argued that 
technology developed in the industrialized countries was not suited to the 
factor proportions of the region, and that it was usually transferred with little 
attempt at adaptation. Tokman (1989) concurred, noting that studies of 
elasticities of substitution (for example ILO-PREALC, 1980) have usually 
found these to be low, and suggesting that the prevalence of foreign techno-
logy has played a role in the falling real wages of unskilled workers in a 
number of Latin American countries. As discussed below, the 'appropriate 
technology' question is an especially tricky one for the Latin American 
region. Since it is Jess labour abundant than the Asian countries, the idea 
that its comparative advantage lies in labour is Jess obvious. 
An Optimistic View of Globalization 
The current optimistic view of globalization and freer trade anticipates 
growth benefits arising from allocative gains, gains in X-efficiency (because 
freer trade means more competition, which promotes efficiency), capital 
inflow raising the total capital stock and hence output, greater technological 
transfer through TNCs, greater imports of capital goods, a greater flow of 
ideas resulting from greater overall contact, and other positive mechanisms. 
Ail of this helps to make plausible the 'convergence theory', that income gaps 
between countries and between regions of countries are narrowing. Mean-
while the optimistic view of the distributional implications of freer trade 
cornes from the belief that the demand for less-skilled labour will increase 
and that the prospects of agriculture, which as a whole tends to be penalized 
by import substitution, will be improved. Optimists also believe that the 
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scaling down of public-sector activity and the introduction of more market 
principles into that which remains will greatly increase the sector's efficiency 
in the provision of public goods and services, including poverty redressai 
services. 
The Effects of Freer Trade 
Because Latin America's experience under globalization and freer trade has 
not thus far led to a clearly better or worse performance than the previous ISI 
model, it is useful to draw on the more general developing-country experi-
ence, even though it too remains surprisingly ambiguous in a number of 
respects. A vast array of empirical cross-country studies show that export 
growth and overall economic growth have tended to go together. But there 
remain questions with respect to how systematic the link is across groups of 
countries and periods of time, to what extent it is due to 'reverse causality' 
from output growth to export growth,6 and to what extent it is due to joint 
causation. 7 Despite the absence of overwhelming confirmation of the positive 
role of exports in growth at the country level, few students of development 
doubt that it is true for individual countries and in a variety of contexts. 
Two other major qualifications have been made. First, the elasticity of 
world demand for developing-country exports may be too low for the benefits 
from exporting to be generalized. Second, though trade may often be quite 
beneficial, this does not necessarily make the virtual absence of trade barriers 
the optimal policy choice. To so assume is to deny the potential validity of the 
infant-industry argument for protection.8 This qualification is also of possible 
importance in Latin America. However mixed the signais provided by the 
empirical analysis on the mechanisms connecting levels of trade and growth, 
researchers have barely attempted (with cross-section or time-series analysis) 
the more refined task of analysing the effects that degree and type of barriers 
to trade have on growth. The historical record in East Asia provides evidence 
that ISI policies have been the normal prelude to and have complemented 
strong export performances. Persuasive arguments can be made that the 
region's successes (beginning with that of Japan) owed much to the effective 
management of trade in the context of organized industrial policies (Wade, 
1990). The cross-country evidence (see especially Helleiner, 1994) that the 
exchange rate is the key variable determining export and growth success is 
consistent with the proposition that trade liberalization is not necessarily or 
generally the best way to achieve potential benefits from trade. 
The Effects of Capital Inflows 
Much less analysis has been undertaken on the effects of capital flows into 
developing countries. As with trade, the main debate concentrates on whether 
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there should be any significant restrictions on capital inflows, beyond such 
obvious rationales as environmental protection. Along with considerable 
microeconomic evidence that important benefits can be reaped by hosting 
FDI, there is concem that such capital may seek out high-profit activities in 
the host economy and, helped by a process in which developing countries bid 
against each other to attract it, succeed in appropriating nearly all of the rents 
it generates. 
Short-term capital flows clearly have negative effects as well as providing 
benefits. They have led to macroeconomic instability in some Latin countries 
and discouraged export production, hence slowing the rate of growth (as in 
Mexico and Argentina). Much of international trade and FDI is undertaken 
by TNCs, most of them large and in possession of considerable oligopolistic 
power. Although FDI by TNCs has trade-creating effects, it tends to assign to 
countries a specific type of commercial specialization in the international 
division oflabour, and often to Iock the country into that role. In the case of 
primary products, countries are vulnerable to replacement oftheir exports by 
synthetic substitutes. In that of export platform manufactures, they are vul-
nerable to TNC strategies. For these and other reasons, Japan and later Korea 
chose to develop without extensive use ofFDI. Not being locked in is of special 
importance to middle-income countries such as those of Latin America. 
The technological and managerial advances of the last 15 years, along with 
deregulation and liberalization, have strengthened the position of large inter-
national firms. The power of FDI-led intraregional, intraindustry and intra-
firm trade is exemplified by the rapid increase in commerce between Mexico 
and the United States. In the second half of the 1980s Mexico accounted for 
two thirds of all employment in LDCs via affiliates of US TNCs (Chesnais, 
1995, p. 20). These affiliates increased their share of Mexican exports to the 
United States fourfold to more than 25 percent, and their share of Mexican 
imports from the United States to more than 40 per cent. The LDC worker, 
however, depends more on whether smaller firms can form an important part 
of the industrial structure. Sorne but not all TNCs have the capacity to draw 
smaller, more labour-intensive firms into the international circuit through 
subcontracting and other contractual arrangements. 
One possibly damaging constraint of globalization as it is presently unfold-
ing in Latin America is the pressure it puts on countries to bring inflation to 
very low levels, by historical standards. In the 'pro-investment macroeco-
nomic environment' maintained by the East Asian countries as part of their 
development process, there have been long periods of large fiscal and current 
account deficits, financial repression and inflationary pressures (UNCT AD, 
1996, p. 128). These countries generally tried hard to boost investor confid-
ence in other ways, for example, by avoiding extreme policy shifts. The 
deployment of some pro-investment incentives may have an inflationary 
impact, and some degree of inflation can facilitate changes in relative prices 
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(for example movements in real wages). A rigidly low inflation policy could 
have significant costs. The long-term experience of Brazil, with its high-
growth/high-inflation combination, is consistent with this hypothesis. 
Perhaps the greatest fear of globalization involves its impact on income 
distribution; that fear has its greatest empirical basis in Latin America, where 
the switch to a more open and market-oriented strategy has been accompan-
ied by a sharp increase in inequality in the majority of the countries (Berry, 
1997a; Bulmer-Thomas, 1996). The expectation that freer trade would raise 
wages has been the exception rather than the rule. One factor probably at 
work is the domination of international trade by large firms - a combination 
of TNCs and large national firms, whose high labour productivity limits 
employment creation. 
Possible Impacts of the Information Technology 
There is a rather widespread expectation that the information revolution will 
have a positive productivity/growth effect, but that this will be associated with 
a negative distributional effect. The impact of the information revolution, like 
that of any other technological advance, depends on who adopts the new 
techniques and how well they fit the factor proportions of the adopting 
countries. With the industrial countries adopting first, what remains to be 
seen is how quickly they spread to other countries, the resulting impact on the 
roles of transnational firms, larger national companies and smaller firms, and 
the overall impact on the demand for different types oflabour. The effect on 
national income depends on how much IT raises total factor productivity 
(TFP). The effect on distribution depends on the factor proportions of the 
technology adopted and on who adopts it; as a first approximation, it is 
more negative the greater the unskilled labour-saving bias and the more 
adoption differentially favours larger firms. The medium- and longer-term 
impact of technology on distribution also reflects any effect it may have on 
the country's factor stocks; some new technologies lead to major bursts of 
investment or to changes in education/training levels and hence influence 
factor proportions. 
The evolution of IT in Latin America appears to include the following 
scenarios. First, in spite of its being revolutionary in some senses, IT is best 
thought of as another wave of technological advance, not qualitatively dif-
ferent from earlier ones in the mechanisms and speed of dissemination or in 
the character of its impact. Latin America borrowed technology at a con-
siderable rate over most of the postwar period (that is, up to the debt crisis of 
the 1980s), overall growth was relatively fast and the region did not suffer any 
major worsening of income distribution (Berry, 1997a). So a continuation of 
these trends would be relatively satisfactory. Though most countries invested 
at least modestly in science and technology, and some (especially Brazil) 
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mounted serious efforts in this direction, these were curtailed by the debt 
crisis and in any case were not of the intensity envisaged by those authors 
emphasizing the importance of this area for Latin America's future economic 
progress (Perez, 1992; Teitel, 1992). 
Second, the region might continue to borrow as successfully as in the past 
without mounting an extensive R&D operation, but only if the rate of human 
capital formation is increased enough to permit efficient borrowing, dissem-
ination and use of the new technologies. In this scenario, effective incorpora-
tion of the new technologies will require more and different skills than in the 
past. 
Third, the above options might be either unfeasible or, inferior to a more 
aggressive technology policy. Such a policy could range from an attempt to 
keep technologically up-to-date by whatever means best achieves that goal 
(for example licensing, reverse engineering and so on), to one aimed at 
effective adaptation, including the 'blending' of new IT with traditional 
technologies, to one aimed at leapfrogging over some of the previous tech-
nologies to the newest ones. 
Finally, the worst situation would be one in which it would be very hard 
not to lose ground in the technology race and hence lose income-earning 
capacity. This is more likely if the overall rate of technological change is faster 
than before (reflected in the term 'revolution'), if the information is more 
closely held (if strategic alliances among TNCs delay dissemination) or if the 
factor intensity of the technology that does disseminate fairly readily is more 
damaging than before. In this scenario IT, and technological change more 
generally, could be damaging to the region. On the question of potentially 
'inappropriate' technology, optimists point to the fact that factor proportions 
do have an effect on the direction of R&D (Hayami and Ruttan, 1971; 
Binswanger and Ruttan, 1978). Though induced innovation does exist - in 
that the effective demand for new technologies affects the broad directions of 
research and of the resulting technological change - this effective demand 
reflects the economic weight behind it and the resources available to comple-
ment it. It explains why such a high share of research takes place in indus-
trialized countries; why it is so concentrated on products that will benefit 
groups with high purchasing power; why so little is directed to producers of 
less important crops, to small and medium enterprises (SMEs), and to the least 
developed countries; and, finally, the labour-saving bias of most innovation. 
At the other end of the spectrum from the 'induced innovation' point ofview is 
the description by Fransman (1991, p. 2, as cited by James, 1993, p. 406), 
whereby the pace and direction of R&D reflects not factor scarcities but 
various 'technological trajectories and momenta that are relatively un-
influenced by economic considerations'.9 
The interface between globalization and IT is important in the sense that 
the former raises the stakes associated with country policy choices in the latter 
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area. With an inward-looking strategy the costs of a wrong decision with 
respect to a new technology are simply the lost benefits from its local applica-
tion. ln the global economy an error can cost the country the large rents to be 
had from having the right products at the right time. ln Latin America, 
perhaps more than in any other major area of the Third World, the appro-
priate degree of scientific/technological capacity is an important and vexing 
question, as evidenced by the widely contrasting views expressed in the 
literature. ln East Asia the requisite capacity is in place in several countries, 
especially Korea; in Africa it is not likely to be in place in the immediate 
future. Latin America is able to step to a higher level of technological 
capability; the question is whether this would be a good use of resources. 
With such risks in mind it is important, as James (1993) emphasizes, to 
know a lot about the appropriability of the new technologies. TNC alliances 
are cause for concern on this front. But it may be that the technologies that 
really matter to Latin countries (on both the consumption and the production 
side) are not these frontier ones, but rather those whose prices tend to fall 
quickly as new breakthroughs appear and competition does its job. For 
example, CD-ROM enables the storage of vast amounts of medical and 
bibliographie information, benefiting agricultural research, health informa-
tion and medical research and library development (Mody and Dahlman, 
1992, p. 1714). Desktop publishing lowers the fixed costs of small-batch 
publications. With the declining cost of hardware, demonstration projects 
have become more feasible. Licensing of proprietary microelectronics tech-
nology from small firms in industrial countries might be more accessible to 
certain developing countries (Evans and Tigre, 1989). Unlike large firms 
these firms are more willing to share the technology. The diffusion of some 
automation techniques may depend on whether the equipment suppliers want 
to send service personnel to marginal markets, so the evolution of this market 
is important (James, 1993, p. 420). 
Together with the factor proportions characterizing the new technologies, 
the way governments and other institutions respond to IT may be a key factor 
in determining whether its distributional impact will be negative or positive. 
James (ibid., p. 413) refers to the area of biotechnology, where a number of 
ILO case studies show clearly that the existing capabilities in the Third World 
are generally not being applied in ways that will alleviate mass poverty, in 
spite of the important potential that many of the new techniques have in this 
respect. Thus, micropropagation techniques are being applied mainly to 
commercial crops to meet the needs of the large-scale, commercial agricul-
tural sector. Public policy (including the regulations set for private-sector 
participants in the R&D area) is based on the fact that private actors focus 
on what will benefit those who are able to afford to pay for the research. Any 
benefits ultimately accruing to the poor are 'trickle-down' in nature, and 
although they may be substantial, nothing is guaranteed. 
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In the case of the new IT, much attention bas been given to its presumed 
effect of raising the productivity and wages of those with skills in information 
use, and on the special value of mental flexibility to allow new learning and 
retooling in line with changing demands for skills. 10 It is well recognized, in 
Latin America as elsewhere, that the educational/training process should be 
modified to take account of the pay-off to information-related skills, but 
translating that recognition into effective action is very difficult, especially 
in the context of tight budgets and typically inefficient ministries of education 
and labour. As higher skills become more valuable in the market it is import-
ant that the variance of skills between people currently extremely wide in 
countries such as Brazil - be shrunk; otherwise there is a serious risk that the 
information revolution will increase inequality, poverty and marginalization. 
It may be equally important for the system to facilitate the entry of workers 
displaced by IT into other activities. 11 Optimists point out that none of the 
earlier technological revolutions bas led to a permanently more skewed dis-
tribution of income, as far as can be ascertained. · 
Information technology could accentuate inequality by improving the rel-
ative situation either of the more skilled workers or of larger firms. At the 
moment large organizations use more IT - both computing services and 
telecommunications - than do small ones. It remains to be seen how this 
gap will change over time. Mody et al. (1992, p. 1813) conclude that in a 
period of rapid technological change, significant productivity differences can 
emerge among competing firms and that these 'can be magnified if the past 
accumulated learning creates an advantage in the adoption of new innova-
tions'. The fact that such initial differentials favour larger firms curtails the 
demand for labour. Such differentials could also have a regional dimension; 
income gaps related to productivity tend to be magnified by weaker demand 
effects and externalities in the poorer areas. The chronic persistence of the 
income gap between the north-east of Brazil and the southern region suggests 
that such income-equalizing mechanisms as the high rate of migration from 
the former are only moderately strong. 
The overall importance of IT in Latin America and elsewhere will depend 
on how it affects the region's trade. Thus far, although there is no evidence of 
a boom on the scale experienced by East Asia, there are some indications of 
real potential. There is no doubt that, IT is becoming essential to serious 
contenders in many markets. The benefits are viewed by some as 'strategic', 
that is, non-price. An important determinant of the employment effects of 
trade increases resulting from the spread of IT will be the degree to which it 
facilitates the relocation of routine parts of production to lower-wage coun-
tries or regions. 12 
It is clear that man y elements of IT are being transferred to Latin America, 
but as yet many ofthem are not at all widespread. Ifthose elements that have 
mainly beneficial effects are non-frontier, have falling prices and can be 
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disseminated widely (for example to smaller firms), then the net impact could 
be quite positive. In the opposite scenario it could be negative. 
TNCs, IT and Globalization 
TNCs play a big role in R&D that undermines developing-country exports of 
primary products and light manufactures. Conversely information technology 
reduces the costs of intrafirm communication and thereby encourages firms to 
engage in more geographically dispersed patterns of activity (see Chapter 2). 
This has helped to keep the location of labour-intensive activities such as in 
clothing relatively unaffected, in spite of the introduction of some modern 
technology and the need for short turnaround times. lt accounts for the 
relocation of computer software activities involving routine data processing 
from the United States to the Caribbean (Barbados, Jamaica), where advanced 
telecommunications facilities exist and a plentiful supply of skilled labour is to 
be found. Such potential is of special interest to Latin America, because of the 
proximity of part of it to the United States, its reasonably advanced telecom-
munications system and the expanding supply of skilled operators. 
One issue is thus the way in which evolving IT will affect the decision of 
TNCs to locate their production activities in regions such as Latin America. 
Another is the implications ofTNC locations for the desirability ofR&D and 
significant technology development within the region. Patel (1995, p. 151) 
concludes that there is no systematic evidence to suggest the widespread 
decentralization of TNCs' R&D activities in the l 980s. An overwhelming 
majority of technological activities are still located close to the home base. 
This, however, does not preclude the possibility that what does occur in 
developing countries is quite important to them (for example microelectronics 
and biotechnology R&D in lndia, biotechnology in Mexico and other coun-
tries). To the extent that it is more directed at producing internationally 
relevant products than was the case under the product cycle model (when 
its main purpose was to adapt products or processes to local tastes and 
production conditions), the positive effects on the host country may be 
reduced (see Chapter 2). 
At this point, then, the international activities of TNCs do not provide a 
reason for Latin America to downgrade the importance of developing its own 
capability in the technology are a. Pack and Westphal ( 1986, p. 111) argue that 
'pecuniary externalities related to investments in technology - in acquiring 
technological capability and in undertaking technological effort - are ubiqui-
tous in industrialization'. James (1993, p. 411) notes that the importance of 
these activities is heightened by convergence among the major new techno-
logies: microelectronics and communications technologies are converging, 
and the former is also interacting extensively with biotechnology (for example 
automated bioprocess control, automatic DNA synthesizers). What remains 
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to be done, however, is to assess the separate roles of activities that are 
complementary to international research, that is, those that facilitate domes-
tic purchase, adaptation and dissemination, compared with those that are 
more competitive with, or at any rate not simply derived from the activities of 
international agents. The general view is that the former fonction is quite 
important and requires considerable effort and expenditure in the technology 
area. As for the latter, which is vigorously pursued only by a modest number 
of countries, a judgment in the Latin context is more difficult. ln their 
comparison of the super-mini industry in Korea and Brazil, Evans and 
Tigre (1989, p. 1752) note that the Korean state exhibits a degree of cohe-
siveness that far exceeds what Brazil can achieve, allowing it to focus and 
coordinate various organizations and instruments in a policy area like this. 
Chesnais's (1995, p. 28) summing up is worthy of note: 
The future of countries in the international trading system now depends 
essentially on their capacity to build domestically (or within close regional 
cooperation and protection) the skills and interactive mechanisms on which 
technological accumulation and capital formation both depend. While the 
possession of these attributes will in due course make them attractive to 
MNEs, the current priorities of the latter and the basis on which interna-
tional investment decisions are taking place mean that it is preferable that 
countries do not lay undue expectations on FDI. 
SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
As noted above, IT and globalization arrived in Latin America at about the 
same time. ln many other parts of the world, including the industrial coun-
tries and the rapidly growing East Asian economies, the advance of IT has 
been part of the process of investment and technological change for a longer 
period. In Latin America, however, investment rates were low during the 
l 980s (Table 3.1) so embodied technological advance was slow. As the recov-
ery came, accompanied by trade liberalization and rising trade and foreign 
investment ratios, the backlog began to be made up. As a result of this 
simultaneity, it is especially hard to identify from the aggregate record of 
growth, distribution and poverty, what may be due to trade and other policy 
change, what to IT and other aspects oftechnical change, and what to other 
factors, including the process of recovery from the crisis. 
The Impact of Globalization on Growth 
The l 990s, while obviously better for Latin America than the disastrous 
l 980s, have been disappointing in that the region has not been able to recover 
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the sustained growth of the pre-1980 period (Table 3.6). Nor has overall 
unemployment declined from the high levels suffered in most countries during 
the mid- l 980s; instead the levels in most countries and the regional average 
have risen during the 1990s, putting the latter at 7.7 percent in 1996 (Table 
3.7). Per capita output in 1995 was still a bit below that of 1980 and per capita 
income nearly 10 per cent below; the regional growth rate through 1996 was 
close to 3 per cent, hardly dramatic but enough to edge per capita incomes up 
by about 6 percent since 1990 (UNECLAC, 1996a, p. 14) and to contribute to 
a return of optimism about the region's economic future. Much of that 
optimism is based on the widespread belief that the currently more market-
friendly economic policies are a change for the better vis-à-vis those of the 
precrisis period. 
How well-founded is this optimism? On the growth front, there are several 
causes for concern. First, the performance of Chile, while stellar in many 
respects, is that of a small, mineral-rich country that was able to disregard 
popular dissatisfaction while putting its reforms in place and ultimately 
managed to get much of its microeconomic policy right from a growth 
perspective. lt would be expecting too much to presume that the region as a 
whole could do this well. Second, those countries that have opted for uncon-
trolled exchange markets may continue to suffer the exchange rate instability 
and periodic overvaluation that is interfering with their attempt to induce 
healthy export growth. Third, there remains the possibility that protection, as 
previously implemented in the major countries of the region, rather than 
impeding the considerable economic success achieved during the ISI era 
Table 3.6 GDP growth rates for Latin American countries (percent per year) 
1970-80 1980-90 1990-94 1995 
Argentina 2.5 -0.3 7.6 -4.6 
Bolivia 4.5 -0.4 3.8 3.7 
Brazil 8.1 2.7 2.2 3.9 
Chile 1.8 4.1 7.5 8.2 
Colombia 5.4 3.7 4.3 5.7 
Costa Rica 5.7 3.0 5.6 2.3 
Dominican Republic 6.5 2.7 4.2 4.7 
Ecuador 9.5 2.0 3.5 2.7 
Mexico 6.3 1.0 2.5 -6.6 
Peru 3.5 -0.2 4.2 7.7 
Uruguay 3.1 0.4 4.4 -2.8 
Venezuela 3.5 1.1 3.2 2.3 
Latin America 5.4 1.7 3.6 0.3 
Sources: World Bank (1995a, 1996a); UNECLAC (1996a). 
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Table 3.7 Urban unemployment rates for Latin America, by country 
(average annual rate) 
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 19961 
Latin America & the Caribbean 6.2 7.3 5.8 5.8 6.3 6.3 6.4 7.3 7.7 
Regional average: 
Argentina 
(total urban rate) 2.6 6.1 7.5 6.5 7.0 9.6 11.5 17.5 17.2 
Bo li via 
( department capitals) 5.8 7.3 5.8 5.4 5.8 3.1 3.6 3.5 
Brazil 
(six metropolitan areas) 
Chile3 
6.3 5.3 4.3 4.8 5.8 5.4 5.1 4.6 5.72 
(metropolitan region) 11.7 17.2 6.5 9.3 7.0 6.2 8.3 7.4 7.24 
Colombia5 
(seven metropolitan areas) 10.0 13.9 10.5 10.2 10.2 8.6 8.9 8.9 11.46 
Costa Rica 
(total urban rate) 
Ecuador5 
6.0 6.7 5.4 6.0 4.3 4.0 4.3 5.7 
(total urban rate) 5.7 10.4 6.1 8.5 8.9 8.9 7.8 7.7 
El Salvador 
(total urban rate) 10.0 7.9 8.2 8.1 7.0 7.0 7.57 
Guatemala 
(nationwide total) 2.2 12.1 6.5 6.4 5.7 5.5 5.2 4.3 
Honduras 
(total urban rate) 8.8 11.7 7.8 7.4 6.0 7.1 4.0 6.0 6.3 
Mexico 
(total urban rate) 4.5 4.4 2.7 2.7 2.8 3.4 3.7 6.3 5.72 
Nicaragua 
(nationwide total) 3.2 11.1 14.2 17.8 21.8 20.7 18.2 16.l 
Panama5 
(Metropolitan region) 9.9 15.6 20.0 19.3 17.5 15.6 16.0 16.2 16.4 
Paraguay8 
tAsuncion metropolitan area) 4.1 5.2 6.6 5.1 5.3 5.1 4.4 5.3 
Peru6 
(Lima metropolitan area) 7.1 10.l 8.3 5.9 9.4 9.9 8.8 8.8 8.7 
Uruguay 
12.64 (Montevideo) 7.4 13.l 9.2 8.9 9.0 8.4 9.2 10.8 
Venezuela 
(total urban rate) 6.6 14.3 11.0 10.l 8.1 6.8 8.9 10.9 11.97 
Notes: 
!. Preliminary figures. 
2. January - October. 
3. From 1991 on the data have been drawn from a new sample. 
4. January - September. 
5. Includes hidden unemployment. 
6. Average for the rates in March, June and October. 
7. First half of the year. 
8. From 1994 onwards the figures shown correspond to the total urban rate. 
9. The data for 1995 and 1996 have been taken from a new survey and refer to the first halfof 
each year. 
Source: UNECLAC (l 996b, p. 40). 
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contributed to it. This may be because, as hinted by Khan in Chapter 4, it 
provided a level of certainty about the future that encouraged high levels of 
investment, perhaps by facilitating leaming by doing, or perhaps through 
other mechanisms. If such was the case, it may be hard to match those earlier 
performances. MERCOSUR and its ilk may be the answer to the need for 
some protection from industrial-country compet,ition, at least for some of the 
countries. Fourth, to the extent that high levels of investment in human 
capital, especially broadly based ones, are a key element of growth, as is 
currently so widely alleged, it remains to be seen how many countries will 
satisfy this requirement in these days of fiscal constraint, especially those 
starting from a modest base. Finally, as has been widely noted of late, 
increasing inequality constitutes a direct impediment to continued stable 
growth. While strong regional growth in the future is far from a foregone 
conclusion (the 1990-96 average has been just 3 per cent), it is nonetheless 
reasonable to expect growth in the 4--5 per cent per year range. Given that 
population growth has decelerated substantially from its peak, and now runs 
at well under 2 percent per year, this could produce a decent rate of increase 
of per capita income and lower the incidence of poverty, unless the level of 
inequality increases. 
The Impact of Globalization on lncome Distribution 
On the distribution front, unfortunately the news is nearly uniformly bad. 
The economic reforms - trade liberalization, labour market reforms and so on 
have coincided rather systematically with a severe accentuation of (primary) 
income inequality; the 'normal' observed increase in inequality accompanying 
reforms is 5-10 percentage points, as measured by the Gini coefficient of 
primary income; among those Latin American countries for which the statist-
ical evidence is adequate to reach conclusions on this issue, the only probable 
exceptions to this generalization seem to be Costa Rica, Jamaica and Peru 
(Berry, 1997a). Available data are insufficient to judge whether the distribu-
tion of secondary income (after allowing for taxes, transfers and the public 
provision of goods) has moved differently from that of primary distribution. 
Effective targeting has made a positive impact in some cases, but the reduc-
tion of govemment activity and changes in tax systems towards the greater 
use of indirect taxes may have had a regressive effect. 
It seems likely that the observed increases in inequality are typically the 
result of a jump in the share of the top decile, with most of this accruing to the 
top 5 per cent or even the top 1 per cent (as in the case of Colombian and 
Ecuadorian households), and most of the bottom deciles losing ground. At a 
moderate per capita GDP growth rate of 2 per cent per year, it would require 
nearly 10 years of distribution-neutral growth for the bottom decile in urban 
Colombia to recover the ground lost as its income share fell. In urban 
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Ecuador where the percentage decline for the bottom decile was sharper (from 
2.2 percent to 1.5 percent), nearly 20 years of such growth would be needed. 
Too little research has thus far been done to establish causality between the 
increases in income concentration and the specific reforms or other changes 
(such as rapid technological change) that have accompanied them. The eco-
nomic cycle appears to have played a role, but it cannot in any obvious way 
be held accountable for the large, lasting (at least to date) shift towards 
inequality. 13 Other possible factors include technological change and the 
elements of globalization (more open trade regimes and increasing foreign 
investment, 14 together with the associated market-friendly reforms), the dis-
mantling of labour institutions and the 'socialization' of debts (whereby the 
state makes itself responsible for certain private debts that might otherwise 
threaten macroeconomic or financial stability). 
Trade and labour market reforms have been consistent elements of the 
reform packages instituted in those Latin American countries where distribu-
tion has worsened significantly. The prediction that more and freer trade 
would raise wages at the expense of capital has not been fulfilled; instead 
wage inequality seems to have widened in a number of countries (including 
Chile, Costa Rica, Colombia and Ecuador) as trade increased or was liberal-
ized.15 Among the alternative theories put forward to explain the correlation 
between the removal of trade distortions and increasing inequality, several 
authors (for example Wood, 1994) assume that the labour involved in produ-
cing exports is relatively skilled, with the result that increased trade widens 
earnings differentials in accordance with level of education. Other theories 
involve 'skill-enhancing trade' (Robbins, l 995a): the increased imports of 
capital goods that result from trade liberalization can increase the returns 
on skilled labour, which is complementary to capital goods (Hamermesh, 
1993; Stokey, 1994). It has also been widely noted that globalization tends 
to favour the 'large-scale sector' of the economy - large firms, large cities, the 
more developed regions of the economy and so on. 
The dominance of large firrns in the production of manufactured exports 
implies Jess employment creation than would otherwise be expected (Berry, 
1992). Since earnings differences associated with firm size (including those 
across the formai - informai sector divide) and with region are often large in 
developing countries, an accentuation of this tendency constitutes a real risk. 
A third inequality-increasing mechanism related to international trade 
involves the fact that import liberalization appears to shift the price vector 
in favour of better-off families. Although optimists have argued that the 
opening up of trade should be expected to raise the relative incomes of 
agricultural workers, the evidence on this point is not encouraging. A signific-
ant feature of the 1984--89 period in Mexico was a widening gap between 
urban and rural incomes and of the sharp decline in income from agriculture 
and livestock as a share of rural income both of which contributed to the 
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overall increase in inequality (Alarcon, 1993, pp. 139, 148). In Colombia an 
unprecedented increase in the gap between urban and rural incomes in the 
early l 990s, coincided with the process of liberalization. In such countries it 
appears that a significant part of the agricultural sector cannot compete easily 
with an onslaught of imports and that its labour resources cannot easily shift 
to other sectors. Paraguay provides a longer-run test of the implications of 
outward orientation for agriculture, since it is unique among Latin American 
countries in having pursued such a strategy more or less systematically since 
the 1950s (Weisskoff, 1992, p. 1531). Sorne exports (for example cotton) are 
produced by small peasant farmers, soybeans and wheat are grown on med-
ium-sized farms with machinery and international technology, while cattle are 
the domain of the latifundia. Although all groups have participated in it, 
Weisskoff concludes that export-led growth has worsened the structural 
inequities of the economy. The three-country study by Carter et al. (1996) 
suggests that Paraguay's experience with export-oriented agricultural growth 
is probably among the most negative in terms of its distributional con-
sequences. lt provides few grounds for optimism that the rural-agricultural 
side of the outward-orientation picture will be positive enough to alter greatly 
the negative conclusions reached mainly on the basis of urban data. 
Sorne policies that countries have chosen as complements to liberalization 
(of trade and foreign investment) may also be contributing to increased 
inequality; three such are privatization, financial reform and labour market 
reform. 
Although privatization is not inevitably associated with trade and invest-
ment liberalization, the international financial institutions have strongly 
encouraged it as an accompaniment to liberalization packages. Thus signific-
ant privatization steps have been taken in Latin American countries as part of 
liberalization. The World Bank (1996c, p. 53) cautions that 'poorly managed 
privatization, even if it delivers short-term revenue or performance gains, may 
be seen as corrupt or highly inequitable, concentrating economic and political 
power in the hands of a domestic elite or foreign investors'. Privatization in 
Chile clearly contributed to wealth and income concentration; 'the sales led to 
an acute concentration of ownership and to the formation of large conglom-
erates' that continue to dominate the economy (Meller, 1992, p. 27). 
Meanwhile the 'socialization' of international and other debts in order to 
save teetering financial and non-financial enterprises has doubtless had a 
significantly negative impact on distribution as well, as detailed most clearly 
for the case of Chile by Meller (ibid.) This was in part a crisis-response policy. 
But such liberalization contributed to financial crises during the 1970s, the 
1980s (Diaz-Alejandro, 1985) and more recently. Mexico once again provides 
the most dramatic example. Both Argentina and Mexico have recently 
engaged in official bailouts to contain banking crises. Solid evidence is yet 
to appear on the distributional effects of financial liberalization, apart from 
Albert Berry 93 
those occurring via financial crises cum bailouts, but there are reasons to 
suspect that these too could be negative. 
Labour market reforms that decrease job protection and labour's bargain-
ing power appear to open the way for wider wage and salary differentials 
among individuals. The record in Latin America, together with evidence from 
developed countries, which implicates them as a factor in increased wage 
inequality, suggests that such reforms and labour market functioning more 
generally need to be carefully assessed as possible contributors to inequality. 
Identifiable Effects of IT 
Latin America, like other countries introducing the new IT technologies, 
awaits the outcome as far as growth is concemed. In industrialized countries 
it has been widely commented that no significant positive impact on growth of 
output or on total factor productivity (TFP) has yet been identified (see 
Chapter 7, Table 7.9 for estimates ofTFP over time), a fact that seems strange 
to some observers given the consensus that this is a technological revolution. 
But students of earlier bursts of technological change note that it takes a long 
time for the changes to work their way through the system, with the main 
productivity effects showing up only after dissemination has reached a rather 
high level; soit is not surprising that no obvious positive output effects can be 
identified in the aggregate national accounts figures for Latin America. 
On the distribution front, the difficulty of identifying the sources of the 
widespread increase in inequality has been noted above; however IT and 
technological change more generally are obvious candidates at this point. 
Evidence from other countries provides some help in this respect. The con-
sensus for the industrial countries seems to be that new technology, and 
increased imports of labour-intensive goods are the main suspects for the 
widespread tendency towards increasing inequality during the last 15 years. 
As we note in Chapter 7, the experience of East Asian countries shows that 
such a tendency is clearly avoidable. 
PO LICY ISSUES AND RECOMMENDA TI ONS 
It is assumed here that the outward-oriented strategy ofmost Latin American 
countries will continue for some time, although the precise mix between the 
unilateral freeing of trade and investment, maintenance of some restrictions 
and participation in trade blocs remains to be seen. Thus much of the policy 
concem, including that in the technology area, will be aimed at complement-
ing a relatively free-trade strategy in a globalizing world. Though externat 
pressures from the industrial world leave countries much less policy space 
than before, there are important decisions to be made on how to design and 
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implement an economic policy in this new context. Greater emphasis on 
exports now must affect the thinking on most of the policy areas discussed 
here. 
The IT area is also characterized by limited policy space. In terms of 
adoption or non-adoption of some of the new technologies, it is possible 
that policy may have at most a modest impact. It may certainly influence 
the speed and extent of their dissemination, and that may be important to 
their overall effect. Here, as with trade, the main decisions revolve around (1) 
which types of IT would be beneficial to the country, if properly complemen-
ted by policy in other areas; (2) whether policy tools exist to guide adoption in 
the desirable directions and away from the undesirable ones; (3) the details of 
policy in the areas of complementary infrastructure, education and training; 
and (4) special support for the adoption of IT by small and medium-size 
enterprise. 
There are three striking similarities about policy making in the context of 
globalization and information technology. First, there is no assurance that 
the broad effects of either globalization or IT will be positive in Latin 
America, even though many policy makers have embraced greater openness 
as desirable and accepted IT as largely inevitable. Second, it is widely believed 
that the effects ofboth phenomena will be large. If such effects are both large 
(the general expectation) and unpredictable (my view, as argued above), it is 
clearly important that decision makers continue to monitor the effects as 
closely as possible in order either to backtrack or to redesign policy .16 
Third, positive output (efficiency) effects appear likely in each case but the 
distributional effects are worrisome. So the policies surrounding both phe-
nomena should give greatest attention to guarding against and alleviating 
those effects. In the case of Latin America, with its legendary high levels of 
inequality to start with, it more generally puts a greater onus on governments 
to design good antipoverty and inequality policies. 
In the case of IT especially, decisions have to be made about whether 
significant support should be given to improving local capacity. It appears 
that some types of benefit will not be forthcoming in the absence of such an 
effort, but whether it should be made is unclear since the effects of IT in 
general remain ambiguous. 
Policies on Globalization 
An optimal set of policies to help Latin America to respond to and take 
maximum advantage of the process of globalization includes some that will 
affect the rate and extent of integration into the international economy, some 
that are related to the accompanying policy package. Others that are not 
directly related to globalization or to IT but affect poverty are increasingly 
important owing to the risks associated with those two phenomena. 
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First, there should be astute management of the new system of freer trade, 
investment and capitalflows so that it does not lead to instability or premature 
loss of productive capacity, especially in those activities and firms that create 
many of the lower-paid jobs. In part this in volves further development of the 
instruments now in widespread use in industrial countries to defend against 
dumping and other unfair practices, import surges and so on. The small and 
medium sectors, which create large numbers of jobs, can be vulnerable to 
import surges. 
Second, great care is needed in the management of the capital account to 
avoid overvaluation and instability of the real exchange rate, since both of 
these tend to discourage exports, reduce growth and increase unemployment. 
The two countries with the most successful growth performances in recent 
years, Chile and Colombia, both impose controls in this market. 
Third, policies designed to assure a healthy demand for labour should give 
due attention to what are likely to be the major sources of productive employ-
ment over the next decade or so: the rural and the SME sector. A strong rural 
sector has been a hallmark of the most successful development experiences 
around the world, including those of Costa Rica, Indonesia, Japan, Taiwan 
and others; and it has been the normal precursor to healthy overall develop-
ment. Most countries of Latin America have been strikingly deficient in this 
area, for reasons that relate to the highly unequal distribution of land. But 
there are enough positive experiences in the region, albeit mostly on a small 
scale thus far, to give some grounds for optimism. 
Fourth, general support is requiredfor small and medium enterprises (includ-
ing microenterprises) in the form of improved credit institutions, marketing 
assistance (fairs, for example) and technological and training assistance. 
Special support should be provided to enterprises with export potential as 
otherwise there is a risk that the export basket, being dominated by large 
enterprises, will not create much employment. The experience of many coun-
tries, including Japan and some of its Asian neighbours, illustrates the poten-
tial importance of linkages between efficient modern industry and smaller 
firms. Though the evidence from Latin America is scant, it suggests that such 
mutually beneficial synergies are significantly less common than in Asia. The 
contribution of effective linkages of this sort is likely to be more important in 
open economies than in closed ones. Where it is larger firms that do most of 
the exporting (as in Brazil for example, see Silber, 1987), export success may 
bring little productive employment in its wake unless smaller subcontractors 
are hooked into the process. 
Finally, complementary to fostering a healthy demand for labour is 
strengthening the human capital at the lower end of the earnings profùe 
through improved coverage and quality of primary education, better and 
more applicable vocational education, and support for on-the-job training 
for lower-skilled persons. In addition, reform of the labour institutions 
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appears to be important in some countries since malfunction there can be 
prejudicial to a country's success in the world market. Sorne of the onus of 
protection against unemployment should be shifted from the firm to an 
unemployment insurance system; and a number of Latin countries have 
already moved in this direction. Perhaps most of ail, labour institutions 
need to be considered with the needs of small and medium enterprises in 
mind, together with those of the workers. This includes responding to the 
possible use of 'labour standards' as a weapon of high-wage countries as 
opposed to lower-wage ones. If SMEs are extensively involved in trade, as 
they will have to be in some countries for employment generation to proceed 
satisfactorily, these issues may become especially contentious. 
Policies on IT: Capacity Building and the Capital Goods Industry 
There is fairly general agreement that a strong capacity to foster the right sort 
of technological change is important in most developing countries; the dis-
agreement revolves around what sort of change (for example does it matter 
greatly whether it is labour saving or not?) and what sort of institutional 
capacity is needed to produce the requisite change.17 As Lall (1992, p. 171) 
notes, healthy industrial development requires a continuous process of tech-
nological learning, adaptation and improvement, a process that still Jacks 
adequate inducement mechanisms. 
For the countries of Latin America it is helpful to consider three policy 
levels or domains. The first level involves policies that will contribute to the 
effective introduction and dissemination ofthose desirable components ofIT 
that will corne by transfer. The second envisages an important role for 
domestic capabilities in complementing the process of transfer in additional 
ways and in developing locally relevant technologies, where much of the 
progress is based on local capacities and Jess on borrowed knowledge (within 
this category one might or might not see a role for leapfrogging). The third 
level refers to a non-local role for the country or region, whereby it develops 
its capabilities in line with exports that draw significantly on that domestic 
capability. These might include direct exports of technology or exports of 
products that incorporate domestically developed technology. At the first two 
levels the main task of local science and technology capacity is to determine 
which technologies are borrowed, adapted and adopted locally, and improve 
the capacity to adapt so that the undesirable elements of foreign technologies 
can be bred out ofthem before being used locally. Exponents of the latter are 
mainly worried about inappropriate technology being introduced when there 
is too little local capacity. 
In bis argument for a strong-support strategy Teitel (1992, p. 366) notes the 
long-term trend towards the capability to export manufactures beyond the 
region - even in product lines involving fairly advanced stages of value added, 
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skills and technology. While the region's recent export performance testifies 
to the competitive potential of industries fostered under the old policy regime, 
Teitel (ibid., p. 374) notes that a substantial technological discontinuity seems 
to have occurred in Latin America around 1975-80. For the industrial appli-
cations required in the new fields, the learning embodied in the stock of 
human capital acquired during ISI is of limited use. He feels that to boost 
the region out of its current stagnation an enhanced role on the part of the 
public sector may be needed. 
Perez (1985) has been a strong proponent of this view. Her view that Latin 
America should be trying to 'get in early at the ground floor' in the present 
information technology revolution is based on the conclusion that this is both 
feasible and desirable for a region with its current factor endowments. The 
implicitly or explicitly interventionist views of such authors as Perez and 
Teitel contrast with the neoliberal view that the process of technical change 
is best left to the market, especially when it involves high technology. 
The optimal levels of activity in and support for technological development 
and capacity building vary widely among the countries of Latin America. 
Only a few have the potential to operate at the third level discussed above -
Brazil and perhaps Mexico and Argentina. Still, the recipe for taking max-
imum advantage of IT may be qualitatively similar. Newness of the techno-
logy, its riskiness and the very imperfect information about it among many 
economic agents would imply that education and training must focus on skills 
complementary to the IT. Moreover, public support to improve information 
about IT and assistance to economic agents to bear risk, and so on may be 
essential for getting the IT into application in the full range of places where it 
would be advantageous. 
Widespread application is necessary if increasing technological dichotomy 
among firms (correlated to their size) is to be avoided, but since rapid 
adoption implies a high level of labour displacement it is important for the 
economy to be growing rapidly so that additional job opportunities can be 
created, whether in the sectors most affected by it or in others. This recipe 
seems to have been achieved in several of the East Asian countries. Distribu-
tion appears not to have worsened significantly during the rapid increase of 
IT in the four tigers. In Korea it actually declined, perhaps in part due to the 
great expansion of subcontracting there - an expansion that linked the SME 
sector to international trade in a major way. Such success stories notwith-
standing, there is much uncertainty about the magnitude and timing of the 
impact of IT in Latin America. The risk of attempting the recipe but failing 
lies in the fact that if labour displacement occurs and this is not balanced by 
rapid growth, the main impact of the whole process might be damage to the 
distribution front. In Latin America, going 'all-out' on a high-tech path is 
riskier than in East Asia because of the likelihood and the costs of leaving 
people behind. This likelihood is greater since there is no reason to suppose 
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that economic growth will be rapid, and the costs will be greater because of 
the currently high level of inequality. But the costs of not pushing ahead are 
also large. There is the danger of losing international competitiveness, if 
indeed these technologies are becoming increasingly central to such competit-
iveness. In addition, losing out on certain technologies that are successfully 
applicable at low scales of production and hence are SME-friendly, would 
deprive SMEs of the opportunity to raise their relative productivity. 
Even the lower ranges of technological capacity, to which Latin countries 
should be aspiring, involve sometimes challenging levels of infrastructural 
and human capital development. An efficient telecommunications infrastruc-
ture is an essential condition for the conduct of everyday business and hence 
for export success. lt is also 'the basis for a rapidly expanding network of new 
services which can be traded internationally and can greatly enhance the 
efficiency of many other services, especially education and health' (Freeman 
et al., 1995, p. 592). The frequent claim (for example Kaplinsky, 1990) that 
the new technologies make it possible to produce at a smaller scale than with 
the earlier technologies remains controversial. James (1993, p. 432) observes 
that thus far there is virtually no empirical evidence to support this claim, 
while Alcorta (1992) has suggested that the impact at the firm level may be 
scaling-up rather than the opposite. lt is important to sort out how much of 
the earlier adoption of IT by larger firms was due to economies of scale and 
how much was due to information asymmetries and different lags in the 
implementation of such technologies. Also relevant in this connection is the 
extent to which the increasing use of IT in banks and other financial institu-
tions enhances their capacity to serve the needs of SMEs by lowering transac-
tions costs. Improved performance in credit verification, a typical 
information-intensive area, might improve their outreach to SMEs. Certainly 
one of the main tasks of local technology efforts in Latin American countries 
should be aimed at reaching small and medium firms, which are often found 
in outlying regions, and improving their technological options. This can 
be done by making new technologies available to them, adapting these 
technologies, blending new with traditional technologies and so on. While 
the objective is obvious, it is less clear how far it might succeed, and what 
policies are most likely to make it successful. Several points can be made in 
this respect. 
First, infrastructure development in the smaller urban and rural areas of 
many Latin countries, which is often desirable irrespective of the new IT, may 
be more so in the presence of th ose options. One of the striking aspects of the 
successful development of some East Asian countries (especially Taiwan) is 
the role of rural electrification, plus the rural industrialization and the general 
non-agricultural dynamism that went with it. Might rural communication 
improvements have a similar effect? They would be especially important 
in tying smaller firms to international markets; FAX machines are now 
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de rigueur for many small exporters and constitute a major improvement in 
their information and communications capacity (Levy et al., 1994). 
Second, 'blending' should be given serious attention. As Bhalla (1996, p. 13) 
notes, 'A proper integration of new technologies into traditional modes 
of production offers much better prospects of learning-by-doing, of 
local experiments in adaptation and capacity development, than an indiscri-
minate use of new technologies in the advanced sectors of economic activity.' 
Unfortunately few resources have been directed towards either blending or 
other approaches to the advance of appropriate technology in Latin America. 
Total spending on R&D has been small and the SME-directed component 
much smaller still. Information about the various activities that do contribute 
in this direction is quite unorganized. 
The Capital Goods lndustry 
Bruton (1985, p. 81) argues that 'technological advance must occur in 
response to the conditions within the country's economic and social system 
rather than be imposed or simply made available from outside sources'. He 
argues that the first condition for the establishment of an indigenous cap-
ability lies on the demand side, that is, when the users are searching for new 
knowledge that begins the process oftheir production over broad areas of the 
economy.18 For there to be an adequate supply response, a domestic capital 
goods industry is essential. 19 A related issue is assistance in the importation 
and refurbishment of used equipment. This is important both to widen the 
scope of available technologies (usually in the direction of more appropriate 
ones) and to facilitate the creation and survival of small firms, which are the 
locus of labour-intensive production in most countries.20 
The Role of Government 
The successful spread of IT depends on an active support policy, according to 
authors such as Mody and Dahlman (1992, p. 1703). They conclude that 
'effective planning and organizational capabilities are essential to successful 
adoption of the new (information) technologies'. Though TNCs are an 
important vehicle for the transfer of technical knowledge, they are unlikely 
by themselves to satisfy the needs of the host country due to some combina-
tion of inappropriate technology being transferred, transfer that is unhelpful 
because of its focus on products rather than processes,21 and more generally a 
failure to contribute to the domestic knowledge-accumulation process22 and 
the associated indigenous technological capacity. 'lndeed, it is easy to find 
evidence that they may well harm any effort to do so' (Bruton, 1985, p. 101). 
Lall (1992, p. 198) notes that, despite its size and capital goods base, Brazil 
has retained a high dependence on foreign technology in the form of foreign 
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direct investment. lts dynamic indigenous private sector is 'wedged between' 
TNC dominance in some industries and that of public-sector enterprises in 
others. Though it has had some major successes, the Brazilian strategy has 
thus far proved ineffective in improving the dynamism and competitiveness of 
large areas of industry. Mexico has not adopted the Brazilian style of inter-
vention to develop specific technologies. 
Notes 
1. The term 'marginalization' is used in this chapter to refer to a situation or a 
process in which segments of a population do not share the fruits of economic 
growth and social change, or in more extreme cases, are isolated and made worse 
off by it. The main operational measures are low levels of income, education, 
health/nutrition and housing- the standard indicators of material poverty. Losses 
so measured often go hand in hand with social and political marginalization. 
2. The current price trends are different from those in constant prices because the 
relative price of capital goods changes in individual countries, and also because 
the relative price of the currencies changes so that their weights in the regional 
totals change. 
3. Since poverty is determined by private purchasing power and by what govern-
ments provide, a further relevant distinction is between private income and 
spending and public-sector income and spending. Globalization may affect the 
public-sector share, as well as the way in which the benefits of public spending are 
divided among people. 
4. A prominent statement was that ofNun (1969). An interesting critique came from 
Perlman (1976). 
5. Of course technological advance is harder to gauge than most of the other 
variables under discussion. Microeconomic evidence contradicting the theory 
has corne from studies such as that of Fairchild (1979, p. 135). His comparison 
between national firms and joint ventures in the city of Monterrey found no 
evidence of greater technical innovation in the joint ventures, though the Mexican 
firms relied much more on the founders or other local people for technical 
information than did the joint ventures. Aggregate data, while subject to quality 
constraints, have likewise not suggested a low rate of technological change in 
Latin American manufacturing. 
6. For example if a country tends to export what domestic demand does not absorb. 
The main tests of direction of causation have been intracountry (for example 
Sharma and Dhakal, 1995); though they clearly suffer from a range ofmethodo-
logical limitations and deficiencies of their own, they have detracted from the 
strong hypothesis cited above. 
7. Most studies reporting the positive correlation in question have been consistency 
checks for the reference hypothesis rather than serious attempts to confront it 
with the more obvious alternatives - various other variables, including imports. 
Fishlow (1994) criticizes the World Bank's (1991) statement of the merits of 
openness on this count. 
8. Such denial might be either on the ground that the 'learning by doing' on 
which the argument is based is quantitatively insignificant (a very hard position 
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to sustain in these days of emphasis on the importance of learning through 
this and other routes), or on the ground that governments do not have the skill 
to implement such protection competently. The second view seems more 
plausible. 
9. In his survey of developments in the economics of R&D, Stiglitz (1987, p. 75) 
notes that in this area 'Adam Smith's invisible hand is not only not visible, but 
there is considerable evidence that it is not even there'. 
IO. Freeman et al. (1995, p. 600) predict that the bias that has appeared in the last 
10-15 years against the use of unskilled workers, or those whose skills are 
wrongly suited to evolving needs and who are not easily retrainable, is likely 
to become much more pronounced in the rest of the decade. 
11. Freeman and Soete (1994) note the potential value ofjob-creation programmes 
for these workers in community and persona) services, which have a high growth 
potential partly because the imperatives of international competition will not 
exert the same degree of force there as on tradables. 
12. This process may explain why countries such as China, Indonesia, Thailand and 
the Philippines have shown very rapid growth in trade in information and 
communication (ICT) products. 
13. In Argentina, Chile and Mexico, for example, the increases in inequality 
occurred mainly during economic downturn or crisis but in Colombia and 
Ecuador they did not. Even in the former cases post-crisis inequality, while 
sometimes Jess than the peak level sustained during crisis, in general has been 
markedly higher than the pre-reform level. 
14. The latter has also been proposed as a source ofworsening in Mexico (Feenstra 
and Hanson, 1995). 
15. Regarding the Latin American experience, see Berry (1997a) and Robbins 
(1995a, 1995b). Increases in inequality also coincided with the liberalization in 
Hong Kong and Taiwan in the 1980s, although not in Korea or Singapore, 
where the relative supply of more educated workers increased strongly (Wood, 
1995). 
16. James (1993, p. 425) refers to the striking absence of general equilibrium macro 
modelling of the impacts of microelectronics and biotechnologies in developing 
countries, even though these are becoming sufficiently widely adopted to be able 
to gauge their detectable effects. 
17. The case for local technological capacity has been made in great detail by Lall 
(1993, 1995a) and Bruton (1985) in the context of Third World countries in 
general, and by Perez (1985) and Teitel (1992) in the Latin American context. 
18. Bruton cites Freeman's (1973) study of the success and failure of innovations in 
the UK, which showed that the single measure most correlated with success was 
'user need understood'; the innovation was designed to meet a need of the 
poten tial user. 
19. A question that arises in these days of trade liberalization (and also of trade 
blocs) is whether the latter can improve the scope for fulfilment of this need. 
20. The role of equipment specialists who imported, repaired, installed and guaran-
teed machinery used by small and medium firms in Colombia is discussed in 
Cortes et al. (1987) and Escandon (1981). 
21. TNCs depend very heavily on the home market to develop their new products, 
and often bring to the LDC a new product (often a luxury) with little linkage to 
the domestic economy. Process technologies - for example, layout, testing 
procedures, properties of materials and so on - are more likely to be useful in 
developing countries than new products, since they may have wider application 
and be free from the undesirable features just noted. 
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22. One manifestation is the infrequency of the common phenomenon in rich 
countries of engineers or other skilled personnel leaving the parent company 
to create their own businesses (Bruton, 1985, p. 100). It might be expected to be 
Jess common in the case of TNCs since a higher proportion are foreign and a 
higher proportion are Iikely to see their future as solidly linked to the firm. It is 
noteworthy that national firms often have considerable spin-offs of this sort. 
Cortes et al. (1987) emphasize the frequency and importance of new firms 
created in this way in the agricultural machinery industry and furniture industry 
in Colombia. In the former, such spin-offs were an integral part of the process of 
quality improvements and price reduction, as they increased competition and 
provided a challenge for the application of good ideas that were bottled up in the 
parent firm. 
4 The Impact of Globalization 
on South Asia 
Azizur Rahman Khan 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the impact that the increasing 
globalization of the world economy is having on South Asia. The analysis 
focuses on five major countries - Bangladesh, lndia, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri 
Lanka - which account for an overwhelming proportion of the population of 
South Asia. 1 In 1994, these five countries together had a population of 1.2 
billion, 21 percent of world population and 38 percent of the population of 
the low-income countries, a category to which they all belong.2 By any 
absolute standard of poverty these five South Asian countries account for 
close to half of the world 's poor. 3 
In this chapter, the term globalization refers to the trend reduction in 
barriers to the international movement of goods, services, capital and tech-
nology. The world economy has gradually been moving in this direction for a 
long time, but the process accelerated during the 1980s. Two events that 
provided a qualitative boost to this trend were (1) the graduai rejection of 
trade restrictions nurtured by the strategy of import-substituting industrial-
ization (ISI) that an overwhelming majority of less developed countries 
(LDCs) had adopted in the post-Second World-War period, and (2) the 
demise of the socialist system that had insulated its members, now classified 
as LDCs, from the world economy, and indeed from each other. The first of 
these phenomena spread in the wake of the debt crisis and the subsequent 
adjustments that the developing countries adopted, often at the behest of the 
multilateral development agencies, from the beginning of the l 980s. The 
second phenomenon began at about the same time, with the launching 
of post-Mao reforms in China, but came to encompass the entire socialist 
world in the late l 980s. While the earlier trend towards the liberalization 
of world trade was led by the advanced industrial countries, the major 
impetus towards the globalization of the world economy in its current phase 
thus derived from the actions of the developing countries. 
The principal elements of the process need to be clearly identified. First, 
there is an increased flow of goods and services among nations due to a 
reduction of protection of all forms: quantitative trade restrictions, tariff 
and non-tariff barriers. Second, there is an increased international mobility 
of capital due to a lowering of obstacles to its movement. lt should be noted, 
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however, that there has not been a corresponding increase in the mobility of 
labour, especially of the unskilled variety with which the LDCs are relatively 
abundantly endowed. A third element of globalization consists of the flow of 
technology. Increased trade and capital flows have, by and large, meant 
an increased flow of technology among nations, although not all aspects of 
globalization have been unambiguously favourable to it. Under the rules 
of globalization, individual nations have been committed to a greater respect 
for intellectual property rights, which may have increased the cost oftechnol-
ogy for many LDCs. Finally, the era of globalization has coincided with the 
revolution in information technology (IT), which has sharply reduced the cost 
of international information flow and thus facilitated trade and capital flows. 
This has also vastly improved the ease of cultural exchange among nations, 
with far-reaching social and political consequences. 
Individual countries or groups of countries have the option of becoming 
integrated into the globalizing world economy or remaining insulated from it. 
But they do not have the option of stopping the process of globalization itself 
in so far as much of the world has become part ofit. Individual countries must 
now compete more fiercely than in the past for a share of the widening world 
market in goods and services because many more countries have abandoned 
the inward-looking ISI strategy of the past. Similarly they must compete more 
vigorously than in the past for a share of international capital flows because 
many more countries have drastically reduced obstacles to capital movement. 
In this sen se, individual LDCs do not have the choice of ignoring the process 
of globalization. They must find a way of coping with it. 
Of course individual developing countries can opt not to integrate into the 
globalizing world economy by perpetuating some variant of the ISI regime 
and/or by maintaining obstacles to capital flows. It is easy to imagine that 
large social groups in many countries nurtured in an environment of com-
parative autarky in the past, would suffer adverse consequences, at least 
during the transition from the existing production structure to the more 
efficient production structure that would emerge after successful integration. 
Whether or not these countries wish to become integrated depends on their 
relative valuation of the possible loss due to the disruption of the existing 
structure of production and the potential gain to be derived from integration. 
Once a country decides to become integrated into the global economy, 
success is not guaranteed. It must embark on a programme of economic 
reform that will make integration possible, that is, increase its external trade 
as a proportion of GDP and gain access to increased inflows offoreign capital 
and technology. Furthermore, successful integration into the global economy, 
according to the above indicators, does not guarantee the achievement of the 
economic and social goals that provide the impetus for integration. It is 
possible that the original estima tes of potential gains and losses of integration 
will turn out to be false. Even if the original estimates prove to be valid, the 
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accelerated growth in overall GDP may result in a distribution ofincremental 
output that is inconsistent with the country's social goals. 
The following section briefly surveys the reform programmes implemented 
by the South Asian countries to facilitate their integration into the global 
economy and analyzes their success in attaining this objective. The next 
section considers the growth and distributional consequences of the process 
ofintegration. The final section summarizes the main findings concerning the 
successes and failures of South Asia's quest for greater integration into the 
globalizing world economy. 
SOUTH ASIA'S INTEGRATION INTO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 
The countries of South Asia followed similar strategies of development in 
the post-colonial era, adhering to an ISI strategy that varied among countries, 
not in terms of essence, but in the extent of successful industrialization. India 
achieved ISI on the broadest front, followed by Pakistan and Sri Lanka, with 
Bangladesh and Nepal lagging considerably behind. In terms of growth in 
GDP, only Pakistan exceeded an average annual rate of 5 percent during the 
1965-80 period. Sri Lanka and India averaged growth rates of 4 percent or 
just under, while Bangladesh and Nepal averaged less than 2.5 per cent.4 
Unlike much of the rest of the developing world, South Asia was not, 
however, severely hit by the debt crisis in the beginning of the l 980s. Bangla-
desh was the only country to have a debt-service ratio (DSR) of more than 
25 per cent, with Pakistan coming second at 18 per cent. The other three 
countries had a very manageable burden of external debt service. 
However it became clear that these countries' growth rates were far lower 
than what was needed to address their urgent problem of poverty reduction 
and social development. Sorne countries began to realize the limitations of the 
inward-looking development as fostered by the ISI strategy during the 1970s. 
But it was during the l 980s that ail the South Asian countries gradually came 
to espouse a more outward-looking development strategy, emphasizing 
export growth, openness to foreign capital and technology and generally 
greater integration into the global economy.5 
Policies for Greater Openness 
To bring about the desired reorientation of development strategy, extensive 
policy and institutional changes were made in these countries. The first, and 
obviously the most important, area of reform was the trade regime. AU these 
countries gradually moved away from an overvalued exchange rate regime 
towards a more market-determined, external valuation of their currencies. 
This was combined with a sharp reduction in quantitative restrictions on 
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imports and a reduction in the tariff rates. There was also a move towards 
reduction of the variable tariffs on different kinds of imports. The general 
effect was to reduce discrimination against exports and to open up domestic 
industries to greater competition with producers abroad. 
These countries also adopted extensive measures to attract foreign direct 
investment. Restrictions in the form of minimum domestic equity participa-
tion were eased, provisions for profit repatriation and tax concessions were 
made more generous, and export-processing zones were created. Domestic 
stock markets were opened up to foreign investors at the same time that 
measures were adopted for the expansion of these markets. 
lndustrial regulations were greatly reduced. There was a drastic reduction 
in the number of industries earmarked as public monopolies, and regulations 
were eased on the foreign exchange needed for the acquisition of raw mater-
ials, equipment and spares. In varying degrees these countries encouraged the 
privatization of nationalized industries and widened the area of operation of 
private enterprises, both domestic and foreign. 
Deregulation also extended to the factor market. Market forces were 
allowed a greater role in the determination of prices and the allocation of 
credit. Attempts were also made to increase the flexibility of the labour 
market, although this had generally limited success. 
Since the economies pursued greater openness within the broader objective 
of transition to a more market-oriented system, the above reforms were 
complemented with extensive price, distribution and macroeconomic policy 
reforms. Subsidies on agricultural inputs and utilities were reduced or abol-
ished. Public procurement and distribution of food and other goods were 
drastically curtailed. There was a general emphasis on macroeconomic stabil-
ization through reduction of the fiscal deficit and control of monetary expan-
sion, with varying degrees of success. 
The reforms did not progress at the same rate in all the countries. Nor did 
they proceed at a steady rate everywhere. But the system of controls and 
incentives were fundamentally altered everywhere between the late 1970s and 
the early 1990s with the following features: (1) the domestic currencies of 
these countries very nearly achieved current account convertibility; (2) quant-
itative restrictions on imports were drastically reduced in comparison with the 
past and the rate of tariff protection was brought down sharply, thereby 
substantially opening up the domestic market to imports from the rest of 
the world; (3) incentives (disincentives) to exports were improved (reduced) 
very substantially; and (4) it became possible for private foreign investors to 
operate in much wider area of these economies under more attractive terms 
than before.6 
It is difficult to carry out a rigorous analysis of the effectiveness of the 
outward-looking reforms undertaken in the individual countries due to the 
difficulty of precisely dating their implementation. Sri Lanka and Bangladesh 
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started in the late 1970s. In Pakistan reforms were begun in the early 1980s 
but intensified in 1987-88. The Indian reforms got under way in the early 
1980s but were greatly intensified in 1991. Nepal began its reforms in the mid 
l 980s. It is Iikely that the reforms started to produce results some time in the 
second half of the l 980s, with more clearly discernible results coming later in 
lndia's case. As Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 show, the South Asian countries have 
achieved considerable success according to several indicators of integration, 
but they have not performed particularly well against other indicators. 
Export Growth 
Ali the South Asian countries were substantially more export-oriented in 1994 
than in 1980. The growth rate of exports was particularly rapid during the 
early l 990s. Not only did exports rise as a proportion of GDP and as a 
proportion ofworld exports, the composition of exports also changed sharply 
in favour of manufactured goods and away from primary goods (Table 4.1 ). 
The improved trade performance of the South Asian countries during the 
period of globalization should, however, be put in perspective. First, it should 
be noted that the weighted export/GDP ratio of these countries in 1994 (13.4 
percent) was well below the export/GDP ratio of the 51 low-income LDCs 
(19 per cent). 7 These countries have indeed increased their share of world 
exports during the era of globalization, but their combined exports only 
increased from 0.66 per cent of world exports in 1980 to 0.89 per cent in 
1994.8 
Second, the hope that increased diversification into manufactured exports 
would protect these countries from a decline in the terms of trade was not 
borne out in many cases: with the exception of lndia, ail these countries have 
Table4.1 Indicators of export growth of South Asian countries 
M anufactured 
Exports as% Growth rate of exports exports as % of 
ofGDP (%per year) total exports 
1980 1994 1970---80 1980-90 1990-94 1986 1993 
Bangladesh 6 12 3.8 7.5 12.7 73 81 
In dia 7 12 4.3 6.3 7.0 62 75 
Nepal 12 24 10.9 7.8 22.1 68 84 
Pakistan 12 16 0.7 9.5 8.8 68 85 
Sri Lanka 32 34 2.0 6.3 17.0 41 71 
Note: The first two columns refer to exports of goods and non-factor services. Ali 
other columns refer to merchandise exports. 
Sources: World Bank (1988, 1993a, 1995a, 1996a). 
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experienced a significant deterioration of their terms of trade during the 
period of globalization.9 
Third, there has been little increase in trade among the South Asian coun-
tries. lt is paradoxical that these countries, because of the large-scale, actual 
and potential complementarities that exist among their economies, should 
undertake an export-led development strategy while remaining virtually 
autarkic with respect to each other. As Table 4.2 shows, trade among these 
countries is extremely low. In recent years, shares of exports to other South 
Asian countries have fallen for Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka 
and increased marginally for Nepal. Only India has registered a significant 
increase in exports to its South Asian neighbours; but nonetheless the share 
remains pitifully low. The time period covered by Table 4.2 is admittedly 
short, but information about the share ofintraregional trade for the region as 
a whole is available over a longer period and it does not indicate a pattern of 
dynamic growth. Together the five South Asian countries sent 3.3 percent of 
their aggregate exports to other South Asian countries in 1980. In 1994 the 
proportion rose to 4.1 per cent. Admittedly there is an unquantified flow of 
illegal trade between Bangladesh and India, between Pakistan and India, and 
between India and Nepal, but the very fact that trade among these countries 
has been partly driven underground is a testimony to the hostility 
Table 4.2 Trade among South Asian countries (percent of total exports of 
countries of origin) 
Destination 
Total South 
Bangladesh India Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka Asia 
Origin: 
Bangladesh 
1990 1.3 0.7 1.3 0.1 3.4 
1993 0.4 0.2 1.3 0.6 2.5 
In dia 
1990 1.7 0.3 0.2 0.7 2.9 
1994 2.5 0.5 0.2 1.4 4.6 
Nepal 
1990 1.6 12.2 13.8 
1993 0.3 9.9 0.2 4.5 14.9 
Pakistan 
1990 1.8 0.9 1.2 3.9 
1994 1.6 0.6 0.9 3.1 
Sri Lanka 
1990 0.5 1.1 0.1 1.7 3.4 
1994 0.2 0.7 1.3 2.2 
Source: United Nations (1995). 
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of public policy to integration among them, which is ironie in view of their 
membership of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC). 
Capital Flows 
Table 4.3 shows the trend in private capital flows - foreign direct investment 
(FOI) and net portfolio equity investment (PEI) - in South Asia during the 
era of globalization. 10 Both these types of foreign capital, especially PEI, have 
increased in absolute magnitude in recent years. But South Asia's share of 
aggregate FOI flows into LOCs - the most dynamic component of foreign 
resources - representing a combination of capital, technology, management 
and international marketing - has actually declined over time. In recent years 
there has been a sharp rise in PEI due largely to the privatization programmes 
under which parts or all of the equity of state-owned enterprises were offered 
for sale, often to non-resident nationals. 
Information Technology 
Although little is known precisely about the development of information 
technology (IT) in South Asia during the period of globalization, two distinct 
aspects are apparent. The first of these is the development of the industry 
for domestic use and export. The importance of this lies in the fact that 
the world demand for this industry's products is rising faster than for most 
other products. A share in this rapidly expanding market provides assurance 
of rapid export growth. There are instances of LOCs setting up industries 
in microelectronics, semiconductors and software by attracting FOI and 
investing in physical and human capital. Korea, Taiwan and Singapore 
Table 4.3 Private foreign investment in South Asia (value is in US$ 
billion, share represents percentage of total for all LDCs) 
Foreign direct investment Portfolio equity investment 
Value Share Value Share 
1980 0.2 3.6 0.0 n.a. 
1985 0.3 2.3 0.0 n.a. 
1990 0.5 1.9 0.1 2.7 
1991 0.5 1.3 0.0 n.a. 
1992 0.6 1.3 0.4 2.8 
1993 0.8 1.2 2.0 4.4 
1994 1.2 1.6 6.2 17.8 
Source: World Bank (1996c), pp. 134-6. 
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have already emerged as major IT traders, after the United States, Japan, the 
European Union, and Canada. Malaysia, lndonesia, Thailand and China are 
rapidly emerging as second-tier international IT traders.11 
Quantitative knowledge about the extent to which the South Asian coun-
tries have succeeded in this kind of enterprise is virtually non-existent. It 
is, however, well known that lndia has made a successful venture into 
software, for which the prospects look bright. Until recently Western 
companies recruited large numbers of computer programmers from Bangalore 
at low wages (by Western standards), but many of those programmers have 
retumed to Bangalore to launch their own software firms and have emerged as 
significant exporters to the industrial countries.12 This clearly indicates that 
lndia (and some of the other South Asian countries) has the distinct possibility 
of becoming a significant producer and exporter of certain components of IT 
technology once the remuneration paid to trained personnel, in which the 
region is well endowed, is adequate and sufficient investment is forthcoming. 
The second aspect of the development of IT is the improvement of IT 
infrastructure in order to improve the efficiency and productivity of the 
industrial and service sectors. It has been argued that an improved IT infra-
structure reduces the cost of communications and increases productivity, 
especially of scarce skilled labour. Furthermore it has been suggested that 
IT improves the relative advantage of small-scale enterprises because of the 
relative efficiency with which it can be used even when the scale of operation 
is small. 13 Once again information on the spread of IT infrastructure is very 
limited, although it is known that several South Asian countries, notably 
lndia, have made significant strides in promoting IT at the firm level. 
Table 4.4 shows South Asia's endowment in some of the more traditional 
components of IT. The region clearly lags far behind the average developing 
countries, although the better endowed of the South Asian countries are on a 
Table 4.4 Indicators of communications technology in 
South Asia (per thousand persans in the early 1990s) 
Telephone Radio Television 
Bangladesh 2 44 5 
In dia 7 80 37 
Nepal 3 34 2 
Pakistan 9 91 18 
Sri Lanka 7 200 49 
LDC average 23 176 56 
China 7 182 31 
Source: UNDP (1996). 
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par with China, a country that has achieved unprecedented growth by taking 
advantage of the globalization process. 
GROWTH AND POVERTY 
The argument that integration into the globalizing world economy enhances 
growth, improves the distribution of income and helps reduce poverty is 
based on the standard theory of trade. Integration leads to an allocation of 
resources that is consistent with comparative advantage, which represents 
greater efficiency and higher output. The end of ISI means that industries 
are no longer insulated from international competition or condemned to the 
limited scale dictated by the domestic market. These changes enhance effi-
ciency and ensure higher productivity. A greater inflow offoreign capital and 
technology further contributes to growth. Adherence to comparative advant-
age leads to a concentration of labour-intensive industries, the abundant 
factor of production in the LDCs. This leads to a faster increase in employ-
ment and wages, which improves the distribution of income and reduces 
poverty. To what extent have these expectations been realized in South Asia 
in the decade of increased integration into the world economy? 
Globalization and Economie Growth 
Table 4.5 shows the South Asian countries' rates of growth from 1970-95. 
Most of these countries achieved higher growth during the l 980s than during 
the 1970s. Severa! ofthem, however, failed to maintain this higher growth in 
the early l 990s. lt is difficult to determine how much of the acceleration of the 
growth rate in the 1980s compared with the 1970s was due to greater integra-
tion into the world economy because in most cases this took place during the 
Table 4.5 GDP growth rates for South Asian countries 
(percent per year) 
1970-80 1980-90 1990-94 1995 
Bangladesh 2.4* 4.3 4.2 4.4 
In dia 3.4 5.8 3.8 6.2 
Nepal 2.0 4.6 4.9 5.8 
Pakistan 4.9 6.3 4.6 5.3 
Sri Lanka 4.1 4.2 5.4 5.5 
* 4.2 percent between 1975 and 1980. 
Sources: World Bank (1995a, l996a); Bangladesh Bureau of 
Statistics (1996); International Monetary Fund (1996). 
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decade itself, and generally quite late. A country by country analysis of 
periodic changes in the rate of growth illustrates the dilemma more clearly. 
ln Bangladesh, the annual average growth rate during the l 970s was biased 
downwards due to the dislocations of the war of independence. If the first 
few years of dislocation after independence are excluded, there has been 
no change in the periodic growth rates since 1975. Extensive reform of 
economic policies and institutions, leading to a far greater external orienta-
tion than in the past, has not led to any perceptible acceleration of growth 
in GDP. 
ln Pakistan, economic growth appears to have been a matter of political 
cycles. 14 Indeed the highest rate of growth was achieved during the l 960s (6.8 
percent per year) using an ISI strategy, supported by large capital inflow and 
under an authoritarian regime. Under the democratically elected regime the 
growth rate fell to 4.8 percent per year between 1970 and 1977. Between 1977 
and 1988, again under an authoritarian regime, the growth rate accelerated to 
6.7 percent per year. Economie reforms began with deregulation and privat-
ization during this period, when a spectacular rise in remittances by migrants 
provided a major impetus to growth. From 1988, after the restoration of 
democracy and the acceleration of reforms aimed at greater integration into 
the world economy, the rate of growth fell below 5 per cent per year, on 
average. 
ln lndia, the rate of growth accelerated significantly during the l 980s and it 
has been claimed that this was, at least partly, due to the beginning of reforms 
in the early to mid l 980s. The strongly externally oriented and accelerated 
reforms from 1991, however, were accompanied by a fall in the growth rate, 
which was at least partly attributable to a weather-induced slowdown in 
agricultural growth in the early l 990s. ln lndia the impact of globalization 
has been far weaker than in, say, China, where the sharp slowdown of 
agriculture after the mid l 980s was easily outweighed by the extraordinary 
surge of the non-agricultural economy under China's rapid integration policy. 
In Nepal, the higher growth rate in the l 980s predated the beginning of 
reforms by at least half a decade. Sri Lanka's reform began in the late l 970s, 
but periodic interruptions to the reform programme and the serious ethnie 
conflict make it very difficult to judge its effects on growth, which was about 
the same in the l 980s as in the l 970s. Growth accelerated in the early l 990s 
and credit for this has been attributed to the country's increased comrnitment 
to reforms since 1989. 
The growth performance of South Asia during the era of globalization has 
thus been mixed. Either there is no evidence of a rise in the trend rate of 
growth (Bangladesh and Pakistan), or the rise clearly predates the beginning 
of global integration (Nepal) or the increase in growth has been relatively 
modest (India and Sri Lanka) and not robust enough to prevent periodic 
lapses into low growth (lndia). The point is not that increased integration into 
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the global economy has not resulted in further growth, but rather that the 
added impulse has not been strong enough to outweigh structural and cyclical 
shocks to the economy (for example bad weather and political cycles). 
One popular explanation of the weakness of the growth impulse that 
should result from globalization is that the economic reform programme 
has not gone far enough. This view, which is dominant among the multilateral 
development agencies, is unconvincing though extremely difficult to refute. It 
is difficult to refute because it is always possible to show that the incentive 
system contains substantial irrationalities. However, it is obvious that the 
reforms have radically transformed the incentive systems of the South Asian 
countries. While it is difficult to compare levels of reform and incentive 
systems across countries, it could be argued that reform of the tracte regime 
and the incentive system in general has been more extensive in South Asia 
than in China. The success of reforms has clearly been enormously greater .in 
China than in South Asia (notably India). 
The alternative explanation of the inadequate growth performance in post-
reform South Asia is that successful integration into the world economy 
requires more measures than just reform of the tracte regime and other 
incentives for greater allocative efficiency. Without additional measures the 
growth impulse is weakened or even rendered ineffective. The additional 
measures required vary from one country to another and their identification 
is too big a task to be tackled in the present study. There are, however, three 
common missing elements that stand out in the case of the countries of South 
Asia. 
The first relates to the inadequate political structure within which South 
Asia has been pursuing its development goals. This has two distinct dimen-
sions: regional and national. Regionally, South Asia consists of a group of 
countries with serious bilateral hostilities and tensions that are an impediment 
to their development. Quite apart from the commitment of intolerably large 
volumes of resources to defence, these hostilities and tensions have prevented 
the growth of tracte among these countries, a phenomenon that was discussed 
in the previous section. Elsewhere - for example East Asia (see Chapter 5) -
opening up to the world economy began with a sharp increase in tracte with 
regional neighbours. When tracte with neighbours is blocked by artificial 
barriers, much of the potential incremental effect on exports is lost. There 
are additional costs of such 'regional autarky', for example FDI would have 
been far greater had the state of autarky not existed among the SAARC 
neighbours. 
Another political dimension inhibiting growth benefits from integration 
is that ail the South Asian countries have had serious problems of governance. 
In Sri Lanka this has taken the form of open ethnie warfare. In Bangladesh 
and Pakistan there has been an endless quest for a non-dictatorial regime 
that is able to govern effectively. In lndia there has been a graduai erosion 
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of the authority of the central government and a failure to create a system 
of governance that takes account of the great regional diversity of the 
country. 
The second element is lack of an incentive system to compensate for 
the abolition of the incentive system under ISI. Whatever its inefficiencies, 
the ISI strategy provided a strong incentive to invest. Once the system 
was scrapped, an alternative incentive system should have been created to 
maintain the incentive to invest. This is especially important in view of 
the 'generalized infancy' suffered by industries in South Asia due to inad-
equate infrastructure and skills, as well as administrative overheads and 
institutional preconditions. It is well documented that a crucial element of 
success in East Asian development was targeted public support of potentially 
worthwhile industries. 15 That dismantling an ISI regime without creating an 
alternative incentive system can adversely affect the incentive to invest is 
most graphically demonstrated by Bangladesh, where the rate of investment 
fell from its peak of 16 percent of GDP in 1980-81 to less than 12 percent 
in the early 1990s.16 This prolonged decline in the rate of investment is the 
central explanation of Bangladesh's stagnant growth rate. Similarly, in Ban-
gladesh and elsewhere, agricultural production was adversely affected by 
the market reforms: the reduction or abolition of input subsidies and other 
forms of support were not compensated for by alternative incentives to 
produce. Without targeted support it is hard to see how these countries 
could establish industries such as IT even if they do have potential com-
parative advantage in them. 
The third element is related to the issue just discussed. Compared with 
successful developing countries in East Asia, South Asia's infrastructure and 
human capital are relatively underdeveloped (Sri Lanka being an exception in 
the case of the latter). 
Table 4.6 shows some of the readily available indicators for South Asia, 
developing East Asia and South-East Asia and the Pacifie. South Asia's 
disadvantage relative to the rest of developing Asia is all-embracing but is 
particularly acute in basic human capital and the human capital endowment 
ofwomen (reflected in the very low index for gender-related development). As 
human capital is a principal determinant of labour productivity, South Asia's 
international competitiveness in the globalizing world economy is seriously 
handicapped. 
What about the argument that the gains from globalization will be greater 
in the future as a result of the reforms agreed during the Uruguay Round of 
GATT? OECD tariff and non-tariff barriers often constitute greater protec-
tion against exports from LDCs - particularly the South Asian countries -
than from the industrialized countries.17 Once the OECD countries fully 
implement the Uruguay Round reforms - including the tariff reduction for 
manufactured products, tariffication of non-tariff barriers in agriculture, 
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Table 4.6 Indicators of human development and infrastructure 
(reference year 1993) 
115 
South Asia East Asia South-East Asia 
& Pacifie 
Life expectancy (years) 60.3 68.8 63.7 
Adult literacy (percent) 48.8 81.0 86.0 
Combined enrolment rate at ail 52 58 59 
levels of education 
Human Development Index 0.444 0.633 0.646 
Gender-Related Development Index 0.410 0.610 0.621 
Radios per thousand persons 87 212 153 
Televisions per thousand persons 33 38 60 
Commercial energy per capita 267 711 380 
(kg of oil equivalent) 
Source: UNDP (1996), which explains both concept and measurement of the 
human development index and the gender-related development index. 
reduction of export and production subsidies in agriculture, and elimination 
of the Multifibre Arrangement there should be substantial gains for the 
LDCs, including the South Asian countries. Detailed numerical exercises 
have been carried out to estimate these gains. The mode! with the most 
detailed regional estimates shows that the total direct (that is, short-term) 
gains for South Asia from ail these reforms will amount to 1 per cent of its 
GDP, and that when ail indirect benefits are accounted for these gains will 
amount to 2 per cent of GDP. 18 Two points need to be noted. First, these 
gains, though significant, are not very high. Indeed South Asia will appro-
priate Jess than 4 percent of the global benefits of Uruguay Round liberal-
ization according to the mode! just cited. Second, these numerical estimates 
are based on continuation of the market shares of the individual countries 
concerned. There is nothing immutable about these market shares in a glo-
balizing world economy. Rather the actual outcome will be determined by the 
international competitiveness of countries and regions. 
Poverty Trends during the Era of Globalization 
Reasonably good estimates of long-term trends in the incidence of absolute 
poverty - per cent of population below a defined, constant, real per capita 
income or expenditure, usually anchored to a minimum level of nutrition in a 
benchmark year with allowance for minimum non-food expenditure, and 
updated by increases in the cost of living - are available for Bangladesh, 
India and Pakistan. Sorne rudimentary estimates are available for Nepal, but 
estimates of poverty trends in Sri Lanka are not available. 
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Poverty Trends in Bangladesh 
According to available estimates the incidence of absolute poverty in Bangla-
desh declined significantly between the mid l 970s and the mid l 980s, but since 
then the incidence of poverty appears to have increased. Evidence for this is 
available from several sources. 19 
Estimates of the incidence of poverty have been made by using data from 
the Household Expenditure Surveys (HES) of the Bangladesh Bureau of 
Statistics (BBS) for different years. According to the BBS estimates, the 
proportion of the population in extreme poverty, those with a per capita 
food energy consumption of less than 1805 kilocalories per day, increased 
from 22 percent in 1985-86 to 28 percent in 1991-92 (quoted in World Bank, 
l995c). Alternative estimates of poverty have been made by Ravallion and 
Sen (1994) by applying a constant real income poverty threshold to the HES 
data. All three indices ofpoverty- the headcount ratio, the poverty gap index 
and the squared poverty gap index - used by Ravallion and Sen reveal a 
steady rise between 1985-86 and 1991-92.20 
Unfortunately HES data are not available after 1991-92. Conflicting evid-
ence from several alternative sources, each documenting change over short 
periods on the basis of relatively small samples of data, are often cited in 
support of divergent daims about trends in the incidence of poverty since 
1991-92. The next HES data (for the year 1995-96) have not yet been 
released, so we shall take the trend in real wages of agricultural workers as 
an indicator of the living standard of the masses. In the past this index moved 
consistently with the trend in the incidence of poverty estimated from the 
HES. lt is highly implausible that the living standard of the masses in 
Bangladesh's overwhelmingly dominant rural society would improve (dete-
riorate) while the index of real wages fell (rose) significantly. After rising 
steadily during the first half of the l980s the real wages of agricultural work-
ers declined by as much as 20. l per cent - that is, 2.5 per cent per year -
between 1985-86 and 1994-95.21 It is true that wages are just one source of 
rural income, accounting for about two fifths of the income of poor rural 
households. lt is, however, highly unlikely that the kind of decline in the 
supply price of agricultural labourers indicated by the above trend in real 
wages would be consistent with a non-diminishing real income of the house-
holds supplying agricultural workers. lt, therefore, seems highly likely that in 
the early l 990s there was a further increase in the incidence of poverty in rural 
Bangladesh, the overwhelmingly dominant part of the country. 
Another strong indicator of a fall in the real income of the poor is the 
decline in the real price of basic food (grain and rice) in spite of a fall in the 
per capita consumption of rice and cereals over the last two decades (this issue 
is dealt with in detail in Khan, 1990). More recently, between 1989-90 and 
1995-96 there was a 7 percent decline in the per capita consumption of cereals 
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but a steady rise in per capita income. That this happened without arise in the 
real price of rice - indeed the price fell - points to a negative income elasticity 
of demand for cereals, which is highly implausible given the low average level 
of food energy consumption in Bangladesh. The only way to make sense of 
the evidence is to assume that there has been a fall in the real .income of the 
poorer population groups, who have a higher income elasticity for cereals 
than do the richer groups of people, so that the weighted average income 
elasticity of demand turned out to be negative. 22 
The rate of growth in per capita income was higher in the decade after 1985 
than in the previous decade due to a decline in the rate of population growth. 
And yet the incidence of poverty declined significantly in the decade before 
1985 while it appears to have increased in the subsequent decade. This 
asymmetrical performance needs careful analysis. Two possible reasons for 
the increase in poverty since the mid l 980s suggest themselves. The first is the 
decline in the growth of agriculture in this period, especially since the late 
1980s, which must have been the main reason for the decline in real wages in 
agriculture. It has been alleged that the decline in agricultural growth was at 
least partly due to the withdrawal of subsidies on inputs, which was an 
integral part of the overall reform programme aimed at integration into the 
global economy. The second possible explanation is the graduai elimination 
of consumer subsidies and special programmes, which might have increased 
the cost of living and reduced the real incomes of the poorer segments of the 
population relative to others. This too was a part of the reforms to promote 
global economic integration. 
Poverty Trends in India23 
Headcount indices of poverty for selected years for India are shown in 
Table 4.7. Between 1969-70 and 1989-90 ten observations of poverty inci-
dence are available (the intermediate ones have not been shown in the table) 
and they reveal a steady decline in the incidence of poverty, with only very 
minor exceptions. The first major break in trend occurred in the early l 990s 
with the intensification of outward-looking reform, when the incidence of 
poverty increased. By 1993-94 the incidence of poverty in rural India had 
once again begun to decline; but even so the incidence of poverty in rural 
India, where most people live, was higher than in the period before the 
accelerated reforms.24 
The time series in the post-reform period is too short and erratic to permit 
unambiguous conclusions. It is, however, clear that during the period of 
accelerated reforms aimed at integration into the global economy, India 
experienced some of its nastiest poverty shocks in recent times and the steady 
trend of declining poverty over the preceding two decades was broken. The 
most obvious explanation of the rise in the incidence of poverty in the early 
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Source: Tendulkar et al. (1996). Of the two sets of 
estimates made by the authors, the one pertaining to 
the lower poverty threshold (that is, showing lower 
incidence of poverty) has been quoted in the table. 
l 990s was the rise in the relative price of food, due largely to liberalization of 
the tracte regime which reduced the wedge between the domestic and external 
prices of food that obtained in the years before reform. As the majority of the 
poor in lndia are net buyers of food, this rise in the relative price of food 
damaged the welfare of the poor.25 This effect might have been mitigated if 
increased globalization had led to higher growth in per capita income. As 
already noted, the rate of growth in output actually declined in the early 
l 990s. The period of globalization also witnessed a sharp reduction in the rate 
of employment growth in lndia, an issue that is discussed below. 
Poverty Trends in Pakistan26 
Table 4.8 summarizes the trend in poverty incidence in Pakistan during recent 
decades. There was a steady decline in the incidence ofpoverty during the two 
decades leading up to 1987-88, when the reforms aimed at opening up the 
economy began. Thereafter Pakistan experienced an increase in the incidence 
of poverty. 
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Amjad and Kemal (1996) identify a number of explanations for the rise 
in the incidence of poverty after the acceleration of outward-looking reforms. 
Sorne of these explanations are directly linked to the reforms, others 
are structural. The rate of growth of the economy, as noted before, fell 
while inequality in the distribution of income increased (as documented 
by the falling share of income of the poorest quarter of the population). 
Increased inequality was due partly to the reform process itself, for example 
a reform of the tax structure made it more regressive, and there was a 
reduction of the subsidies and public expenditure that had benefited the 
poor. The reduction in agricultural subsidies adversely affected the poor in 
two distinct ways: the productivity of subsistence farmers fell due to the 
partial withdrawal of modem inputs; and a large proportion of the poor, 
who were net buyers of food, were hurt by the rise in the price of food 
that resulted from the compensatory policy of increasing agricultural pur-
chase prices. Growth in employment declined sharply from 2.5 per cent per 
year in the period preceding 1987-88 to just 1 percent per year in the period 
after 1987-88. This was partly due to the fall in public employment that 
occurred as a result of the reform programme's emphasis on reducing public 
expenditure. Remittances from migrants - which in the past had helped 
the poor both directly by augmenting their incomes and by expanding 
employment through the increased investment that it financed - fell sharply. 
There was also increased concentration of agricultural landholdings among 
fewer bands. 
Poverty Trends in Nepal 
The evidence for N epal, although far less convincing than the evidence for the 
countries discussed above, also suggests a rise in the incidence of poverty 
between 1985 and and 1992.27 This change is not easy to explain in view of the 
steady rise in per capita income over the period and the absence of convincing 
documentation that the distribution of income sharply deteriorated. One 
adverse change for the poor was the rise in the relative price of food. This 
was due to the reform of the trade regime, food being a net import. Most of 
the poor being net buyers of food, the rise in the relative price of food 
contributed to an increase in the incidence of poverty. 
To summarize, South Asia's steady progress towards a reduction of the 
incidence of absolute poverty appears to have slowed down, halted or 
reversed in the wake of reforms in the period of globalization. This was partly 
due to disequalizing forces inherent in the reform programmes. Greater 
integration into the world economy meant a rise in the relative price of food 
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that was imported/traded internationally. In lndia, Pakistan and Nepal there 
is evidence that this particularly affected the poor, the majority ofwhom were 
net buyers of food. The reforms often involved the removal of agricultural 
subsidies, causing a reduction in the growth of agriculture, the principal 
source of income for the majority of the population. 
Globalization and Employment 
Contrary to the expectation that greater integration into the world economy 
would lead to growth in employment, there appears to have been a sharp 
reduction. ln Pakistan, annual growth in employment in manufacturing in the 
three years after the acceleration of reforms (that is, between 1987-88 and 
1990-91) was -0.2 percent while manufacturing output grew at an anuual 
average rate of 5.3 per cent, yielding an output elasticity of employment of 
-0.04.28 In Bangladesh, employment in most major manufacturing indus-
tries, including jute textiles, cotton textiles, paper and steel, declined abso-
lutely in the early 1990s.29 ln lndia the output elasticity of employment in 
manufacturing industries during the period 1987-92 was 0.23. 30 
That this represents an extraordinarily low degree of labour intensity in 
industrial growth can be gauged by comparing it with the output elasticities of 
employment in manufacturing in Korea:31 during 1970-80, 0.67; during 
1980-90, 0.45. By the 1980s Korea had been transformed into a high-wage 
economy by LDC standards. lt is appropriate to consider its elasticity in the 
l 970s when comparing Korea with contemporary lndia. Employment elasti-
city in lndian manufacturing, on this basis, was only one third of that of 
Korea! 
This phenomenon of sharply reduced labour intensity in industrial growth 
during the period of globalization needs careful analysis, but in the absence of 
suitable studies one can only surmise what its cause might have been. Integ-
ration into the global economy has created tremendous pressure for improved 
international competitiveness, that is, reduced unit labour costs. Many of the 
industries developed under the previous ISI regime incorporated concealed 
unemployed labour, especially in public-sector enterprises. Faced with the 
pressure to reduce their unit labour costs, these industries, often privatized, 
did all they could to reduce their concealed unemployment. Thus the head-
count rate of employment growth became very slow even though labour 
absorption at constant intensity of employment may have increased at a 
reasonable rate. Once concealed unemployment is eliminated, the headcount 
rate of employment growth will be higher. Industries will have become more 
efficient by the end of the transition, but the transition has been marked by 
increased unemployment. 
These countries should have exercised better management of the transition 
process. lt was certainly efficient to improve the effectiveness of employment 
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in industries, but the incrementally unemployed workers should have been 
protected either by public works programmes or by some form of unemploy-
ment insurance. It was certainly efficient to end the discrimination against 
producers of food and agricultural goods in the form of artificially depressed 
prices that was fostered under the ISI trade regime, but the adverse effect this 
had on the living standard of the poor should have been mitigated by care-
fully designed programmes: for example targeted income subsidies and tar-
geted public distribution and public works programmes to supplement the 
eamings of poor households. Substantial public resources should have been 
committed to such programmes and policies, but the contractionary macro-
economic policy that was a part of the reform programme during the era of 
globalization ruled this out. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The main arguments of this chapter are summarized as follows. During the 
1980s the South Asian countries followed many other LDCs in gradually 
moving away from the ISI strategy to become better integrated into the global 
economy. This course of action was more than justified in view of the 
inefficiencies and limitations of ISI as a development strategy. 
These countries implemented extensive reforms of their trade regimes and a 
multitude of other policies and institutions at the behest of the multilateral 
development agencies. They achieved significant success in increasing their 
trade, both as a proportion ofGDP and as a proportion ofworld trade. Trade 
among themselves, however, remained very restricted due to serious bilateral 
hostilities and tensions. Ali the countries had very limited success in attracting 
FOI. With few exceptions, these countries have not succeeded in breaking 
into the IT export market; they have also lagged behind the newly industri-
alizing East and South-East Asian countries in adopting IT technology in 
their own industries. 
Increased integration into the global economy has brought some growth, 
but this has not been robust enough to outweigh the periodic effects of 
adverse weather and/or political cycles. That increased integration has failed 
to produce a more powerful growth impulse is also due to the preoccupation 
of the reforms with allocative efficiency and neglect of the complementary 
measures needed to create a broader framework for growth. Three deficien-
cies stand out: ( 1) the lack of effective governance, leading to a failure to 
promote regional cooperation and to a failure to build a consensus in favour 
of an effective development strategy; (2) the failure to replace the discarded 
ISI system by an alternative system of incentives to invest in potentially 
worthwhile activities, and (3) the failure to promote investment in infrastruc-
ture and human capital. 
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Globalization has not allowed South Asia's progress towards poverty 
reduction to continue at its previous pace. Indeed it has often slowed down 
or temporarily reversed. This has been due to structural inequality being 
aggravated by the disequalizing forces unleashed by the reform packages 
that were adopted in the pursuit of global integration. lt might have been 
possible to offset the adverse effects of these forces if the integration process 
and growth had been more robust. 
Notes 
1. Although there is no unambiguous way of defining South Asia, one widely used 
definition is that it consists of the member countries of the South Asian Asso-
ciation for Regional Cooperation (SAARC): Bangladesh, lndia, Nepal, Pakis-
tan, Sri Lanka, Bhutan and the Maldives. The reason for excluding Bhutan and 
Maldives from the present analysis is that, apart from their minuscule size 
(together they account for Jess than 0.08 per cent of the population of the 
SAARC countries), information on them is very limited. There is also the 
question of whether Myanmar should be considered a part of South Asia, but 
it would make little sense to include it in a study of globalization, partly because 
of the Jack of relevant data and partly because Myanmar is only just beginning 
to shed the autarkic economic strategy it has followed for decades. 
2. Ali countries in this World Bank category had a per capita income ofless than 
$725 in 1994, according to the World Bank's 'atlas method'. Of the 133 coun-
tries, each with at least a million people, included in World Bank (1996a), 51 
belonged to this category. 
3. The World Bank (1990) estimated that South Asia had 47 percent ofworld's 
poor in 1985. 
4. See Khan (1994) p. 53. 
5. For an excellent account of the past development strategy in the lndian context 
see Bhagwati (1993). 
6. The most detailed chronicles of policy reforms in individual countries are the 
World Bank's periodic country economic memoranda. For independent 
accounts of the lndian reforms from different perspectives, see Bhagwati and 
Srinivasan (1993) and Bhaduri and Nayyar (1996). For an independent account 
of the Bangladeshi reforms see Centre for Policy Dialogue (1995). 
7. See World Bank (1996a). 
8. These ratios are based on data in World Bank (1996b), pp. 216-17. 
9. Between 1985 and 1994 the terms of trade declined by 13 percent for Nepal, 25 
per cent for Bangladesh, 10 per cent for Pakistan and 17 per cent for Sri Lanka. 
For lndia there was an improvement of about 9 per cent. See World Bank 
(1996a), p. 192. 
1 O. Like most World Bank reporting of capital flows, the figures in Table 4.3 seem 
to refer to net flows of capital (that is, net of any withdrawal of past capital 
investment), but not net of repatriation of dividends and interest. 
11. See the report entitled 'IT pact just around the corner, say US and EU' in Asia 
Times, 13, December 1996. 
12. See 'Asia's Labour Pains' in The Economist, 26, August 1995. 
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13. See Lai (1996) for the sources of these arguments and for a study of the effect of 
IT on a sample of electrical and electronic goods manufacturing firms in India. 
Lal's very limited sample does not provide conclusive evidence of improved 
productivity through the use of IT. He attributes this to the time lag in the 
productivity effect of IT, whose application in the Indian industries studied by 
him has been recent. 
14. The idea of the political cycle and the rates of growth in different periods of the 
cycle are from a paper by Amjad and Kemal (1996). 
15. References to this topic are well known. Of particular interest is the recent paper 
by Wade (l 996a). 
16. The Bangladeshi case is perhaps extreme and is discussed in Khan (l 996a). 
17. See World Bank (l 993c), p. 49 for details of discriminatory OECD protection 
against exports from LDCs, including South Asia. 
18. See Harrison et al. (1995). 
19. Evidence for the period up to the mid 1980s is analysed in Khan and Hossain 
(1989). For more recent periods see Ravallion and Sen (1994) and World Bank 
(l 995c). 
20. The headcount ratio simply shows the proportion of population in poverty, that 
is, below the poverty threshold. The poverty gap index - the ratio of the total 
income gap of ail the poor to the total income required to provide everyone with 
just enough income to rise above the poverty level - is a composite measure of 
the number in poverty and the average extent of their poverty. The squared 
poverty gap also gives an indication of the distribution of income among the 
poor. See Ravallion and Sen (1994) for further explanation and additional 
references. 
21. According to the data collected by the Agricultural Statistics Wing of the 
BBS, the average daily money wages of male agricultural labourers without 
food changed from Tk29.54 in 1985-86 to Tk42.25 in 1994-95. Between 
these two dates the rural consumer price index increased by 79.06 per 
cent (BBS, 1996). This means that at 1985-86 purchasing power, the daily 
agricultural wages in 1994-95 were Tk23.60 or 20.1 per cent lower than in 
1985-86. 
22. The problem of the worsening distribution of income in Bangladesh during the 
post-1985 period has two distinct dimensions: there was a fall in the average 
rural income relative to the average urban income, while intrarural inequality 
did not change significantly; and there was a rise in urban inequality. For 
evidence see the BBS estimates of rural and urban Gini ratios reported in 
World Bank (l 995c). 
23. Evidence cited here is from Tendulkar et al. (1996). 
24. One might wonder about the impact of the earlier reforms, that of the early 
l 980s, on poverty. There is no evidence that the reduction in rural poverty was 
halted at that time, although the reduction in urban poverty was briefly halted in 
1987-88 and 1988-89 (see Tendulkar et al., 1996). 
25. Tendulkar et al. (1996) carry out econometric analysis oflndian data to demon-
strate the validity of the argument. 
26. Evidence on poverty trends on Pakistan has been obtained from Amjad and 
Kemal (1996). 
27. Official estimates of the headcount index are reported in Guru-Gharana (1996). 
The problem with the Nepalese estimates is that the poverty threshold does not 
appear to represent a constant standard of living, the number of observations 
are far too few and the assertion that poverty has been increasing does not 
appear fully convincing in view of the steady and significant growth in per capita 
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income, without any clear evidence of a sharp rise in the inequality of income 
distribution. 
28. These official estimates of employment and output growth in manufacturing are 
quoted in Amjad and Kemal (1996). 
29. See BBS (1996), p. 9. 
30. This is estimated by fitting a double-logarithmic function to data on employ-
ment and output in manufacturing reported in World Bank (1995d). The 
elasticity coefficient is significant at the 1 per cent level. 
31. The elasticities for the Republic of Korea are estimated in the same way as for 
India, based on data reported in different issues of The World Bank's World 
Tables. 
5 Growth and Poverty in East 
and South-East Asia in the 
Era of Globalization 
Azizur Rahman Khan 
East and South-East Asia (ESEA) is the most populous of the regions into 
which the contemporary world economy is typically classified. ln recent 
decades this has also been the most dynamic region of the world economy. 
This chapter analyses the performance of the region during the accelerated 
globalization of the world economy that has taken place since the beginning 
of the l 980s. 1 
Although the region has generally achieved a superior economic perfor-
mance, progress has by no means been uniform everywhere. Four distinct 
categories can be identified among the main countries of the region. 
The Republic of Korea and Taiwan represent the first tier of the newly 
industrializing economies (NIEs) of ESEA that adopted an outward-oriented 
strategy of development from the l 960s. 2 Hong Kong and Singapore are 
usually grouped together with Korea and Taiwan, but this study excludes 
these city states because they have long held the status of high-income 
countries.3 Their inclusion in the group would not add much to the analysis, 
while their status as city states means that they are often considered atypical 
and unrepresentative. 
ln the next category are the second-tier NIEs of ESEA: lndonesia, Malay-
sia and Thailand. Their past development strategies incorporated many ele-
ments of import-substituting industrialization (ISI), but in the years 
immediately preceding and during the period of globalization they made 
significant adjustments to their development strategies in order to become 
better integrated into the global economy. 
The third category consists of China alone as a unique case. China was 
more or Jess insulated from the world economy until about a decade ago, 
when it began a controlled transition towards greater participation in world 
trade. 
In the fourth and final category, the Philippines will be used as an example 
of countries whose development strategies have produced different outcomes 
from those of the above mentioned ESEA countries. Until at least the middle 
of the l 990s its performance in terms of growth and distribution was dismal. 
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These four groups of countries represent the principal types of ESEA 
response to globalization, and together the seven countries represent a third 
of the population of the Jess developed countries (LDCs). The ESEA coun-
tries that are excluded from the study are Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and 
North Korea.4 The reason for their exclusion is that little relevant informa-
tion about them is available, although it is known that in recent years 
Vietnam has made significant progress towards greater integration into the 
global economy. Furthermore its growth performance bas also been very 
impressive, averaging 7.4 percent per year between 1988 and 1995.5 
As with the study on South Asia (Chapter 4), the beginning of the 1980s is 
identified as the approximate start of the acceleration of globalization. The 
main impetus for this was the removal of two major obstacles to the interna-
tional movement of goods, services, capital and technology, namely the ISI 
strategy pursued by the LDCs and the highly autarkic policies of the centrally 
planned socialist economies. 
Ail seven of the ESEA countries discussed here achieved high rates of 
growth in the 1970s (see Table 5.1), and ail but China achieved a relatively 
high degree of integration into the world economy (as measured by their ratio 
of trade to GDP) in that period. With the exception of China and Taiwan, ail 
the countries were hit by severe extemal imbalances around the beginning of 
the J 980s. Thus the period of globalization for these countries began with the 
implementation of stabilization and structural adjustment programmes. This 
often meant a short period of reduced growth, but apart from the Philippines 
they ail succeeded in achieving a high average annual growth rate in the 
subsequent decade and a half. The growth rate of GDP actually accelerated 
in China and Thailand, and while it declined marginally to moderately in 
Korea, Taiwan, lndonesia and Malaysia, it remained very high everywhere by 
LDC standards. In the Philippines, the J 980s and the early J 990s turned out 
to be a period of sharply reduced growth in GDP. ln this study Korea, 
Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and China - referred to as the 
ESEA-6 - are regarded as examples of economic success during the period 
of globalization on the evidence of their excellent growth performance based 
on their high and/or accelerated integration into the global economy.6 
However, the record of these countries in poverty reduction is Jess uniform. 
ln the J 970s the ESEA-6 made good progress towards the elimination of 
poverty but during the J 980s and early J 990s their progress was less uniform 
than in the past and by no means highly correlated with their growth perfor-
mance. 
The first section begins with a brief account of the performance of these 
ESEA countries in the period before the J 980s and J 990s. It goes on to discuss 
the nature of the imbalance they faced at the beginning of the period of 
accelerated globalization and the adjustments they made to overcome 
that imbalance. The second section discusses their growth and integration 
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performance and the role that IT played in their success. Special emphasis is 
placed on the first-tier NIEs. The third section analyses income distribution 
and poverty reduction in the l 980s and l 990s. The final section summarizes 
the main conclusions. 
THE ESEA PERFORMANCE RECORD 
All the ESEA countries achieved very high rates of growth in the l 970s (Table 
5.1). During this decade the slowest growing of the seven ESEA countries, 
China, achieved an annual growth rate that was higher than the average 
growth rate of the developing world as a whole (5.2 per cent per year) and 
nearly three fifths higher than the growth rate achieved by South Asia (3.5 per 
cent per year). The most rapidly growing of the seven countries - the first-tier 
NIEs - achieved historically unprecedented, double-digit growth rates. 
The development strategies pursued by these countries before the l 980s 
were not uniform, but in the l 970s all had very high rates of investment, 
backed by very high rates of domestic saving (Table 5.2). By the end of the 
decade the rates of investment and saving in all the countries were substan-
tially higher than the LDC average. Another shared characteristic was a high 
level of basic human capital development. As early as 1970 these countries 
had attained primary school enrolment rates that were far higher than those 
of other LDCs at comparable stages of development: 80 percent in lndonesia, 
89 per cent in China and over 100 per cent in Korea, Taiwan and the 
Philippines. 7 
Over time there has been an evolution in the interpretation of the remark-
able success of the first-tier NIEs ofESEA and to date there does not seem to 
Table 5.1 GDP growth rates for East and South-East Asian 
countries (percent per year) 
1970-80 1980-90 1990-94 1995 
Korea 10.1 9.4 6.6 9.0 
Taiwan 10.0* 7.7 6.5 5.9 
Indonesia 7.2 6.1 7.6 8.1 
Malaysia 7.9 5.2 8.4 9.6 
Thailand 7.1 7.6 8.2 8.6 
China 5.5 10.2 12.9 10.2 
Philippines 6.0 1.0 1.6 4.8 
*For the 1963-80 period. 
Sources: Lee (1994); Yu (1994); ADB (1993); China, State Statistical 
Bureau (SSB) (1996); World Bank (l 995a, 1996a); IMF (1996). 
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Table 5.2 Domestic investment and saving rates for East and South-East Asia 
(percentage ofGDP) 
Investment rate Saving rate 
1970 1980 1994 1970 1980 1994 
Korea 24 32 38 15 25 39 
Taiwan 30 30 24 n.a. 33 29 
Indonesia 16 24 29 14 37 30 
Malaysia 22 30 39 27 33 37 
Thailand 26 29 40 21 23 35 
China 28 35 42 29 35 44 
Philippines 21 29 24 22 24 18 
Sources: ADB (1993, 1994); China, SSB (1996); World Bank (1995a, l996a). 
be agreement on the nature of its various components. 8 It is, however, well 
documented that the key to their success was not an adherence to laissez faire 
policies pursued in a free market under conditions of free trade. The key 
element of their strategy was targeted support, through the provision of 
subsidized credit and other incentives, to industries identified as potentially 
profitable. The principal difference between the standard ISI strategy pursued 
elsewhere and the interventions made by these countries was that (1) ISI was 
highly arbitrary, resulting in randomly distributed rates of effective protection 
for individual activities, whereas the first-tier NIEs systematically promoted 
activities that were identified as worthwhile bets; and (2) unlike the ISI, these 
NIEs did not discriminate against exports. The protection they provided to 
targeted industries was outward looking in so far as the effective exchange rate 
for exports was frequently higher than the effective exchange rate for imports. 
These countries also avoided overt overvaluation of the exchange rate, which 
makes the adoption ofuniversal quantitative restrictions on imports inevitable 
and promotes employment-restricting technology by underpricing imported 
capital equipment. Dependence on quantitative import controls was not so 
widespread and inflexible as to create serious supply rigidities and a totally 
arbitrary (unintended) system of effective protection. 
The second-tier NIEs - Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand - followed a 
strategy that was closer to ISI until late in the l 970s or early in the l 980s. But 
as Amsden's (1993) analysis of Thailand shows, support to industries during 
the ISI phase in these countries was carefully targeted to promote efficiency, 
and was not the arbitrary kind promoted by South Asia and many other parts 
of the developing world. 
During the l 970s, growth in both groups of NIEs was poverty alleviating. 
In Korea and Taiwan this was in large part due to the initial egalitarian 
redistribution of land. Its effect was subsequently reinforced by the high 
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employment intensity of growth and the wide access to human capital. In 
Malaysia and Thailand too growth during the l 970s was poverty reducing, 
largely because of widespread access to land, facilitated by the relatively large 
and elastic supply. ln Malaysia's case, ethnically based redistributive mea-
sures might also have helped increase access to land. Furthermore growth was 
highly employment intensive in these countries. In Indonesia the incidence of 
rural poverty increased between 1970 and 1976 due mainly to a rise in the 
price of rice, the principal source of food energy for the poor, on which the 
country was import dependent. This was brought under control by an accel-
erated programme of self-sufficiency in rice and complemented by generally 
favourable policies towards agriculture and the rural economy. Ever since, 
growth has been associated with poverty reduction. 
China's economy grew at a slower rate than the economies of the other six 
countries in the l 970s, although it achieved the highest rates of investment 
and saving. There was widespread inefficiency of resource use, but none-
theless the economy grew at a reasonably high rate due to the sheer volume 
of investment. Strongly egalitarian policies, often arbitrarily imposed at the 
cost of reduced incentive and efficiency, succeeded in keeping down discre-
pancies in income distribution, but low incomes led to widespread poverty. 
The Philippines achieved a reasonably high rate of growth in the l 970s aided 
by a high rate of capital inflow after the first oil shock. But growth was not 
particularly poverty reducing due to the extreme inequality of agricultural land 
ownership and the adverse effect of its ISI strategy on employmen t growth. 9 
At different times in the late l 970s and early l 980s all the ESEA countries 
except China and Taiwan faced serious external imbalances (Table 5.3). 
Korea, Thailand and the Philippines, all oil-importing countries, faced the 
problem earlier, mainly because of the two oil shocks. Indonesia and Malay-
sia, both oil exporters, faced it later, after the oil boom came to an end. 
While the problem of extemal imbalance hit Korea, Indonesia and Malaysia, 
emergence in the case of Thailand and the Philippines was more graduai. In 
Table 5.3 Current account deficit before official transfer for East and 
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Source: World Bank (l 995a). 
130 Growth and Poverty in East and South-East Asia 
all the countries the problem reached unsustainable proportions and forced 
them to adopt stabilization programmes and reform their trade regimes. 
China's peak rate of external deficit was only 1.8 percent of GDP (in 1980). 
The country had, however, embarked on extensive systemic reform in 1979, 
beginning with complete transformation of the organization and institutions 
of agriculture. By the middle of the l980s the focus of China's reform 
programme had shifted to export-led growth and rapid integration into the 
global economy. Taiwan's long record of extemal surplus was broken only 
twice after the first oil shock, in 1975 and 1980. The impetus for the reform of 
the trade regime in favour of greater openness to imports and capital flows, 
however, came from the pressure exerted by trading partners in the advanced 
industrial countries. 
Thus the accelerated globalization of the world economy in the 1980s 
coincided with the widespread reform of the trade regimes and economic 
policies in the ESEA countries. Korea and Taiwan liberalized imports, a 
policy that was feasible in view of the successful transition to adulthood of 
targeted infant industries that had been promoted in the previous decade. 
This also led to a massive restructuring of exports. The comerstone of the 
continued strategy of export-led development was the maintenance of a high 
degree of international competitiveness. 
The second-tier NIEs - Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand - also under-
took a large-scale liberalization of their trade regimes and completed their 
transition from ISI to export-led development policies. This again was feasible 
because of the relative efficiency of industries that had been promoted earlier 
in a targeted and coherent ISI regime. These countries also liberalized their 
investment policies, a reform that encouraged large inflows of foreign direct 
investment (FDI). The structure of exports was radically altered in the process 
of greater integration into the world economy and was facilitated by the 
maintenance of a high degree of international competitiveness. 
By the mid l 980s China was also making a decisive transition to export-led 
growth by sharply shifting incentives in favour of exports while retaining 
many of the controls over and regulations goveming trade and industry. 
Among the policies that had a major role in this transition were adjustments 
to the exchange rate, numerous forms of targeted support to export industries 
and vast liberalization of foreign investment. 
Reforms in the Philippines during the l980s were less effective. Its indus-
tries, developed under an indiscriminate ISI regime and suffering from a lack 
of competition, were not subjected to radical reform and the trade regime 
continued to discriminate against exports. A combination ofpolitical instabil-
ity, ineffective attempts to stabilize the macroeconomic imbalance and failure 
to ensure international competitiveness led to a loss of the Philippines' share 
of the world export market and delayed its access to the benefits of the world 
economy until the early 1990s. 
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GROWTH AND INTEGRATION DURING THE l 980s AND l 990s 
Integration into the Global Economy 
This section considers how well the ESEA countries have succeeded in taking 
advantage of the increased globalization of the world economy since the 
beginning of the l 980s and the extent to which their increased integration 
into the world economy has contributed to their growth. Between 1981 and 
I 993 ESEA ex ports grew at an average annual rate of 11.2 percent, compared 
with 5.3 percent for the LDCs as a whole10 and 5.4 percent for the world as a 
whole (World Bank, 1996a, p. 80). During this period the ESEA share ofFDI 
also increased rapidly. In 1994 it attracted 54 percent of the FDI received by 
all LDCs (ibid. p. 84). 
Tables 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 highlight some of the features of the accelerated 
integration of the ESEA countries into the global economy. As seen in Table 
5.4, of the first-tier NIEs, Korea continued to show an increase in its export/ 
GDP ratio between 1980 and 1994 but Taiwan experienced a fall in this ratio. 
As already noted, Taiwan's export/GDP ratio in 1980 was unusually high. 
Indeed the annual growth rate of Taiwan's exports was well over twice the 
growth rate of world ex ports. The exports of the second-tier NIEs increased 
extremely rapidly, especially during the early l 990s. China's ex ports increased 
at a dramatic rate: between 1980 and 1994 China's export/GDP ratio quad-
rupled! The Philippines was the only country to experience slower export 
growth than the rest of the world, and it was only in the early l 990s that its 
exports began to grow rapidly. 11 
A second important feature of export growth is an increase in the share of 
manufactured exports and a fall in the share of primary exports. The first-tier 
NIEs already had a high ratio ofmanufactured exports to total exports at the 
beginning of the l 980s, the period of acclerated globalization, and since then 
there has been a further increase in the ratio. The change in the ratio of 
manufactured exports to total exports hides the remarkable change in the 
composition of manufactured exports that took place in the first-tier NIEs 
during this period. To illustrate, machinery and transport equipment as a 
proportion of total exports increased in Korea from 20.3 per cent in 1980 to 
42.3 per cent in 1993, and in Taiwan from 24. 7 per cent in 1980 to 44.2 per 
cent in 1993 (Table 5.4). 
The second-tier NIEs have experienced a dramatic change in the composi-
tion of their exports in favour of manufactured goods, particularly the more 
sophisticated products. Exports of machinery and transport equipment as a 
proportion of total exports increased from 11.5 per cent in 1980 to 40.5 per 
cent in 1992 in Malaysia, and from nearly 6 per cent to over 27 per cent in 
Thailand {Table 5.4). The composition of China's exports has similarly 
changed: not only did manufactured exports rise sharply as a proportion of 
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Table 5.4 Growth and composition of exports from East and South-East Asia1 
Exports/GDP Growth rate of Manufactured Machinery 
ratio exports (% p.a.) exports as % of exports as % of 
total exports total exports 
1980 1994 1980-90 1990-94 1980 1993 1980 1993 
Korea 34 36 13.7 7.4 90 93 20.3 42.3 
Taiwan 482 382 13.l 8.0 88 96 24.7 44.2 
lndonesia 24 34 5.3 21.3 3 48 0.5 4.5 
Malaysia 58 90 11.5 17.8 19 653 11.5 40.53 
Thailand 24 39 14.3 21.6 28 73 5.9 27.7 
China 6 24 11.4 14.3 48 81 2.9 15.9 
Philippines 24 34 2.9 10.2 37 76 2.1 18.7 
Notes 
1. Exports refer to exports of goods and non-factor services in the first two 
columns (except for Taiwan) and to merchandise exports only in the other 
columns. Growth rates are based on values at constant price, that is, current 
price values deflated by the relevant price indices. 
2. Merchandise exports only. 
3. 1992. 
Sources: Taiwanese data from ADB (1993, 1996); China, SSB (1996); Data for 
manufactured exports and machinery exports are from World Bank (1993d); All 
other data are from World Bank (1996a). 
total exports, between 1980 and 1995 machinery and transport equipment as a 
proportion of total ex ports increased from 4. 7 per cent to 21.1 per cent 
(China, SSB, 1996, p. 581). The Philippines have also experienced a substan-
tial diversification of exports, although there are important qualifications to 
the significance of this. Technologically advanced manufactured exports 
largely represent low-value-added activities carried out in export-processing 
zones that use a large proportion of imported inputs and have very limited 
linkage to the rest of the economy (Khan, 1997). 
A third notable feature of export growth of the ESEA countries is a rise in 
the share of exports to other LDCs, especially those in Asia, and declining 
dependence on the OECD market for export growth (Table 5.5). Thailand and 
the Philippines are the only exceptions to this trend. In future the OECD 
countries are likely to grow at a much slower rate than the LDCs, especially 
the Asian LDCs, which are likely to continue to be in the front rank of rapidly 
growing economies. A shift of exports away from the OECD countries with 
slow growth in demand and towards faster growing economies will be favour-
able to the ESEA countries. This particular outcome is also directly related to 
policy reform in these and other LDCs during the period of globalization. In 
the past, these countries, with the exception of the first-tier NIEs, often 
allowed their domestic currencies to be artificially overvalued, a practice that 
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Table 5. 5 Direction of tracte of East and South-East Asia (percentage of exports 
of countries of origin) 
Destination 
Asian LDCs OECD Other 
Country of origin 1985 1992 1985 1992 1985 
Korea 12.9 25.4 62.3 53.I 24.7 
Taiwan 15.6 28.4 34.7 49.7 
Indonesia 17.2 24.4 75.I 63.5 7.6 
Malaysia 38.I 41.1 52.9 47.9 9.1 
Th ai land 27.1 21.9 52.8 59.9 20.2 
China 38.2 53.5 39.4 32.9 22.5 
Philippines 19.5 12.9 70.8 81.8 9.7 
Source: ADB (f994). 
Table 5.6 Indices of real effective exchange rates in 
East and South-East Asia (1985=100) 
1988 1990 1993 
Korea 93.6 107.3 99.9 
Taiwan 100.3 106.8 94.7 
Indonesia 55.5 54.4 54.6 
Malaysia 71.7 66.7 77.3 
Th ail and 79.3 83.5 78.9 
China 79.9 68.0 73.8 
Philippines 74.5 76.3 77.8 








made their exports to each other unattractive relative to exports from the 
OECD countries. As Table 5.6 shows, most of these countries have sharply 
reduced the value of their currencies in real terms since the middle of the l 980s. 
As for FDI, while the ESEA countries as a group have attracted a very large 
and increasing share of total FDI going to al! LDCs, the pattern bas been 
vastly different among individual countries. The principal advantage of FDI 
is that, in addition to augmenting investable resources, it provides access to 
technology, management expertise and the international market. Korea and 
Taiwan were neither hospitable towards nor dependent on FDI during their 
early development. This pattern continued for Korea and was only moder-
ately relaxed in Taiwan during the period of accelerated globalization. Their 
domestic savings rates were high enough for them not to depend on foreign 
capital. Korea preferred to acquire technological knowledge through licensing 
arrangements, while in recent years Taiwan bas been more disposed towards 
direct participation by transnational corporations in selected industries. 
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FDI as a proportion of investment has generally been higher in the second-
tier NIEs. The ratio has been particularly high for Malaysia (Table 5.7), 
although the most dramatic increase in FDI has taken place in China in recent 
years. In 1994 China accounted for 42 per cent of all FDI going to LDCs! 
None of the second-tier countries had a pressing need for FDI as a source of 
augmenting investable resources, rather the main reason for seeking FDI was 
to gain access to technology, management skills and the international market. 
A major determinant of the success of the ESEA-6 in taking advantage of 
the globalizing world economy was their ability to maintain a high degree of 
international competitiveness by stabilizing the unit labour cost in foreign 
exchange, in spite of increasing real wages. This was achieved through the 
combination of a rapid increase in labour productivity, a low rate of domestic 
inflation relative to world inflation and adjustment to the exchange rate. 12 
Labour productivity increased rapidly due to the emphasis placed by these 
countries on human capital investment and the overall incentive structure that 
guided investment towards socially profitable activities. Both groups of NIEs 
achieved substantially lower rates of inflation during the l 980s and l 990s 
than in the preceding decade (Table 5.8). China's inflation was higher during 
the l 980s and l 990s than previously; but the aggressive adjustment in the 
exchange rate allowed China to stabilise its unit labour cost in foreign 
exchange. The Philippines failed to stabilize its unit labour cost in foreign 
exchange because of its inability to improve labour productivity and to 
contain the rate ofinflation.13 
These countries were not only competing against others in the international 
market, they were also competing against each other. What prevented this 
Table 5. 7 Foreign direct investment as proportion of investment in 
East and South-East Asia1 
1981-85 1986-90 1994 
Korea 0.5 1.3 0.6 
Taiwan 1.5 3.5 2.42 
Indonesia 1.0 2.0 4.2 
Malaysia 10.8 10.5 16.3 
Thailand 3.2 5.9 1.2 
China n.a. n.a. 15.5 
Philippines n.a. n.a. 6.5 
Notes: 
1. Data for 1981-85, 1986--90 and 1993 (Taiwan) are FDI as a 
percentage of gross fixed capital formation. For 1994 the figures 
refer to the ratio ofFDI to gross investment. 
2. For 1993. 
Sources: UNCTAD World Jnvestment Report (various years); World 
Bank (l 996a, l 996b ). 
Azizur Rahman Khan 
Table 5.8 Annual rates of increase in the consumer 
price index in East and South-East Asia 
1971-80 1981-90 1991-93 
Korea 16.5 6.4 7.1 
Taiwan 11.1 3.1 3.6 
lndonesia 17.5 8.6 8.6 
Malaysia 6.0 3.2 4.3 
Thailand 10.0 4.4 4.3 
China 1.1 7.5 9.4 
Philippines 14.8 13.0 11.7 
Source: ADB (1994). 
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from becoming a 'beggar-thy-neighbour' game was the fact that the indivi-
dual countries restructured their production and exports according to the 
changing pattern of comparative advantage. 
Economie Growth 
The six ESEA countries that successfully integrated into the global economy 
all attained high growth in GDP during the period of economic globalization 
(Table 5.1). The Philippines, which failed to take advantage of the increased 
globalization, stagnated during the 1980s and its performance only began to 
improve in 1994. 
During the 1980s Korea maintained an annual GDP growth rate that was 
almost as high as during the preceding decade. Taiwan's growth rate during 
the l 980s was significantly lower than in the previous decade, though still very 
high by international standards. During the early l 990s the growth rate of 
both these countries fell further, though remaining 3.6 times the world aver-
age! As noted earlier, for years Taiwan has had a per capita income that 
almost puts it in the World Bank's high-income-country classification. It is 
currently at top of the league of the upper-middle-income countries and is 
destined to be the next country to enter the top rank. However, while Korea 
and Taiwan have enjoyed unprecedented development achievements in many 
areas in the past, it is unlikely that their economies will continue to grow at 
their historical rates. Nonetheless their growth performance in the period of 
globalization must be regarded as remarkable by any standard. 
Among the second-tier NIEs, Thailand experienced steady acceleration 
of GDP growth during the period of globalization. Its annual population 
growth rate is now down to 1 percent and per capita income has been growing 
by more than 7 per cent a year. The GDP growth rates of Indonesia and 
Malaysia declined somewhat in the early to mid 1980s due to the short-term 
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retrenchment effects of stabilization, but since then they have accelerated 
steadily. 
China's growth performance during the era of globalization has been 
historically unprecedented. Never before has more than a fifth of humankind 
experienced a more than 10 percent increase in GDP (about 9 percent in per 
capita GDP), sustained over a decade and a half. 14 
The Philippines is the only ESEA country in our list not to conform to this 
pattern of high growth. ln fact, during the period of globalization it experi-
enced negative growth in per capita income and its per capita GDP was lower 
in 1995 than in the early 1980s. 
The remarkable growth performance of the ESEA-6 during the period of 
globalization was the result of development strategies that cannot be analysed 
adequately in the present study. One might characterize them as extensions of 
the strategies used in the l 960s and l 970s, briefly outlined in the first section, 
with modifications necessitated by increased integration into the global econ-
omy. These modifications were efficiency augmenting: for the second-tier 
NIEs and China in particular, outward-looking reforms led to more efficient 
resource use. As the incentive to save and invest was kept as high as before, 
and targeted support to worthwhile industries remained intact, this led to high 
growth. 
Information Technology 
Globalization has been facilitated by the rapid spread of information tech-
nology. Activities that encompass the electronics industry, telecommunica-
tions and information services, including computers, semiconductors, 
software and information systems, have reduced the cost of international 
communication and facilitated the flow of information. IT has therefore 
emerged as a critically important factor in the accelerated process of eco-
nomic globalization. 
A recent W orld Bank study of the role of IT in the development of East 
Asia identifies three distinct aspects of its importance. 15 First, it is an industry 
whose output demand is highly income elastic and rapidly growing. If a 
country can obtain comparative advantage in some aspect of the industry, 
this is a very important source of export revenue. Second, IT makes an 
important contribution to increased industrial productivity by enhancing 
the efficiency of both management and technology. Third, IT can contribute 
to overall economic efficiency through modernization of the transport and 
communication infrastructure. 
An important point about IT activities is that comparative advantage in 
some segment of it is feasible for countries with vastly different factor endow-
ments and most of its components are 'footloose'. Sorne processes (for 
example the assembly of microelectronics and computer motherboards) can 
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be undertaken in countries with abundant unskilled and semi-skilled labour, 
as happens in Malaysia and the Philippines; while other processes require 
more sophisticated skills, such as those available in Korea and Taiwan. 
The appropriateness of using IT for the enhancement of production tech-
nology of course varies from one country to another depending on whether it 
is complementary to or competitive with other production factors. It is 
conceivable that certain IT-based production techniques will replace labour 
and hence be inappropriate for a labour-abundant LDC (for example Indo-
nesia) but quite appropriate for an LDC that is well on its way towards 
comparative labour scarcity (as Korea and Taiwan appear to be). 
Information on different aspects of IT adoption in LDCs is often not 
readily available. The evidence that is available suggests that the ESEA 
countries are among the foremost LDCs in terms of carving out a market 
share in the IT industry. In 1993 Korea and Malaysia respectively had 9.5 per 
cent and 7.5 percent of the world export market in electronic microcircuits, 
4. 7 per cent and 8.6 per cent of the market for diodes and transistors, and 6.1 
percent and 2.6 per cent of the market for automatic data processing (ADP) 
peripherals. Korea had 3.1 per cent of the market for digital computers. 
Singapore and Hong Kong, the high-income ESEA economies, had large 
shares of the world market in these IT products. Thailand, China and the 
Philippines had also entered the world export market in IT products. 
Together all these ESEA countries had 31.4 percent of the world export 
market in electronic microcircuits, 27.7 percent of the market in diodes and 
transistors, 38.8 percent of the market in ADP peripherals and 28.4 per cent 
of the market in digital computers. 16 Information is not available about 
Taiwan's share. Clearly the ESEA region had become the largest country 
group, outside the OECD, to produce and export IT products. 
Table 5.9 summarizes the available information on some indicators of the 
extent of use of IT in four of the ESEA countries in 1989. Korea had clearly 
attained a high level of IT use by LDC standards and was already on the way 
to the level of use in some OECD countries. Taiwan may also have attained a 
comparable stage of development, although information is not readily avail-
able in this regard. The other ESEA countries were still at a comparatively 
low level of use of IT. 
Within ESEA the strategy for IT development varies among countries. The 
Korean strategy is probably representative of that of the first-tier NIEs. In 
1992 Korea adopted an IT master plan, which set the following targets: an 
increase of persona! computers and terminais from 2.2 million to 10 million 
by 2001; an increase in the share of locally produced computers from 3 per 
cent to 50 percent; development of 256-Mbit DRAM chips within three to 
four years; development of broad-band information service digital networks 
for cellular phones; and establishment of a centre to map out a standard 
linking code in Korean and other languages (Hanna et al., 1996, p. 87). The 
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strategy adopted for the achievement of these targets was similar to that used 
in the past for the development of industries, namely broad-range but 
targeted public support. The IT industry has been protected from competition 
from established producers abroad. However, it has been recognized that the 
domestic market is not sufficiently large to allow the efficient development of 
the industry. Thus the protection afforded is not inward-looking; support is 
extended to enable them to expand exports as well. Government procurement 
is used to guarantee a minimum market. R&D support from the public sector 
amounted to 64 percent of total R&D in the industry in 1980, falling to 20 per 
cent in the early l990s. The use of IT in government administration was 
promoted to encourage the expansion of domestic demand. Providing R&D 
tax incentives to the private sector, encouraging industries to automate and 
investing in the human capital required for R&D development are other 
measures that helped the development of the IT industry.17 
In stark contrast to this comprehensive strategy of developing IT and using 
it to enhance productivity and efficiency throughout the economy, is the case 
of the semiconductor industry in the Philippines. In 1987 imported inputs 
amounted to 76.3 percent of the value ofexports of the IT industry. While the 
industry accounted for 10.2 per cent of exports, it contributed only 0.4 per 
cent of value added and 0.14 per cent of employment to the economy. 18 The 
low linkage between this industry and the rest of the economy was due to its 
development in enclaves under the auspices of FDI, attracted by incentives 
that were strong enough to induce their location in the country but insuffi-
ciently strong to promote their integration into the rest of the economy. While 
this development has brought other important benefits to the Philippines, 
semiconductor exports have contributed little to the economy. 
Table 5.9 Indicators of information technology for East and South-East Asia, 
1989 
Korea Thailand Malaysia Philippines Braz il USA 
Telephone lines per 28.32 2.08 7.35 0.95 6.00 50.58 
thousand persons 
Per capita sale of 92.87 14.53 33.54 8.44 8.40 442.35 
telecom services ($) 
Mainframe computers 222 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 8287 
per million persons 
Per capita sale of 10.70 0.71 3.63 0.43 1.61 39.06 
data processing ($) 
Per capita sale of 9.40 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 414.00 
information 
processing services ($) 
Source: Hanna et al. (1996). 
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Malaysia perhaps represents an intermediate case in which the IT industry 
has been promoted by FDI but has been more successful in creating linkages 
between this industry and the domestic economy by encouraging a more rapid 
diffusion of IT use. Unfortunately there is insufficient information available 
to analyse this comprehensively. 
TRENDS IN PO VER TY 
This section aims to determine the trends in the incidence of poverty in 
the ESEA countries during the 1980s and 1990s, the period associated 
with accelerated globalization. As shown below, poverty reduction has 
been less uniform among the ESEA countries than their growth perfor-
mance. 
Poverty is measured by the number of the population below some threshold 
per capita income or expenditure that is held constant over time. Such thresh-
olds do not represent constant standards of living across countries. Although 
the thresholds are frequently anchored to a minimum acceptable level of 
nutrition, as indicators of the living standard they differ between countries 
for a variety of reasons, for example differences in the nutritional standards 
used between countries, intercountry differences in consumption patterns, 
and differences in the method of allowing for non-food needs when estimating 
the poverty threshold. Thus the levels of absolute poverty are not comparable 
between countries. Furthermore it is not clear that use of a uniform poverty 
threshold for all countries, had it been possible to do so, would have changed 
the findings. 
The First-Tier NIEs 
Korea and Taiwan are among the countries with the most egalitarian dis-
tribution of income and a low incidence of absolute poverty. Indeed the 
incidence of poverty, by any reasonable standard, had declined to very low 
levels in Korea and Taiwan by the early 1980s and there is little evidence that 
high growth in the period of globalization has been associated with increased 
inequality. For Korea the Gini ratio of income distribution is estimated to 
have declined from 0.389 in 1980 to 0.345 in 1985 and 0.336 in 1988 (Korea 
Labor Institute, 1992, p.126). The hourly real wage in industries increased at 
an annual rate of 9.3 percent from 1982-90 (ibid., p. 65). Direct estimates of 
change in the distribution of income are not readily available for Taiwan, but 
real manufacturing earnings increased at an annual rate of 4.4 per cent 
between 1979 and 1985 and 9.4 per cent between 1985 and 1990 (ADB, 
1994, p. 207). The unemployment rate in both these countries declined 
between 1985 and 1990 (ibid.). Although direct estimates are not available, 
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it is almost certain that the incidence of absolute poverty, according to any 
reasonable criteria, bas fallen in these countries. 
The Second~ Tier NIEs 
Tables 5.10, 5.11 and 5.12 provide estimates of the trends in poverty in 
lndonesia, Malaysia and Thailand during the l980s and early l990s. The 
incidence of poverty in all these countries declined over this period although 
the extent and pattern of poverty reduction varied. 
In lndonesia the incidence of poverty in both rural and urban areas 
declined steadily throughout the period under review. A notable feature of 
the trend is that between 1981 and 1987 - the period of stabilization and 
decline in GDP growth rate - poverty reduction took place at a faster rate 
than during the subsequent period of [aster growth and more rapid integra-
tion into the global economy. 
Successful reduction of poverty during the stabilization period was due to 
the fact that fiscal retrenchment concentrated on the capital-intensive sectors 
and government programmes had little adverse effect on employment growth. 
ln addition the severity of retrenchment was limited due to the cooperation of 
donors and creditors, who allowed a continued inflow of net resources. ln 
more recent years the fall in the rate of poverty reduction bas been attributed 
to the isolation of the remaining poor in remote pockets of poverty that are 
not easily reached by public programmes. 
The incidence of poverty in Malaysia bas declined more rapidly than in the 
other NIEs. By the early l 990s poverty in urban Malaysia had become insig-
nificant and poverty in rural areas had been reduced to a very low level. 
Poverty reduction during the early to mid l 980s - the period of stabilzation 
Table 5.10 Trend in poverty incidence in lndonesia 
(percentage of population below the poverty threshold) 
Rural Urban 
1980 28.4 29.0 
1981 26.5 28.1 
1984 21.2 23.l 
1987 16.4 20.l 
1990 14.3 16.8 
1993 13.l 14.2 
Note: These are estimates by the Central Bureau of Statistics. 
Poverty threshold refers toper capita expenditure based on the 
cost of 2100 kilocalories of food energy and a further mark up 
for non-food expenditure. 
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Table 5.11 Trend in poverty incidence in Malaysia 
(percentage of population below the poverty threshold) 
Rural Urban 
1973 55.3 22.9 
1984 27.6 6.5 
1987 24.7 7.3 
1989 13.0 2.2 
1995 6.5 1.9 
Note: Poverty threshold refers to RM33 per capita per 
month at 1970 prices, using the consumer price index in 
subsequent years. 
Source: Samudram (1996). 
Table 5.12 Trend in poverty incidence in Thailand 
(percentage of population below the poverty threshold) 
Whole country Villages 
1981 23.0 27.3 
1986 29.5 35.8 
1988 22.8 26.3 
1992 18.6 20.7 
Note: Poverty threshold refers to an income level that 
provides adequate nutrition (along with other basic 
necessities). 
Sources: Suganya and Somchai (1988); Medhi et al. 
(1992); Medhi (1996). 
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and reduced growth - was due to an improvement in income distribution. 
Accelerated growth from the late 1980s was not accompanied by a significant 
worsening of the distribution ofincome, so that the pace ofpoverty reduction 
was maintained. 19 
ln Thailand the incidence of poverty increased during the period of 
increased globalization and declined thereafter. Over the period as a whole 
there was a substantial reduction in poverty, although some of the potential 
poverty-reducing effects of the sharp acceleration in growth were offset by 
increased inequality in the distribution of income. A recent study by Medhi 
(1996) reports that from 1988-90 about 36 per cent of the reduction in the 
headcount index of poverty that would have resulted from income growth, 
with unchanged distribution, was offset by the adverse change in income 
distribution. The same study reports simulation exercises that show that the 
radical reduction in effective protection in the late l 980s - directly deriving 
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from Thailand's greater integration into the world economy - contributed to 
poverty reduction. Higher growth in the period of globalization also helped 
channel more resources into poverty-alleviating programmes. Since the mid 
l 980s the share of economic and social services in total public expenditure has 
increased rapidly, with a favourable impact on the poor. 
China20 
China embarked on a massive reform of the rural economy in 1979 and until 
the mid l 980s its remarkable growth was largely led by the growth of the rural 
economy. From the mid l 980s the focus of China's development strategy 
shifted away from the rural economy in favour of export-led growth, whereby 
the Chinese economy became rapidly integrated into the global economy. 
There was a sharp decline in the incidence of poverty in rural China until 
the mid l980s, but thereafter the rate of decline slowed dramatically and in 
the early l 990s it ground to a complete hait (Table 5.13), with a consequent 
rise in the absolute number in poverty. In urban China there was a steady fall 
in the incidence of poverty until the end of the l 980s, but in the l 990s this 
trend reversed. Overall China's poverty-reduction record during the period of 
increased integration into the global economy was poor, in sharp contrast to 
its remarkable growth performance during the same period. 
The asymmetrical performance in poverty reduction in the pre-1985 and 
post-1985 period in rural China is largely explained by a fall in the growth 
rate of persona! income (the variable that features in the poverty threshold). 
Table 5.13 Trend in poverty incidence in China 
(percentage of population below the poverty threshold) 
Rural Urban 
Standard PIT Low PIT Standard P lT Low PIT 
1980 59.8 40.8 n.a. n.a. 
1981 48.3 30.3 44.3 20.l 
1983 26.4 14.3 n.a. n.a. 
1985 24.5 14.0 26.2 12.7 
1988 27.0 16. l n.a. n.a. 
1989 n.a. n.a. 17.7 7.4 
1990 23.9 13.9 15.0 7.4 
1991 n.a. n.a. 12.2 4.7 
1992 22.9 13.6 n.a. n.a. 
1993 23.7 14.l n.a. n.a. 
1994 23.l 13.6 12.0 5.9 
Note: PIT stands for poverty income threshold. 
Source: Khan (l 996c). 
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In the earlier period, personal income grew rapidly due to a high rate of 
growth of agricultural output and a sharp improvement in the agricultural 
terms of trade. The effect of growth was strong enough to outweigh the effect 
of moderately rising inequality in the distribution of personal income. In the 
la ter period the rate of growth of persona! income declined drastically due to 
a fall in agricultural output and a decline in or stagnation of the agricultural 
terms of trade. The growth in personal income was no longer high enough to 
offset the effect of inequality, which continued to rise. Since most of China's 
poor are located in rural areas, the decline in the rate of rural poverty 
reduction affected China's overall poverty-reduction statistics. 
Until the late 1980s the rate of growth of personal income in urban China 
was high enough to outweigh the effect of the moderate rise in inequality. 
Thereafter growth in personal income accelerated, but it could no longer 
outweigh the effect of what was now a sharp increase in the inequality of 
income distribution. 
An important point emerging in the case of China is that the overall growth 
rate of GDP is a poor predictor of the growth rate of personal income, the 
variable that features in the estimation of poverty. This is due partly to 
macroeconomic policies concerning the rate of accumulation, and partly to 
a change in the sectoral terms of trade, which feature prominently in the 
transmission of aggregate growth to sectoral growth. 
The unprecedented rate of industrialization in the era of China's integra-
tion into the global economy (1984-94) contributed to income concentration 
in two very important ways. First, the output elasticity of employment in 
manufacturing fell drastically, from 0.62 in 1978-84 to 0.27 in 1984-94. This 
was in spi te of the fact that the growth in manufactured exports was mainly in 
labour-intensive products. The explanation of this paradox seems to lie in the 
initial condition of the manufacturing industries, mainly state and collective 
enterprises: in the past employment had been expanded beyond the dictates of 
efficiency as part of the social policy of guaranteed employment. Economie 
reforms aimed at integration into the world economy made it increasingly 
difficult to continue this system of social protection. Both state and collective 
enterprises, in their quest for greater efficiency and collaboration with foreign 
investors, began to shed surplus labour during the period of globalization and 
this process gained momentum once legal cover was gradually extended to it. 
The observed low output elasticity of employment was the sum of two 
divergent effects: (l) a fairly high output elasticity of employment measured 
at constant intensity of employment per worker; and (2) a rise in the intensity 
of employment due to a reduction of concealed unemployment in industry. 
The process was certainly efficiency enhancing and one could argue that its 
adverse distributional impact might have been mitigated by appropriate social 
policies, for example unemployment insurance and/or an accelerated public 
works programme. Second, growth was concentrated in the richer coastal and 
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eastern provinces, regions that attracted the most FDI. These trends were 
closely related to the fact that reforms aimed at facilitating the integration of 
China into the world economy were not offset by policies to protect the 
unemployed and the poorer regions. 
Sorne specific aspects of development policy deserve to be highlighted in 
connection with the disequalizing effects that were unleashed by China's 
greater integration into the global economy. The push for an ever higher 
rate of accumulation was an obstacle to the growth of GDP being transformed 
into growth of persona! income. The change in the composition of public 
expenditure and credit away from the rural sector and towards the urban 
sectors of the richer provinces was detrimental to overall poverty alleviation. 
The policy of allowing the state and collective enterprises to shed under-
employed labour was not matched by an adequate policy to protect the 
unemployed. While the official tolerance of migration should have benefited 
the poor, de facto discrimination against them has impeded their welfare.21 
Institutional changes to the provision of education and health services were 
not complemented by increased public funds that would allow the poor to 
gain access to these services.22 
The Philippines 
Because of its dismal growth performance until the early l 990s the Philippines 
is an unlikely country to have experienced a reduction in poverty. It is there-
fore surprising that the incidence of poverty declined, albeit slightly, between 
1985 and 1991 (Table 5.14). With the resumption of growth in 1994 there was 
more of an impetus for poverty reduction in urban areas. The relationship 
between growth, inequality and poverty has been different in different peri-
ods. From 1985-88 real per capita GDP increased by 12 percent. According 
to the Family Income and Expenditure Survey (1985, 1988, 1991) real con-
sumption per capita was stagnant, indicating a failure to convert growth of 
aggregate GDP into improved living standards. The incidence of poverty 
nevertheless declined due to an improvement in the distribution of expendi-
ture in rural areas. From 1988-91 there was almost no growth in per capita 
GDP and inequality in distribution increased. The result was an increase in 
the incidence of poverty. 
Greater integration into the global economy, prompting a downward 
adjustment of the exchange rate, appears to have contributed to increased 
poverty in the Philippines. According to Balisacan (1996) a 5 percent deva-
luation increases the rural headcount ratio of poverty by 1.9 percentage 
points and the urban headcount ratio by 2.5 percentage points. Since agri-
cultural products are more tradable than those of industry in the Philippines, 
the devaluation substantially raised rural prices. The resulting terms of trade 
improvement did not benefit the rural poor, who are largely landless workers 
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Table 5.14 Trend in poverty incidence in the Philippines 















Note: Poverty threshold is the one officially estirnated by the 
Inter-agency Technical Working Group on Poverty Determi-
nation and is believed to be relatively high compared with the 
ones for Indonesia and Thailand. 
Source: Balisacan (1996). 
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and small farmers, net buyers of food. The urban poor also faced a higher 
increase in food prices than in nominal earnings. 
CONCLUSIONS 
During the l980s and early 1990s the ESEA-6 achieved a greater degree of 
integration into the global economy by increasing their share ofworld exports 
and FDI. The success ofboth tiers ofNIEs in this task was strongly facilitated 
by the relative efficiency of the industries that their past development policies 
had promoted. This enabled them to compete internationally in a more 
liberalized trading system. Their ability to maintain international competi-
tiveness was another critical element in ensuring their successful integration 
into the global economy. 
The period of globalization also witnessed a high rate of growth for these 
economies as they maintained the positive elements of their past development 
policies and reinforced them further by the efficiency-enhancing reforms that 
were introduced as part of their programme of increased integration into the 
global economy. Strong emphasis on the IT industry, especially in the first-
tier NIEs, was another important element ofincreased integration and higher 
growth. Their growth in the period of globalization was not associated with a 
significant increase in inequality of income distribution. As a consequence 
they ail experienced a continued reduction in the incidence of poverty. 
China's remarkable success in increasing its share of global trade and FDI 
was due to a sharp shift in its development policy towards exports and 
international competitiveness. The resulting improvement in the efficiency 
of resource use, combined with continuation of the high investment rate, led 
to a very high rate of growth in GDP. However, the process unleashed 
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strongly disequalizing forces, which led to an increase in inequality and a hait 
to the reduction of poverty that China had experienced before its integration 
into the global economy. 
The Philippines failed to take advantage of the process of globalization due 
to its inability to maintain international competitiveness and its failure to 
break out of the inefficient ISI regime sufficiently quickly. Political instability 
and the absence of a coherent development strategy led to a decline in the rate 
of investment and the prolonged stagnation of GDP, from which it has only 
recently started to recover. 
lt is useful to note that specific elements of globalization can have asym-
metrical redistributive effects under different circumstances. Trade liberal-
ization and exchange rate adjustment seem to have improved the distribution 
of income in Thailand but adversely affected the poor in the Philippines. lt is 
also important to exercise caution in attributing the absence of favourable 
distributional trends in China and the Philippines during the period of glo-
balization to these countries' increased integration into the world economy. 
In the case of China, the adverse distributional effects are transitional and due 
to the initial distortion of its industries. This could have been offset by 
compensatory policies during the transition period.23 In the Philippines the 
main cause of persistent poverty is slow growth. Greater integration into the 
global economy would almost certainly have contributed to higher growth in 
the Philippines. 
Notes 
!. This chapter employs the same notion of globalization as Chapter 4 on South 
Asia. As is stated in that chapter, the world economy has been gradually moving 
towards greater integration for a long time, but the process accelerated at the 
beginning of the l 980s. What is often referred to as the 'period of globalization' in 
this chapter should more accurately be called, as indeed it is from time to time, 
'the on-going period of accelerated globalization of the world economy'. This 
longer phrase is often replaced by the shorter one in the interest of brevity. 
2. As will be discussed later, their outward-looking strategy did not mean that they 
rejected protection in favour of free trade. It was outward looking in the sense 
that there was an absence of discrimination against exports. In the promotion of 
targeted industries there was no discrimination in favour of industries that sold 
their products in the domestic market relative to industries that sold their pro-
ducts abroad. 
3. The World Bank classifies these two territories as high-income countries (HICs). 
According to World Bank (1996a), the per capita GNPs of these territories are 
close to or above that of the median of the 25 HICs that have at least one million 
people each. Indeed Taiwan would be included in the group of HICs, according 
to the World Bank classification, if it were recognized as a country, though it 
would rank second last in the group. Its per capita income in 1994 was 54 percent 
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ofthat of Hong Kong and 52 percent of that of Singapore. Note that the United 
Nations includes Hong Kong and Singapore in the category of 'developing 
countries', a classification with which the authorities in these countries seem to 
agree. 
4. There is no unanimity of view as to whether Myanmar should be designated as 
part of South Asia or South-East Asia. Even if one were to consider it part of 
South-East Asia, it would not make sense to include it in the present study 
because of the absence of relevant information and because of its long-term 
adherence to autarkic policies from which it is only now beginning to emerge. 
The ESEA region in this chapter excludes the Pacifie Islands (including Papua 
New Guinea). 
5. According to the IMF (1996, p.123). 
6. As shown later, Taiwan was the only country in this group to experience a 
reduction in the ratio of exports to GDP during the period of globalization. Ali 
the others succeeded in increasing their export/GDP ratios. The reduction in 
Taiwan's export GDP ratio started from a very high base and the ratio bas 
remained very high in recent years. 
7. The primary school enrolment rates were 67 percent for South Asia and 68 per 
cent for North Africa and the Middle East. For Latin America, which was 
considerably richer at the time, it was 95 per cent. Ali these data are from 
World Bank (1995a). 
8. For various interpretations of this experience see Amsden (1979), Wade (1990, 
1996) and World Bank (1993b). 
9. See Khan (1997) for an account of the Philippines experience. 
10. Estimates of the export growth of the non-ESEA LDCs are not available, but 
growth was clearly much lower. 
11. For an account of the poor performance of the Philippines in this and other 
regards see Khan (1997). 
12. The underlying analytical mode! and the evidence for Korea and Malaysia can 
be found in Mazumdar (1993). Evidence for Chinais provided in Khan (1996d). 
13. This is documented in Khan (1997). 
14. Admittedly, as shown in the next section, this average growth was not shared 
equally by ail the 1.2 billion people of China. 
15. See Hanna et al. (1996). The report provides case studies of IT in Japan, Korea, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. 
16. This information is from Chapter 2 of this volume. 
17. See Hanna et al. ( 1996, pp. 90-2) for an account of the Korean strategy. 
18. See Krugman et al. ( 1992, p.12) for this information. Unfortunately more recent 
information is not available. 
19. See Samudram (1996) for some of the evidence. 
20. The analysis of poverty trends in China is based on Khan (1996c), which 
provides detailed evidence that can not be reproduced here for reasons of space. 
21. There bas been a very large flow of migrants out of rural areas into cities, where 
in the past migration was controlled by the strict enforcement of residence 
permits. This enforcement bas been relaxed, but the migrants have not been 
granted access to public resources such as subsidized education, health services 
and housing. 
22. ln the past these services were provided by collective institutions. The disman-
tling of these institutions bas not been followed by adequate provision of 
services by local govemment or other bodies. 
23. Admittedly these compensatory policies might have affected the pattern of 
globalization. It is possible that a policy of greater regional balance in public 
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investment would have affected the volume and pattern of FDI. Similarly a 
policy of greater social protection might have reduced the rate of accumulation 
and growth. 
6 The Impact of Globalization 
on Africa 
S.M. Wangwe and Flora Musonda 
Africa is the least-developed continent in the world today, as is evident from 
the low levels of per capita income in man y African countries. Among other 
things there is a lack of infrastructure, including telecommunication linkages 
with the outside world and within Africa, low levels of technological innova-
tion, low expenditure on research and development (R&D) and inadequate 
social services. 
This chapter examines the position of Africa in the globalizing economy. 
The first section deals with structural adjustment programmes aimed at open-
ing up Africa to the global economy. The second section investigates diverse 
aspects of marginalization in trade, investment (including foreign direct 
investment) and information technology. The third section looks at factors 
that are influencing Africa's integration into the global economy; and the 
fourth at globalization's effects on growth, poverty and employment in Africa 
during the I 980s and l 990s. 
LIBERALIZATION AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT 
Most African countries have introduced and implemented economic reforms 
in the form of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), and these reforms 
are clearly related to globalization. Trade liberalization, for example, is a 
structural-reform measure that in many cases serves to open up the economy, 
but it also brings stiffer competition. In turn globalization can further stiffen 
competition, so it is difficult to determine which portion of the effect is 
brought about by SAPs and which by globalization. We shall summarize 
the salient features of SAPs and globalization to pin down some important 
interrelationships. 
In Africa, governments introduced SAPs in response to economic crises 
resulting from external and internai factors. The external factors included 
price hikes in petroleum, cyclical deterioration in terms of trade, droughts, 
wars and political upheavals. The internai factors included inappropriate 
policies such as overvalued domestic currencies, which penalized exports, 
subsidized imports and distorted factor market prices, slowing down overall 
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growth. An over-extended public sector was evident in a large and inefficient 
civil service and direct government involvement in the production of goods 
and services through myriads of money-losing public corporations. The losses 
of public corporations caused large budget deficits, which were financed by 
printing currency (seigniorage), leading to high inflation. An inward-looking 
trade policy of import substitution, supported by the widespread use of tariff 
and quantitative barriers to protect uncompetitive manufacturing enterprises, 
stifled any innovative response to global competition. Excessive use of price 
controls to tinker with market forces and a corrupt bureaucracy emphasized 
licensing rather than market forces to achieve allocative efficiency. This 
fuelled rent-seeking activities and discouraged agricultural production. Gov-
ernments controlled inefficient fiscal and tax structures by making dispropor-
tionate use of public debt (issue of treasury bills), interest-rates fixing and 
directed credit. 
Financial liberalization has failed to improve the capacities of the fragile 
financial institutions. Foreign banks have been slow to finance development 
in those countries where they have been allowed to operate. Bank insolvencies 
and weak supportive infrastructures persist, and they have delayed the devel-
opment of an efficient financial system. 
The counterproductive policies pursued under the economic reform 
programmes have led to poor performance in the manufacturing sector. 
For instance the devaluation of national currencies has made imports 
more expensive, thereby raising the cost of production. Trade liberalization 
has compounded the problems of domestic industries. Cheaper imports 
from technologically advanced developing countries, especially South-East 
Asian countries, have made rapid inroads into the African basic consumer-
goods markets (Bagachwa et al., 1995; UNIDO, 1996). Manufacturers' 
associations in Ghana, Nigeria and Zambia have complained of dumping 
and unfair competition. In some cases external reforms have led to excessive 
competition among both large- and small-scale firms, and this competition 
has threatened their profit margins and lowered their sales volumes. In 
other cases reforms have resulted in plant closures, especially in less 
competitive, small-scale activities such as soap making, shoe making, textiles, 
and tie-and-dye-cloth industries (the latter are usually undertaken by women; 
the clothes are tied and coloured with the dye). Trade liberalization has also 
encouraged trading activities and discouraged investment in long-term 
productive activities. 
On the other hand import liberalization has given some small-scale and 
informal-sector firms access to raw materials, tools and spare parts. This has 
been especially true of small-scale retail, tailoring, food and woodworking 
enterprises. Import liberalization has also generally improved the supply of 
goods. 
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African governments' capacity to manage their economies deteriorated 
during the economic reforms, and the past policies of many countries 
undermined the private sector's ability to make up for the diminished role 
of the state in the economy. Where the private sector is strong, it is dominated 
either by ethnie minorities (such as Asians in East Africa and whites in South 
Africa) or by subsidiaries of transnational corporations. Whether interna-
tional linkages created by the non-indigenous private sector will improve 
domestic economies is unclear. The strength of the indigenous private sector 
can be improved if African governments take a more active role in enhancing 
its capacities, if the public sector is streamlined, and if better cooperation 
between the private and the public sector is ensured. 
Preliminary assessments indicate that African countries' responses to SAPs 
differ, depending on a number of factors, such as the situation that prevailed 
before the reforms, the speed, intensity and sustainability of the reforms, 
resource endowments and financial inflows to complement domestic resources. 
THE MARGINALIZATION OF AFRICA 
The SAPs have failed to integrate Africa effectively into the global economy. 
The weakness of Africa's global integration is evident in its falling share of 
world trade, investment and IT. In this section we examine these three aspects 
of the marginalization of Africa as they pertain to its main regions: East, 
West, Southern and North Africa. 
Tra de 
Africa's current position in the global economy is characterized by a small 
and declining share of world trade, and concentration on the production of 
primary exports and importation of non-primary products. Africa's share of 
world trade varied from 4.1 percent to 4.9 percent from 1960-65, fluctuated 
around 4.4 percent during the l 970s and declined to 2-3 percent in the l 990s. 
Its share of world exports fell from 4. 7 percent in 1975 to 2.0 percent in 1990; 
the share of the least developed African countries suffered a more drastic fall, 
from 0.6 percent to 0.2 percent (UNIDO, 1993). 
Table 6.1 gives four indicators of export growth: share of exports in gross 
domestic product (GDP), growth rate of exports, share of manufactured 
exports, and share of machinery exports. Between 1980 and 1994, although 
the share of exports in GDP increased somewhat in many countries, it 
actually declined in others, such as Algeria, Congo, Nigeria, Togo, Uganda 
and Zambia. Similarly export growth was negative for Côte d'ivoire, Niger-
ia,Tanzania and Zambia in the 1980s, and for Algeria, Cameroon, Côte 
d'ivoire, Mauritania and Togo in the l 990s. In the l 980s Mauritius was the 
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Table 6.I Indicators of export growth for selected African countries 
Exports as% Growth rate of exports Manufactured Machinery 
ofGDP (%per year) exports (% of exports 
total exports) (%of total 
exports) 
1980 1994 1970-80 1980-90 1990-94 1980 1993 1970 1980 1991 
East Africa: 
Kenya 28 39 -2.2 4.3 0.4 12 29 0.3 0.7 10.61 
Tanzania 14 24 -6.8 -1.8 10.0 14 n.a. n.a. 0.6 2.62 
Uganda 19 8 -10.5 2.3 5.3 3 1 n.a. 2.7 0.5 
West Africa: 
Benin 23 27 -5.3 -2.2 1.9 8 Il n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Côte d'ivoire 35 47 3.2 -1.0 -1.2 n.a. 16 1.1 n.a. 2.1 
Ghana 8 25 -8.0 2.5 7.5 1 24 0.1 n.a. 0.2 
Malawi 25 29 3.9 2.5 0.4 7 4 0.2 0.1 0.2 
Mauritania 37 43 -5.3 3.4 -3.8 2 1 0.4 1.4 0.2 
Nigeria 29 22 1.4 -0.3 1.7 0 2 n.a. 0.1 0.1 
Senegal 28 36 -1.3 2.8 1.4 15 22 4.2 3.0 2.1 
Togo 51 30 1.5 0.6 -13.6 Il 9 2.0 1.7 1.0 
Southern Africa: 
Lesotho 20 15 n.a. 4.1 10.6 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Mauritius 51 59 6.0 10.4 4.6 27 90 0.1 2.8 2.0 
Zambia 41 34 -0.5 -3.3 13.7 6 9 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Zimbabwe 30 39 2.8 5.4 4.5 38 38 n.a. 1.9 1.8 
North Africa: 
Algeria 34 24 1.1 4.1 -0.4 0 4 1.6 n.a. 0.7 
Morocco 17 22 -0.6 5.6 2.1 23 57 0.5 0.6 5.9 




Sources: World Bank (1993d, !995a, !996a). 
only African country with an export growth rate that exceeded 10 percent. 
African countries' shares of manufactured exports were quite low, with the 
exception of Kenya, Mauritius, Senegal, Tunisia and Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe's 
share remained constant between 1980 and 1993. 
Finally, the shares of machinery exports were very low for all countries 
except Cameroon, Kenya and Tunisia. These very low shares suggest that 
Africa's competitiveness has lagged behind relative to the rest of the world. 
The rates of productivity growth and technological leaming and innovations 
have been much lower in Africa than elsewhere. 
Variations across subregions show no clear pattern. Generally, export 
growth in the 1990s has been faster for Southern Africa (and the shares 
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of manufactures in GDP have also tended to be higher) than for other 
regions. 
Since independence the commodity structure has remained relatively 
unchanged, as reflected in the indices of concentration and diversification 
for 1970 and 1990 (Table 6.2). Heavy dependence on primary commodities 
persists. However changes in the structure of exports, such as an increase in 
manufactured exports, may be important for inducing technological advance-
ment, tapping dynamic comparative advantage and increasing productivity. 
Table 6.2 Diversification and product concentration indices for the exports of 
selected African countries, 1970 and 1990 
Number of commodities Diversification Concentration 
exported1 index2 index3 
1970 1990 1970 1990 1970 1990 
East Africa: 
Kenya 17 123 0.918 0.806 0.499 0.309 
Tanzania 49 74 0.848 0.832 0.255 0.262 
Uganda 28 26 0.916 0.948 0.596 0.699 
West Africa: 
Côte d'ivoire 81 130 0.863 0.856 0.422 0.312 
Gabon 21 39 0.883 0.913 0.500 0.770 
Ghana 24 56 0.941 0.907 0.752 0.377 
Nigeria 83 117 0.875 0.915 0.583 0.952 
Senegal 82 92 0.793 0.857 0.311 0.280 
Southern Africa: 
Mauritius 9 101 0.968 0.711 0.93 0.338 
Zambia 22 45 0.963 0.932 0.952 0.823 
Zimbabwe 165 0.782 0.327 
North Africa: 
Algeria 76 85 0.831 0.883 0.652 0.554 
Egypt 87 154 0.784 0.700 0.442 0.440 
Morocco 84 155 0.816 0.756 0.292 0.166 
Tunisia 70 174 0.754 0.668 0.260 0.200 
Notes: 
1. Refers to those commodities whose exports were greater than $50 000 in 1970 
and $100 000 in 1990 or contribute more than 0.3 percent to the total exports 
of the country. 
2. Share of the most important commodities in total national exports. 
3. Hirshman index normalized to yield values between 0 and 1 (maximum con-
centration). 
Sources: UNCTAD (1984, 1991); ECA secretariat. 
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Commodity prices have rebounded, and projections suggest that some 
upward pressure will be exerted for the next few years. Although supply 
constraints have prevented some African countries from benefiting from the 
higher commodity prices, they will have to make every effort to increase their 
export volumes and thus increase their export earnings. However, the African 
countries must use the increased revenues to enhance the productive capacity 
of their economies and to improve their international competitiveness. They 
must also diversify their economies, particularly their exports, because the 
high commodity prices might not be sustained. 
With liberalization of world trade and the increased interdependence of 
national economies, the African countries can expect stiffer competition from 
other producers of manufactured exports and primary commodities. Unless 
they take appropriate measures, the African countries may continue to lose 
world-market share to other countries, even in traditional export commod-
ities such as cocoa, palm oil and coffee. Given that the diversification of 
production and exports is a medium- to long-term undertaking, the African 
countries will have to improve their international competitiveness in tradi-
tional exports too. This will require appropriate macroeconomic and sector 
policies - namely competitive exchange rates and measures to reduce the 
domestic costs of production - as well as improved competitiveness in non-
price factors such as more efficient marketing services, and this includes using 
the information highway, discussed below. 
The preferential trading arrangements with the European Union and 
through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that African 
countries achieved through the Lomé Convention are now under attack. 
lmplementation of the Uruguay Round accord is likely to cause a phasing 
out of these preferences. Although the overall gain from Uruguay Round of 
trade negotiations is estimated at $213 billion, Africa ( excluding Egypt and 
Libya) is likely to lose $2.6 billion a year (see Martin and Winters, 1995). 
Investment 
The small manufacturing base and poor export performance noted above are 
consistent with the low rate of investment in Sub-Saharan Africa. The levels 
of private and public investment have been modest, even in African countries 
with the most successful reforms. Investment as a percentage of GDP declined 
significantly between the l 970s the l 990s, from nearly 26 per cent to a little 
over 16 per cent (Table 6.3). Contributing to the investment decline was 
the drying up of externat funding in the early 1980s. The fall in gross 
domestic investment mirrors the decline in the gross domestic savings 
rate: public savings declined by an average of 2 per cent a year. Public 
investment in infrastructure and the social sector has deteriorated since the 
start of the economic reforms as has investment in science and technology 
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Table 6.3 Public and private investments in Sub-
Saharan Africa, 1970-94 (weighted averages, 
percentage of GOP) 















institutions, telecommunications, power generation, general education and 
universities. 
The sustainability of economic reforms and the credibility of government 
policy regimes are important for inducing investment in medium- and long-
term development. The donor community and international financial institu-
tions (IFls) have been providing credibility to African governments during the 
economic reform, but what is required to gain investment is macroeconomic 
stability. Oebt relief and selective financing might be more effective in achiev-
ing genuine macroeconomic stability than IFI-imposed trade policy regimes. 
Oespite liberalization of the investment codes of many countries, Africa is 
marginalized in terms of FOI inflows (Table 6.4). Most FOI in Africa 
is concentrated in a small number of countries that are endowed with natural 
resources, especially oil. Sub-Saharan Africa has failed to attract much 
FOI. The bulk of external resource flows into the region is accounted for by 
grants and official loans, with FOI accounting for only 12 per cent of the 
total in 1993 (UNCTAO, 1995a, 1995b). If the recent surge of FOI in Angola 
and Nigeria is excluded, the region as a whole recorded a decline in FOI 
inflows in 1994. In recent years the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) has established several programmes, for example the African Project 
Oevelopment Facility and the African Enterprise Facility. However the IFC's 
investments in Africa in 1994 averaged only $600 000, compared with an 
average of $12.3 million elsewhere. By 1994 the share of Sub-Saharan Africa 
in IFC investments was about half that of the 1970s and 1980s (Helleiner, 
1996). 
Africa's share of FOI in the developing-country total fell from 11 percent 
during 1986-90 to 6 percent during 1991-93, and to 4 percent in 1994. Net 
resource flows to Africa dropped sharply, from $24.1 billion in 1992 to $19.0 
billion in 1993 - a fall ofnearly 21 percent. This was largely accounted for by 
a decline in bilateral development finance. The decline in official development 
finance was not compensated for by increases in private capital flows or 
export revenues. In effect, the decline contributed to a contraction in imports, 
such as occurred in 1993. 




Region 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Sub-Saharan Africa -730 780 568 1 212 1 089 2 473 809 1 897 1 571 1 713 3 116 
(-112.3) (35.4) (34.2) (59.1) (44.1) (61.3) (44.4) (77.7) (57. 7) (59.2) (68.0) 
Sub-Saharan Africa 40 1 280 688 1 372 991 2 463 814 1 905 1 576 1 721 3 111 
excl. South Africa (6.1) (58.2) (41.4) (66.9) (40.2) (61.0) (44.6) (78.0) (57.9) (59.4) (67.9) 
West Africa -472 464 91 791 444 1 988 703 883 1 022 1 538 2 353 
(-72.6) (21.1) (5.5) (38.6) (18.0) (49.2) (38.6) (36.2) (37.5) (53.1) (51.4) 
East Africa 78 13 28 45 -2 61 57 20 21 25 72 
(12.0) (0.6) (1.7) (2.2) 0.0 (1.5) (3.1) (0.8) (0.8) (0.9) (1.6) 
Central Africa 223 390 184 153 171 -129 -Il -67 30 -Il -42 
(34.3) (17. 7) (11.1) (7.5) (6.9) (-3.2) (-0.6) (-2.7) (1.1) (-0.4) (-0.9) 
North Africa 80 1 421 1 093 838 1 378 1 565 1 014 544 1 152 1 182 1 464 
(12.3) (64.6) (65.8) (40.9) (55.9) (38.8) (55.6) (22.3) (42.3) (40.8) (32.0) 
Ail Africa -650 2 201 1 661 2 050 2 467 4 037 1 823 2 441 2 723 2 895 4 580 
(8.9) (14.1) (5.3) (6.0) (5.0) (3.9) (5.4) 
(1.2) (2.0) (0.9) (1.5) (1.6) (1.4) (2.1) 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are percentages of the total for African countries; percentages for Ail Africa are developing-
country and world totals. 
Source: World Bank (1996e). 
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Information Technology 
Overall, investment in technology in the form of R&D is very low in Africa 
and has been declining. Africa spent only 0.33 percent of its GDP in invest-
ment in technology in 1970. This ratio fell to 0.29 per cent in 1990 (see Table 
7.9, Chapter 7). With the exception of South Africa, the African countries' 
expenditure on telecommunications equipment in 1986 represented only 0.7 
per cent of world spending. Moreover, only a few countries are the main 
spenders: Algeria, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, 
Morocco, Côte d'ivoire and Tunisia. The low GDP levels and poor growth 
rates of most African countries (see Table 6.6) have resulted in poor tele-
communications infrastructure and low teledensity levels. The African tele-
communications network is growing very slowly by international standards. 
South Africa is the only country with good telecommunications. Table 6.5 
compares the state oftelecommunications in South Africa with that in the rest 
of Africa. The most striking indicator is teledensity; teledensity in South 
Africa is 9.5 main lines per 100 people whereas in the rest of Sub-Saharan 
Africa it is only 0.5. About 33 percent of Africa's main lines and nearly 84 per 
cent of all cellular subscribers are in South Africa. North Africa is much 
better offthan Sub-Saharan Africain terms of main lines and teledensity, but 
it has a much smaller proportion of cellular subscribers. 
The lack of software in local African languages is a serious problem even in 
South Africa, which is relatively more advanced. Sorne countries have 
attempted to apply local languages to computer technology. Ethiopia, for 
example, has searched for a reliable means of fully exploiting computer 
capability in the national language and thereby enhancing IT applications 
in all sectors of the economy. 1 
Access to IT is influenced, inter alia, by purchasing power as well as by 
education and computer literacy. Economically disadvantaged groups are less 
likely to be able to afford to buy computer hardware. To the extent that 
women are underrepresented in the education system, they are likely to lack 
Table 6.5 Comparison of South Africa's telecommunications infrastructure with 
the rest of Africa, 1995* 
Indicator South Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 
Main lines (millions) 3844.5 (32.5%) 2628. l (22.2%) 
Teledensity (main lines 9.5 0.5 
per 100 people) 
Cellular subscribers 520000 (83.9%) 63554 (I0.3%) 
* Percentage of African total is given in parentheses. 
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access to its technology. In addition the information highway is inherently 
exclusionist in its use of culturally determined symbols, images, sounds and 
language (see Marcelle, 1996). 
Factory automation and computerization are uncommon in African indus-
tries, and this is preventing the industries from becoming internationally 
competitive. Most African countries rely on the importation of such IT as 
numerically controlled machine tools (NCMTs), which are used mainly in the 
defence industry.2 
Locally manufactured computer hardware is extremely rare. 3 Government 
policies have also hindered the use of computers in Africa in the past. 
For example, from 1974 to the 1980s Tanzania banned the importation of 
computers on the pretext that they were luxury items. Sorne countries have 
resisted connection to the information highway because of the undesirable 
information that can be accessed. Thus a country may voluntarily exclude 
itself from enjoying the benefits of new technology (Ramani, 1996). 
The Uruguay Round accord formalized and universalized standards for the 
protection of intellectual property rights (Correa, 1996). The implication of 
this for developing countries is that access to existing computer programmes 
will become more costly when the scope for 'pirating' is reduced. Pirating is 
evident in many African countries, although it is difficult to give accurate 
figures. Pirated software (including diskettes) is available at lower cost. In 
addition, patenting will make the underlying ideas and concepts involved in 
software preparation difficult to access, thus raising barriers to entry into the 
semiconductor industry. 
We can conclude that the marginalization of Africain terms of IT occurs 
through: 
• An inability sufficiently to increase the stock of IT hardware in Africa. 
• The low capacity to develop appropriate software. 
• The ineffectiveness and unreliability of the telecommunications systems, a 
situation that is aggravated by their unequal distribution between and 
within countries, especially between urban and rural areas. 
• A lack of skill in developing and making effective use of IT. 
Electronic Networking 
Despite these constraints, more than half of African countries have some 
form of e-mail service and a gateway to the Internet. However infrastructure 
is poor, and access to low-cost electronic communications is confined mainly 
to capital cities. Only Mauritius, Senegal and South Africa have these facil-
ities outside their capitals (see Jensen, 1996). 
A commercial, up-to-date communications system for Zambia's business 
and professional community (Zamnet) operates from the University of 
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Zambia. It began by offering an e-mail service, free of charge, to non-
commercial organizations such as non-governmental organizations, 
health and education institutions and United Nations agencies. Zamnet 
now offers the opportunity to browse on the World Wide Web, as well as 
network news and file transfer. At present Zamnet bas more than 600 full 
Internet accounts. The service is concentrated mostly in Lusaka and 
the Copperbelt. 
Information from Zamnet's database of hotels and lodges in Zambia, 
for example, can be downloaded by any Internet user interested in 
accommodation in that country. A construction company bas found the 
network useful for obtaining information on low-cost housing in other parts 
of the world. Banks are using Zamnet for the import declaration form 
system - the network provides a rapid means of communication between 
themselves, the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Zambia. Commercial 
rose growers are using it to keep in touch with market developments in 
Europe. 
Zamnet services in Zambia have scope for further expansion. A potential 
source of business is Telcom 2000, a fibre-optic system primarily in tended for 
improving communications in farming communities, especially in remote 
areas. However, the use of Zamnet bas been constrained by insufficient 
telephone lines, a small Internet link and the computer illiteracy of the general 
population. 
Kenya too bas Internet services. Two of Kenya's major Internet providers 
launched their services in April 1996, although the Kenya Post and Telecom-
munications' (KP&T) announcement of Internet availability and providers 
was not due until early May 1997. According to the latest count, eight 
Nairobi-based companies are or will soon be providing full e-mail and Inter-
net services. 
South Africa bas five network operators, all of which aim to expand 
their business in Africa. Telkom SA Limited is the dominant operator 
with 3.7 million main exchange lines in operation. Eskom is the national 
supplier of electricity. It bas its own telecommunications network and coop-
erates with several African countries. Transtel is the telecommunications 
subsidiary of Transnet, South Africa's government-owned railway and trans-
port company. Transtel is currently expanding to link all its African opera-
tions via satellite. South Africa bas two competing cellular operators: MTN 
and Vodacom. 
Subscription charges for access to Internet vary considerably across the 
different subregions of Africa. For example in Southern Africa these charges 
range from $10 to $100 per month, which is a fairly high sum relative to the 
average per capita income in most African countries. This means that even if 
computers are available, access to them is likely to be limited to a few people 
(see Jensen, 1996). 
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Regional Cooperation 
Sorne modest initiatives at regional cooperation in electronic networking are 
underway. The first African regional grouping for the provision of Internet 
infrastructure has been established in Nairobi (Kenya) as a focal point for the 
East African Internet Association. lt plans to provide shared services to its 
members in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. 
The Trade Information Network (TINET), the Automated System for 
Customs Data (ASYCUDA), the Advanced Cargo Information System 
(ACIS) and the Regional Telecommunications Programme are useful begin-
nings in regional cooperation. TINET deals with trade data bases and has 
links to local points in other countries of the Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA). ASYCUDA deals with customs inform-
ation in the member countries. In 1996 COMESA launched a third regional 
programme to coordinate and upgrade the telecommunications systems in the 
region. 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is involved 
in shared telecommunications networks. SADC has outlined plans to link 
its member countries via a computer-based network for the exchange 
of geological and mining information. The government of France has 
contributed $500 000 towards the cost of hardware, software and training. 
Under the auspices of the Pan-African Geological Information System 
(PANGIS), SADC geologists have teamed up with the International 
Centre for Exchange in the Geosciences (CIFEG) - a branch of the 
French geological department - to pool regional bibliographical information 
on geology and mining for a database to be hosted by SADC's mining-sector 
coordinating unit in Lusaka. The network will provide potential investors 
with information on geological and mining resources. lt will also 
enable Southern African states to exchange data and information 
electronically with other parts of Africa that have access to the PANGIS 
network. 
Another good example of regional cooperation in IT is the digital loop 
that is being provided by a phased-development programme in Botswana. 
This programme is designed to provide a gateway to the rest of the world 
through Namibia, in addition to those through South Africa, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. 
lt would be to Africa's great advantage if a number of countries 
coordinated their incipient software and hardware programmes with 
common suppliers in order to ensure larger production runs and 
consequent cost reductions. Regional cooperation can ensure consolidation 
of resources to undertake research and development (R&D). Local 
solutions to local problems can be found through the sharing of national 
experiences. 
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FACTORS INFLUENCING AFRICA'S INTEGRATION 
Several factors have contributed to the marginalization of Africa in the 
globalization process. The first was the colonization of Africa by Belgium, 
France, Germany, Portugal and the United Kingdom. These colonial masters 
ensured that the occupied countries were very closely linked to the governing 
economies rather than to the rest of the world or to other African countries. 
The colonies were deprived of adequate infrastructure, education, clean 
water, health care and so on. After independence, many African leaders 
tried to reverse the colonial legacy of dependence by adopting inward-looking 
manufacturing policies, but a protective environment was not particularly 
conducive to developing the national capabilities needed to attain interna-
tional competitiveness. 
The marginalization of Africain terms ofinvestment is largely explained by 
political instability and the poor quality of its supportive infrastructure. It is 
generally believed that successful attraction of FOI lies in the incentives and 
investment environment a country has to offer, including a favourable 
national regulatory framework. Positive macroeconomic indicators also 
help determine the magnitude of investment flow. 
Collier ( 1995) cites four main factors in Africa's marginalization: insufficient 
reforms, insufficient scale and low-level traps, a high-risk environment and 
weak restraints. The thesis of insufficient reforms is that though the reforms 
implemented to date may have substantially narrowed the gap in economic 
incentives between Africa and elsewhere, they have not eliminated it. The thesis 
of insufficient scale and low-level traps is that Africa has relatively smalt 
markets and scales of production as well as fewer human resources. Another 
major obstacle to successful integration is the perception that Africa's invest-
ment environment is more risky for private agents than that of Asia, for 
example. Africa is subject to the risks and shocks associated with frequent 
policy changes. Weak agencies ofrestraint indirectly account for the high-risk 
environment: the weakness of the armed forces means that government policies 
can change without notice; the weakness of the central bank means that 
macroeconomic policy can change abruptly; the weakness of audits means 
that taxes can change abruptly. Weak agencies of restraint also directly con-
tribute to marginalization: weakness of the accountancy department implies 
that the financial system is rudimentary, often supplying only trade credit. 
GLOBALIZA TION'S EFFECTS ON GROWTH, INCOME AND 
EMPLOYMENT 
This section examines the growth performance of selected African countries 
and the incidence of poverty and unemployment in the era of accelerated 
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globalization - the l 980s and l 990s. Table 6.6 compares the annual rates of 
growth in these African countries in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. The growth 
rates were higher in the 1970s than in the subsequent periods for Algeria, Côte 
d'Ivoire, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria, Togo and Tunisia, 
while growth rates improved during the 1980s and 1990s for Benin, Ghana 
and Mauritania. For Tanzania, the growth rate remained more or less 
unchanged throughout the period 
Africa's economic performance has been unpromising for a long time. 
The rate of growth of per capita GDP has remained low both in absolute 
terms and relative to that of other developing regions. All the African sub-
regions experienced relatively high growth rates during the 1960s, however 
the momentum slowed over the years. Since the l 970s most of the subregions 
have consistently recorded GDP growth rates that are below the population 
growth rates. The aggregate GDP growth rate for Africa declined from 
3.6 percent during 1970-80 to 2.5 percent during 1980-90 and 1.7 percent 
Table 6.6 GDP growth rates for African countries (percentages) 
1970-80 1980-90 1990-94 
East Africa: 
Kenya 6.4 4.2 0.9 
Tanzania 3.0 3.8 3.1 
Uganda 3.1 5.6 
West Africa: 
Benin 2.2 2.6 4.1 
Côte d'ivoire 6.8 -0.1 -0.2 
Ghana -0.1 3.0 4.3 
Mauritania 1.3 1.7 3.6 
Nigeria 4.6 1.6 2.4 
Senegal 2.3 3.2 0.0 
Togo 4.0 1.8 -3.4 
Southern Africa: 
Lesotho 8.6 4.3 6.1 
Malawi 5.8 2.7 -0.7 
Mauritius 6.8 6.5 5.3 
Zambia 1.4 0.8 -0.1 
Zimbabwe 1.6 3.5 1.1 
North Africa: 
Algeria 4.6 2.9 -0.6 
Morocco 5.6 4.2 1.7 
Tunisia 6.8 3.3 4.5 
Sources: World Bank (1995a, 1996a). 
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during 1990-94 (Table 6. 7). The decline was more marked in the case of the 
Maghreb countries and the net oil exporters. For instance growth in the 
Maghreb, which was nearly 4 percent in the l 970s, fell to 1.4 percent during 
1990-94. 
Cornia et al. (1992) argue that the orthodox adjustment policies that were 
applied on a massive scale in Africa during the l 980s have failed to contribute 
to the achievement of long-term development objectives, which have also 
been hindered by the presence of persistent macroeconomic imbalances and 
too much emphasis on demand rather than supply management. 
The situation regarding poverty alleviation is also not encouraging.4 Pov-
erty tends to be worst in rural areas, even allowing for the often substantial 
differences in the cost of living between town and countryside. The problems 
of malnutrition, Jack of education, low life expectancy and substandard 
housing are also generally more severe in rural areas. 
Despite the distributional concerns of many African governments, 
the objective of reducing income inequalities has not been achieved. Income 
Table 6.7 Real GDP annual growth rate by African sub-regions at constant 
prices and exchange rates, 1970-94 percentages) 
Sub-Region 1970-80 1980-90 1990-94 1994 
ECCAS 2.7 1.9 -3.7 -2.6 
ECOWAS 4.2 2.1 2.0 1.7 
Maghreb 3.7 1.9 1.4 2.0 
PTA 1.1 3.2 2.0 2.9 
Franc Zone 4.3 1.7 0.2 1.3 
Net oil exporters 4.1 2.5 1.6 1.2 
Net oil importers 2.5 2.5 1.9 3.5 
Ali RMCs 3.6 2.5 1.7 1.9 
Notes: ECCAS Economie Community of Central African States (Burundi, 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, and Zaire); ECOWAS = Economie 
Community of West African States (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte 
d'ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo); Maghreb= Algeria, Libya, Maurita-
nia, Morocco and Tunisia; PT A = Preferential Trade Area of Eastern and 
Southern Africa (Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethipia, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe); Franc Zone = Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, 
Côte d'ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Mali, Senegal, Niger, and Togo; Net 
oil exporters = Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Egypt, Gabon, Libya, 
Nigeria and Tunisia; RMCs = regional member countries of the African 
Development Bank. The 1994 figures are preliminary estimates. 
Source: African Development Bank (1995), p. 16. 
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inequalities, which were quite large in the mid-1970s, have perhaps changed 
somewhat in character but they have not diminished. The stabilization poli-
cies of the l980s led to a narrowing of the rural-urban income gap in most 
cases, but they did not result in an overall decline in income inequality, as 
income differentials within both urban and rural areas have accentuated 
(Cornia et al., 1992). 
The trends in income distribution are also discouraging. Table 6.8 shows 
the income shares of the top 20 per cent and bottom 20 per cent of the 
population for a few of the African countries for which data are available. 
For Kenya, Tunisia and Uganda, the share of the top 20 percent improved 
between the 1970s and l980s whereas that of the bottom 20 percent either 
remained constant or increased marginally. 
The data on real wages also reveal worsening trends. Real wages in manu-
facturing fell throughout the l 980s in 12 of the 15 countries for which data 
were available (ILO, l995b). For example the minimum wage declined by 72 
percent in Zaire between 1984 and 1988, by 30 percent in Niger between 1980 
and 1987, and by at least 25 percent in Nigeria between 1986 and 1990 (see 
Jespersen, 1992). 
The decline in real wages did not promote employment expansion during 
the l980s. Instead the growth rate of formai employment in Africa fell from 
2.8 percent in 1975-80 to 1 percent in the l980s (!LO-JASPA, 1989). The 
SAPs discussed above led to a decline in public-sector employment in the 
l980s. Private-sector employment fell because manufacturing shrank after 
import liberalization - wage employment in manufacturing declined at an 
estimated rate of 0.5 per cent a year in the l980s (ILO, l995b). Table 6.9 
shows that during the l980s many African countries experienced stagnating 
or declining rates of growth in employment. An important source of the 
unemployment problem in the African countries is the large reserve ofunder-
employed labour outside the modem sector. Diminishing job opportunities 
Table 6.8 Trends in income distribution in selected African 



















Source: World Bank (1996d). 
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Table 6.9 General employment levels in selected African 
countries (percentage change over the period) 
1983--87 1987-91 1983-91 
Moderately growing 
employment levels: 
Algeria 14 15 20 
Botswana 49 48 122 
Kenya 16 14 32 
Malawi 5 15 21 
Mauritius 32 12 47 
Seychelles 11 21 34 
Zimbabwe 5 15 20 
Declining employment 
levels: 
Benin -4 -33 -36 
Burundi 22 -10 10 
Central African Republic 1 -27 -26 
Ghana 26 -45 -31 
Niger 37 -14 19 
Stagnating employment 
levels: 
Côte d'ivoire -6 -5 -Il 
Gambia, The -1 8 7 
Senegal -26 50 12 
Swaziland 5 10 16 
Zambia -1 8 7 
Source: ILO-JASPA (1995). 
in the modern sector and the depressed state of rural economies have dis-
couraged migration, which suggests that open unemployment may now pre-
vail even in rural areas. The urban informai sector, which offered an outlet for 
the urban and rural unemployed, is also becoming saturated. It generates 
mainly 'survival' jobs of extremely low productivity and income. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has discussed the contribution of globalization to Africa's 
marginalization. We have demonstrated that Africa is only weakly integrated 
into the global economy and that its integration is not on terms determined by 
Africa. The marginalization of Africa is evident from its falling share ofworld 
trade, investment and information technology. This process can be explained 
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in terms of historical developments, the policies that African countries have 
pursued, and the inadequate economic and social infrastructure. 
The economic reforms adopted in many African countries in the l 980s and 
1990s have exhibited a variety of relationships and interactions with the 
globalization process. The results of the SAPs have varied from country to 
country, and their full effects are not yet known. However there are indica-
tions that these reforms can improve Africa's position in the globalization 
process. In particular, policies relating to macroeconomic stability, trade and 
investment regimes, and transport and communications infrastructure can 
enhance Africa's integration into the global economy. 
African govemments also need to formulate national technology policies to 
create an environment in which the economic and social benefits of inform-
ation technology can be realized. The international competitiveness of Africa 
is unlikely to improve without increased use of information technology in 
economic and social activities. The private sector should be encouraged to use 
information technology in production systems. This can be done by removing 
or reducing import duties on computers in order to make them more afford-
able - computers are still quite expensive in Africa because of these import 
duties and also because of value added and sales taxes. 
The main issue for further research is how Africa can redefine its position in 
the world economy in ways that are consistent with its medium- and long-
term development objectives. Further research is needed to determine the 
options open to Africa and the opportunities that could be created by effect-
ive use of information technology in the pursuit of greater interdependence 
and greater integration into the global economy. 
Notes 
1. The Ethiopian government established a National Computer Centre (NCC) in 
1987 under the Ethiopian Science and Technology Commission. The NCC devel-
oped application software packages in Amharic (for example an Amharic oper-
ating system, 'AGAFARI', and Amharic publishing, 'MAHTEME') and 
encouraged the use of PCs in the local language for word processing, data bases, 
desktop publishing, statistical analysis, spreadsheets and so on. To make persona! 
computers operational in the Amharic language, an add-on device was devel-
oped. In addition, printer chips for Arnharic are also available. 
2. In Zimbabwe, NCMTs are imported for use in the manufacture of components 
for transport equipment, mining machinery and weapons. They are also used to 
produce such precision items as diesel engines for railways and trucks, and 
components of agricultural and mining machines, often for export to neighbour-
ing countries such as Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia. 
3. Sorne local efforts in the manufacture of computers include assembly operations 
for persona! computers in Cameroon, Zimbabwe and Kenya, minicomputers in 
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Côte d'ivoire and microcomputers in Morocco. In 1996 two international com-
puter firms set up computer assembly projects in Zambia to accelerate the pace of 
computerization: Cellcome Computers set up a ZK445 million assembly plant for 
its DCS computers in Lusaka, while Quantum Technology (Africa) is planning a 
ZK2.2 billion computer assembly facility. Cellcome is primarily targeting the 
Zambian market, but Quantum has a wider market projection for domestic 
users and for the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA). 
4. According to the World Bank (1990), nearly half of the world's poor live in South 
Asia; Sub-Saharan Africa has about one third fewer poor, although in relation to 
the region's overall population its poverty is roughly as high. 
7 Regional Perspectives: An 
Overview 
A.S. Bhalla and Albert Berry 
Our main concern in this volume is to examine the effect that globalization and 
information technology (IT) are ha ving on developing countries. Sorne analysis 
of industrial countries is also presented for completeness and as yardstick 
against which the impact of globalization on developing regions can be con-
sidered. If there is one thing that the earlier chapters have suggested, it is that 
the impact of globalization and IT vary considerably across regions and 
national boundaries. For simplicity, and despite the significant variations 
within them, this overview uses the same conventional designation of regions 
applied throughout the rest of the volume, namely SouthAsia, East and South-
East Asia, Africa, Latin America and the OECD countries. 
The conditions prevailing at the time of accelerated globalization varied 
from one region to another.1 ln Africa, for example, the conditions in terms of 
global integration were much less favourable than those in Asia and 
other regions (see Collier, 1995; Mosley, 1996), including low growth 
(lower than in the other regions), caused in part by poor macroeconomic 
policies; a weak performance on the part of the agricultural sector, in which 
the bulk of the population is engaged; inadequate support by aid donors with 
respect to agricultural research and extension systems; depressed and declin-
ing commodity prices, leading to worsening terms of tracte; and unsustainable 
levels of debt. Particularly weak governance/severe corruption contributed to 
the poor average performance of two of the states, Nigeria and Zaire, despite 
the fact that they have the greatest volume of exploitable natural resources. 
The debt problem severely plagued Latin America from the early l 980s, but 
the countries of both South-East and South Asia suffered far less from this. 
Foreign banks stopped lending to Latin American countries following the 
Mexican government's inability to service its debt in 1982. No such capital 
supply shock had hit the Asian countries until 1997, when the Thai baht came 
under attack as the country's large fiscal and balance of payments deficits 
worried the international financial community. With impressive speed the 
pressure moved to Malaysia, lndonesia, Republic of Korea and Hong 
Kong. There was concern (The Economist, 15 November 1997) that if the 
banking reform in the affected countries did not proceed quickly and 
effectively the crisis in South-East Asia could drag China and Japan down 
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with it. This new contagion highlights one of the risks of an interconnected 
world financial system-the greater vulnerability of banks and countries to 
attacks which would not pose a threat to them in a less open system. For the 
open system to fonction well, the agents and institutions must be both more 
careful and better regulated. I t remains to be seen how quickly and success-
fully the needed institutional improvements can be made. 
The above differences in the conditions prevailing at the beginning of the 
l 980s partly explain the wide variations in the level and rate of integration of 
different regions and individual economies into the global economy. 
REGIONAL DIVERSITY IN GLOBAL INTEGRATION 
In terms of the two frequently used indicators of globalization - the ratio of 
exports to GDP and the ratio of FDI to GDP - East and South-East Asia 
(ESEA) is now the most integrated region, but it is noteworthy that this status 
has only recently been achieved. Judging by the (current price) export/GDP 
ratio, Sub-Saharan Africa was the most integrated of the major regions as 
recently as 1980,2 a year in which no less than 30 per cent of its GDP was 
exported (reflecting in part the high price of Nigeria's oil exports) (Table 7.1 ). 
During the 1970s all of the four major developing regions experienced sig-
nificant increases in this ratio (though its absolute level remained quite low 
for both India and China), as did the industrial countries. As a result the 
world figure rose sharply from 14 percent to 22 percent. It was during the 
1980s, however, that regional trends diverged dramatically. The export ratio 
fell in both Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, then recovered to end the 
decade at about where it started; that of South Asia edged up a little, while 
that of East Asia continued its dramatic increase to equal the African figure. 
Changes in relative prices were central to some of these trends. Thus the big 
increase in Sub-Saharan Africa's current price export/GDP ratio in the 1970s 
was entirely explained in this way - in fact the corresponding constant price 
ratio was falling. Since 1980 the current price ratio has fallen somewhat, but 
the constant price ratio has changed very little. The contrast is more extreme 
for Latin America: the current price ratio rose in the 1970s then showed little 
net change until 1994, despite a fall in the mid 1980s, whereas the constant 
price ratio fell very sharply in the l 970s and has risen nearly as much since 
then. East Asia's performance has been unequivocal by both measures, 
showing a contimung increase since 1970. By the early 1990s South Asia 
and Latin America were exporting around 15 per cent of their output, while 
Sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia exported close to 30 percent. Interestingly, 
the dramatic increase in the export ratio of non-communist East Asia was 
virtually mirrored a few years later by that of China. 
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Table 7.1 Exports of goods and non-factor services as a percentage of GDP 
1960 1965 1970 1980 1985 1987 1990 1994 
Low- and middle-income 
economies, by region 13 13 23 20 24 22 
Sub-Saharan Africa 23 20 30 25 29 27 
East Asia 7 61 31 31 1 281 
South Asia 6 5 8 8 9 13 
Middle East & North 192 29 
Africa 
La tin America and the 
Caribbean 13 13 16 12 15 15 
Low-income 7 7 7 13 10 13 18 19 
India 5 4 4 7 6 7 8 12 
China 4 4 3 6 11 13 18 24 
Other 17 16 13 20 14 20 24 17 
M iddle-income 17 17 26 22 25 23 
Lower middle-income 15 15 23 22 28 
Upper middle-income 18 20 15 28 28 22 24 
High-income 13 14 22 19 20 
World 12 14 22 193 20 
Notes: 
1. Includes the Pacifie. 
2. lncludes Europe. 
3. Total reporting economies. 
Sources: World Bank (1984, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1992, 1993a, 1995a, 1996a). 
A different perspective on international economic integration can be gained 
by looking at the share of manufactured goods in total exports (Table 7.2). 
Africa has the lowest share of manufactured exports of all the developing 
regions, that of Latin America and the Caribbean is at an intermediate level, 
while those of South Asia and East Asia are substantially higher.3 
The composition of manufactures varies considerably across regions. 
Although in both subregions of Asia the share of manufactured goods in 
merchandise exports is high, the manufactured exports of South Asia are 
much less sophisticated than those of East Asia. A large proportion of 
exports, particularly those from Bangladesh, India and Pakistan are low-
skill, rudimentary, labour-intensive goods such as textiles and garments, and 
processed versions ofraw materials such as cotton and jute. On the other hand 
the ESEA countries have moved far in the direction of sophisticated, capital-
intensive (higher value-added), high-tech manufactures. Meanwhile, China 
has become a major exporter of labour-intensive manufactures. 
The World Bank (1996b, p. 23) uses the share ofmanufactured exports as a 
proxy variable to indicate 'countries' access to learning and technology 
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Tablez 7.2 Manufactured exports as share of total exports, by region 
(percentages) 
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Sub-Saharan Africa: 
WB estimates 11.3 17.7 21.3 23.4 38.0 39.2 
Our estimates 9.5 11.5 16.2 16.6 n.a. n.a. 
Middle East & North Africa: 
WB estimates 20.8 29.l 45.7 41.5 44.6 42.4 
Our estimates 4.7 9.6 15.3 13.8 15.8 13.0 
Latin America & the Caribbean: 
WB estimates 25.0 29.9 28.6 30.0 35.8 34.9 
Our estimates 15.9 17.7 29.0 21.6 31.3 n.a. 
South Asia: 
WB estimates 47.5 55.2 77.7 67.4 76.6 76.9 
Our estimates 52.4 55.3 71.0 73.5 75.2 n.a. 
East & South-East Asia: 
WB estimates 26.1 32.0 50.9 57.1 55.4 55.0 
Our estimates 
Exc. Japan & Hong 34.0 45.2 63.5 65.5 67.4 55.7 
Kong 
Inc. Japan & Hong 68.6 76.3 82.7 70.7 84.5 64.7 
Kong 
Note: Data refer to merchandise exports. 
Sources: Our estimates are based on World Bank (1993d). World Bank (WB) 
estimates were supplied by the W orld Bank and refer to the data used for W orld 
Bank (1996b). (These estimates are not fully reported in World Bank (1996b) and 
were supplied by the Bank on special request.) 
transfer gains and ability to produce at world standards'. Given the Jack of 
robustness and comparability of data on this share (see note 3), this proxy can 
be qui te misleading. A more appropriate indicator of learning and the effects 
of modern technology is the share of manufactured exports that fall in the 
category ofhigher value-added products, for example machinery. The data in 
Table 7.3 show the substantial lead enjoyed by East and South-East Asia 
(excluding China) in this regard (over 40 percent in the early l 990s), followed 
by Latin America (averaging about 10 percent), South Asia (around 5 per 
cent), the Middle East and North Africa (about 3 percent) and Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Jess than 2 per cent).4 
FDI as a percentage ofGDP is another frequently used index of globaliza-
tion. Table 7.4 presents estimates of an FDI index - the ratio of a country's 
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Table 7.3 Share of machinery exports in total exports, by region (percentages) 
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Sub-Saharan Africa n.a. 0.9 l.O l.7 1.7 n.a. 
Middle East & North l.l 2.7 2.9 2.8 3.6 3.6 
Africa 
Latin America 6.0 5. l 10.7 5.6 12.9 6.8 
South Asia 5.4 4.3 5.0 4.8 4.6 n.a. 
East & South-East Asia 
Inc. China 5.5 4.7 l l.2 13.2 14.9 12.8 
Excl. China 34.8 44.7 44.2 41.4 45.8 40.0 
Source: World Bank (l993d). 
share in total world FDI to its share of total world GDP (for details see 
Bhalla and Bhalla, 1997). An FDI index of l implies that the investment flow 
as a proportion of world FDI is proportional to the region's share in world 
GDP; a value above l shows a relative attractiveness for FDI inflows. Here 
both the Asian regions have a relatively high score, with Latin America a little 
behind and Africa substantially so (the l 990 figure for Africa clearly seems to 
be wrong). The limited attractiveness of Africa for FDI inflows is reflected in 
its low ratio: Africa's share has been declining, along with that of Latin 
America (Figures 7.l and 7.2). 
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Table 7.4 GDP-weighted index of inward and outward FDI flows, by region 1 
lnward FD l flows Outward FDl flows 
1986 1990 1994 1986 1990 1994 
Africa 0.96 6.7 1.82 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
South Asia 0.17 0.14 0.33 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
East & South-East Asia 1.88 2.05 3.63 n.a. 0.67 2.14 
Australasia 3.07 2.87 2.13 n.a. 0.73 2.26 
Latin America & 1.05 2.00 1.80 n.a. 1.00 0.33 
the Caribbean 
Western Europe 1.17 1.66 1.00 n.a. 1.95 1.62 
North America 1.42 1.03 0.88 n.a. 0.49 0.77 
Notes: 
1. Sorne ratios are based on incomplete data and may be wrong, as seems to to be 
the case for the Africa ratio for 1990. These ratios are therefore more illus-
trative than definitive. 
2. Excluding Taiwan. 
Sources: UN/UNCTAD World lnvestment Reports (various years); World Bank, 
World Development Report (various years) 
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While most geographical regions are being increasingly integrated into 
the world economy, Sub-Saharan Africa has thus been left out of this process. 
Its export/GDP ratio has shown little net change for 15 years and its share 
of the FDI going to the developing countries has fallen. In contrast the ratio 
of aid to GDP in Africa is much higher than in other regions and has risen 
markedly, from 3.4 percent in 1980 to 12.4 percent in 1994. The correspond-
ing ratios for South Asia were 2.4 percent and 1.4 percent, East Asia 0.7 per 
cent and 0.8 per cent; and Latin America and the Caribbean 0.3 per cent 
and 0.3 per cent (see World Bank, 1996a). While foreign aid to Africa 
increased, the FDl/GDP ratio declined from about 2.4 per cent per annum 
during 1984-89 to about 1.5 percent in 1995. In contrast, that of Asia more 
than doubled (from 10 percent to 21.6 percent) while that of Latin America 
and the Caribbean rose more slowly (rising from 6.7 percent to 8.4 percent) 
(see UNCTAD, 1996). Thus aid became the only major channel through 
which foreign investment and technology entered Africa. 
THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION 
Growth and Productivity 
The protagonists of globalization argue that liberalization of tracte and 
investment, the shift to a more market-based economy and deregulation of 
industrial and tracte policies should improve the allocation of resources, raise 
productivity, improve international competitiveness and enhance growth. 
That this has not yet happened at the world level can be partly attributed to 
the slow growth of the GDP and exports of the high-income countries in the 
early 1990s (see Table 7.5 and Appendix Table 7.1) and to the economic woes 
of the countries of the former Soviet Uni on. It is more helpful to look at th ose 
countries and regions that have gone far enough with the introduction of the 
new policy to provide a meaningful test of its merits, though there would be 
arguments as to which countries fall into this category. In any case the growth 
rates for all regions outside Asia were much faster during 1966-73 than 
during 1974-90 and 1991-93 (Table 7.5). The growth rates for South Asia 
were about the same in the early 1990s as in 1966-73 but slower than during 
1974-90. The forecasts for all the regions show that growth rates during 
1995-2005 will be much lower than those during 1966-73. Only in East and 
South-East Asia has growth during the past decade surpassed the earlier 
record. The W orld Bank also forecasts that all regions will have much 
lower growth rates during 1995-2005 than in 1966-73. It is possible that the 
failure of both labour productivity and growth to increase during the past 
decade, when the globalization process accelerated, was due to continued 
imperfections in the factor and product markets and to the wide disparities 
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Table 7.5 GDP growth rates, by region (annual growth in percentages) 
1995 1996-2005 
1966-73 1974-94 1991-94 ( estirnated) (forecast) 
Industrial countries 
GDP 4.7 2.7 1.6 2.4 2.8 
GDP per capita 3.8 2.1 0.9 1.8 2.4 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
GDP 6.4 2.6 3.6 0.9 3.8 
GDP per capita 3.7 0.4 1.6 -0.7 2.2 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
GDP 4.7 2.2 0.7 3.8 3.8 
GDP per capita 2.0 -0.7 -2.2 1.1 0.9 
Asia 
GDP 5.9 6.8 7.7 8.2 7.2 
GDP per capita 3.3 4.9 6.0 6.7 5.8 
East Asia and Pacifie 
GDP 7.9 7.9 9.4 9.2 7.9 
GDP per capita 5.1 6.2 8.0 8.0 6.8 
South Asia 
GDP 3.7 4.9 3.9 5.5 5.4 
GDP per capita 1.3 2.7 1.8 3.6 3.7 
Middle East and North Africa 
GDP 8.6 1.4 2.4 2.5 2.9 
GDP per capita 5.7 -1.8 -0.3 0.1 0.4 
Europe and Central Asia 
GDP 6.9 3.3 -9.0 -0.7 4.3 
GDP per capita 5.8 2.3 -9.3 -0.8 3.7 
Source: World Bank (1996b). 
in the degree of global integration. Perhaps the earlier import-substitution 
model had advantages over the new one in areas such as the promotion of 
learning-by-doing and the encouragement of high investment rates. 
The regions that have experienced rapid growth also account for a high 
share of total FDI inflows, especially East and South-East Asia. Interestingly 
this positive relationship between FDI and growth does not extend to the 
OECD (industrial) countries, which account for the bulk of the FDI inflows 
that do not go to East and South-East Asia. 
The protagonists of globalization have argued that without it growth rates 
during the l 980s might have been even lower. Even if one assumes that faster 
growth results from globalization (as in ESEA for example), it may be more 
the result of industrial and trade policies adopted in the earlier periods (see 
Chapter 1). 
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Poverty, Income Distribution and Employment 
Developing Countries 
There are large economic and social disparities among the countries and 
regions of the world. Per capita incarne in Sub-Saharan Africa (in terms of 
purchasing power parity) is only about one twelfth that of the industrial 
countries, white that in South Asia is about a tenth (Table 7.6). Such social 
indicators as literacy rates, life expectancy and the human development index5 
also vary widely among regions (Table 7. 7). Life expectancy in l 993 was just 
51 years in Sub-Saharan Africa compared with over 74 years in the industrial 
world and close to 70 years in some developing regions. Among the develop-
ing regions the overall human development index (HDI) is highest in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, followed by ESEA. Bath these regions also show 
higher rates of literacy and life expectancy than South Asia and Sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
Over the last couple of decades, during which the effects of globalization 
(reflected in increases in average trading ratios for the world in general and 
developing countries as a group) and the new wave of technological change 
have been felt, incarne disparities have widened in two areas of particular 
concern. First, certain regions or countries have tended to slip back in the 
global incarne parade. Sub-Saharan Africa bas lost ground in bath relative 
and absolute terms, with per capita GDP falling by about 24 per cent over 25 
years. Despite the increasing participation of the developing countries in 
world trade, growth is not evenly distributed among them. Three quarters 
of the aggregate increase in the ratio of trade to GDP bas occurred in just l 0 
developing countries - the ratio bas fallen in 44 of 93 developing countries 
over the last decade (World Bank, l996b, p. 21). The ILO (l995a) points out 
Table 7.6 Ratio ofshare ofworld incarne to share ofworld 
population, by region 
1960 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.27 
South Asia 0.16 
ESEA (exc. China) 0.19 
Latin America 0.66 
Ali developing countries 0.23 
Least developed countries 0.15 
Industrial countries 2.67 
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East Asia (exc. China) 
South-East Asia & Pacifie 




*Human development index. 
Adult literacy Real GDP per Life expectancy 
rate(%) capita (PPP$) (years) (HDI)* 
55.0 l 288 50.9 0.379 
48.8 l 564 60.3 0.444 
81.0 2 686 68.8 0.633 
95.9 8 336 71.3 0.877 
86.0 3 216 63.7 0.646 
85.9 5 756 68.5 0.824 
98.3 15 136 74.3 0.909 
76.3 5 428 63.0 0.746 
Source: UNDP (1996), p. 209. 
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that the overall developing-country share of world trade scarcely changed 
between 1970 and 199 l: the remarkable increase in the share of the Asian 
countries from 4.6 percent to 12.5 percent was offset by a corresponding 
decline for other developing countries. The l990s have witnessed a surge of 
private capital flows to developing countries - both FDI and other types of 
capital - but official flows have dwindled. However these flows, like the 
growth of trade over a longer period, have been highly concentrated among 
a few countries: half of the developing countries receive little or no FDI, and in 
a third ofthem the ratio ofFDI to GDP has fallen over the last decade (ibid). 
Africa's share of net priva te capital inflows from 1989-95 was just 4.2 percent. 
The World Bank (ibid.) is inclined to blame poor policy in many developing 
countries for keeping them out of the export and capital inflow bonanzas.6 
Easterly et al. (1993) and UNCTAD (1996), in contrast, attribute more blame 
to external circumstances. Clearly the impact of declining commodity terms 
oftrade has been severe in many countries. The benefits oftrade for the least 
developed countries have been curtailed during the last 25 years by a cumu-
lative decline of about 50 per cent in their terms of trade (Berry et al., 1997, 
table 4), which offset much of the quantum increase in exports, especially 
during the early l 990s. Also limiting the benefits of export expansion was the 
heavy pressure of debt whose servicing precluded the export earnings from 
being used to import developmental goods in the degree which would have 
been desirable. 
A second distribution-related concern flows from the fairly general trend 
towards intracountry increases in inequality in the developing world during 
the recent phase of globalization. At the same time the wide regional differ-
ences in levels of income inequality that existed before this phase appear to 
have worsened somewhat. The already extreme inequality has further 
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widened in most of the Latin American countries (see Chapter 3, and Berry, 
l997b); a similar trend, albeit with lower absolute levels, has characterized 
South Asia (see Chapter 4). Although information on Africa is scant and 
generally not very reliable, the situation in that region seems to be similar, 
judging by the increased income dispersion reported for Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Nigeria and Tanzania by Demery et al. (1995). Increased openness and trade 
are widely hypothesized to have amplified wage differentials between skilled 
and unskilled or less skilled workers in these and other regions. This situation 
contrasts with that of East Asia, where wage differentials and income inequal-
ity narrowed during the l960s and l970s, although some concentration has 
occurred in more recent years (Berry et al., 1997). Most of countries in this 
region have relatively low levels of income concentration, and were able to 
keep them low during the periods of rapid growth and rising trade ratios. In 
Korea the level of concentration fell further, it may have done so in Indonesia 
as well; in Malaysia it did not worsen significantly; in Thailand it worsened to 
the point of cancelling out some of the potential poverty reduction associated 
with rapid growth (Chapter 5). 
East Asia vs. Latin America 
What explanation can be given to the divergent experiences across the 
regions, and especially between Latin America and East and South-East 
Asia (ESEA)? In the simplest theory, openness and trade are posited to 
raise the demand for unskilled labour and thus their wages in developing 
countries relative to those of skilled workers. However the Latin American 
experience of widening wage inequality in the late l 980s and early l 990s, 
together with a considerable amount of less systematic evidence from other 
parts of the developing world, is inconsistent with this argument. 
Various interpretations of the tendency towards increasing inequality and 
divergence among the regions have been advanced. The inequality trend may 
be substantially due to the process of globalization; but it could also be due to 
elements of the economic reform packages that have been so widely imple-
mented in order to achieve structural adjustment, or to the pace and character 
of technological change. Wood (1997) speculates that the reasons for differ-
ences across regions may include faster growth of the supply of skilled labour 
in East Asia, differences in natural resources (Latin America is better 
endowed with natural resources) and more regulated labour markets in 
Latin America. 
If trade does play a significant role in the noted outcomes, the effects of the 
increases that have occurred may differ significantly according to the compo-
sition of a country's exports and imports and when the expansion occurred. 
Wage differentials narrowed in Korea and Taiwan in the l960s, when many 
of the exports were labour intensive and when the market was not crowded by 
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competing low-wage suppliers. Those differentials widened in Latin America 
during the 1980s, and 1990s. Most of the countries ofthis region do not have 
a very labour-intensive export basket, and were they to compete in that 
market they would be up against China and other low-income countries of 
Asia at a time possibly characterized by a new technology bias against 
unskilled labour (Wood, 1997), though as we argue below there is no dear 
evidence in support of the latter bias. 
Although growth is normally vital for poverty reduction, the level of and 
changes in inequality also matter. Poverty often responds faster to growth 
where inequality is lower: intuitively, ifmany people are bunched doser to the 
poverty line, growth tends to pull them more quickly out of poverty than it 
does in societies where income distribution is polarized and many of the poor 
are a long way from the poverty line. Bringing such people doser to (but still 
not above) the poverty line may be as useful as raising others above it, but 
their being very poor in the first place often signais a lack of immediate 
economic potential and a lack of political voice, which together may imply 
that they will not systematically share the fruits of overall growth. Without 
efforts to redistribute, poverty reduction will be sluggish in many countries 
even when income does grow - as was the experience of a number of Latin 
American countries over the last decade and one that may be in store for 
lndia and a number of African countries in the future. 
In the developing countries open unemployment is a less frequent and 
obvious outcome of low demand for various categories of labour than is the 
case in industrial countries. Such changes are more likely to show up in the 
widening wage and income differentials discussed above. 
Industrial Countries 
The effects of globalization on employment and income distribution in the 
industrialized countries are usually assumed to be manifested either through 
the importation of labour-intensive manufactures from developing countries 
and the FDI that moves to those countries, or through the rapid technological 
change that has contributed significantly to the latest phase of globalization 
and to a considerable extent is necessitated by the need to remain competitive 
with other countries. There is controversy over whether trade and FDI are 
significant factors in explaining unemployment or reduced demand for low-
skilled labour in the OECD countries. The main competing argument is that 
recent technological change has been heavily labour displacing (see ILO, 
l 995a; OECD, 1994). While there is some truth in this, there is no dearcut 
empirical evidence to suggest that the use of information technology in recent 
180 Regional Perspectives: An Overview 
years bas reduced employment in the North (see below). It is widely believed 
that the much higher unemployment in the industrialized countries of con-
tinental Europe compared with the United States is due to the more flexible 
labour market in the latter, which makes labour mobility and sacking easier 
than in Europe, and which also makes it easier for wage reductions to occur. 
Accordingly, the general view is that a declining demand for less-skilled 
labour, whatever its origins, leads to rising unemployment in continental 
Europe while showing up in increasing wage differentials and income inequal-
ity in the United States. 
Wood (1994) argues that growing unemployment in the North is caused by 
the expansion ofimports from the South. Krugman and Lawrence (1994), on 
the other band, argue that trade is not a very important factor in explaining 
both the unemployment of the unskilled in the United States and the widening 
differential between the earnings of skilled and unskilled workers. Analysing 
the US data on the employment and earnings of high-school dropouts, high-
school graduates and those with some college education, Lawrence (1996) 
reports that the wage differentials between skilled and unskilled workers 
increased by about 15 per cent during the l 980s,, and estimates that the 
trade factor accounted for only 10 per cent of this increase. On the other 
band, the effect of technological and organizational changes involving the 
replacement of unskilled by skilled workers is estimated to account for about 
half of the total increase. Krugman and Venables (1995, p. 877) also conclude 
that 'growing integration with the South is at best a minor factor in the 
economic woes of the North'. 
Trade cannot fully explain the problems (unemployment, falling wages) of 
unskilled workers in the North, more particularly in the United States. First, 
if trade does lead to a fall in real wages of the unskilled in the North, then 
prices in the sectors using unskilled labour should also fall, but no such 
pattern can be observed (see Bhagwati and Dehejia, 1994; Lawrence and 
Slaughter, 1993). On the contrary, the 'international price of skill-intensive 
goods bas fallen over the past decade or so relative to the price of (low-skill) 
labour-intensive goods, which would go against a trade-based explanation of 
rising inequality (UNCTAD, 1995a, p. 133). Furthermore, only 20-30 per 
cent of the US workforce is engaged in the traded goods sector, making it 
doubtful that what happens there would dominate the trends in the labour 
market as a whole. Freeman (1993) argues that the answer to the problem of 
low-skilled workers in the United States bas to be sought primarily in the non-
traded goods sector. 
Second, the share of developing-country exports to the OECD countries is 
quite small: non-oil imports into the United States from low-wage countries 
account for just 2.8 per cent of GDP; the main impact of trade on employ-
ment would thus appear to be that which occurs within the OECD countries 
rather than that of trade with the ESEA newly industrializing economies 
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(NIEs). The United States continues to import mainly from the industrialized 
countries with similar skills and wage structures (see Krugman and Lawrence, 
1994). It is noted that a good deal of Joss of employment in the UK textiles 
and clothing industries has been due to imports from such countries as Italy, 
Germany and the United States (Dicken, 1992). For the European Union 
countries, the biggest adverse effect on employment results from a very large 
trade deficit with Japan. 
Third, the fall in manufacturing employment in the OECD countries may 
have been due more to recession and slow growth in these countries, and to a 
reduction of exports to developing countries (in the l 980s), than to rising 
manufactured exports from developing countries (UNCTAD, 1995a). 
Finally, where imported manufactures from developing countries do not 
substitute for domestic products in the developed countries, they need not 
lead to a decline in domestic employment in these countries. 
Thus the direct overall employment effect in the OECD countries oftrade 
with NIEs is likely to be small. In such industries as textiles and clothing and 
leather products and footwear, developing countries have been able to 
increase their exports to the industrialized countries quite significantly. 
From the early l 980s to the early l 990s import penetration in these industries 
rose from around 8 percent to 16 percent (UNCTAD, 1995a, p. 142). These 
are also the industries in which job losses in the North are significant. 
The impact on labour demand and employment at the low-skill end of the 
spectrum is probably substantially greater, and may thus play a significant 
role in the prospects for low-skill workers. The indirect effect on certain 
industries and geographical areas of OECD firms being induced to invest in 
labour-saving technology and rationalize production appears to have been 
significant (Dicken, 1992). 
The bulk of the increase in manufactured exports from developing 
countries has been accounted for by two groups of NIEs in South-East 
Asia: (!) the 'gang of four' (namely Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and 
Taiwan) and (2) the second-tier NIEs (China, lndia, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines and Thailand). Observers in the North believe that the com-
petitive advantage of these countries lies in abundant unskilled labour and 
lower labour costs (sometimes dubbed 'unfair' trade and competition). 
However this cannot be the entire explanation as many of these countries 
(with the exception of India and Indonesia) are now suffering from increasing 
labour shortages and rising real wages. Other important factors in explaining 
their success in exports include increased FDI, product and technology 
upgrading, industrial diversification and rapid productivity growth (see 
below). 
What about the impact of increased FOI flows on employment in the South 
and the North? There are two reasons why transnational enterprises invest 
abroad: (1) to replace ex ports by production abroad when they face tariff and 
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other barriers, and (2) to search for lower costs in order to improve competit-
iveness. Production abroad may mean Joss of production and employment at 
home, especially if production abroad does not generate any demand for 
inputs from the home country and the goods produced abroad are reexported 
to the home country rather than to the rest of the world. The net effect on 
employment in the home country (mostly industrialized countries in the 
North) will depend on whether the substitution effects of FOI on domestic 
investment and exports more than compensate for its complementary effects 
(UNCT AD, 1995a, p. 153). 
At the global level, transnational enterprises (the main channel of FOI) 
employ barely 2 per cent of the economically active population. ln the 1980s 
and 1990s the numbers employed may have increased as a result of the 
internationalization of services. However the increase in FOI in the late 
1980s mainly took the form of mergers and acquisitions, which may not 
involve a net employment creating effect (Parisotto, 1993). 
THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY 
Those who do not accept a trade-related explanation of the unemployment 
and falling wages of low-skilled workers in the North blame rapid 
technological change, particularly the use of information technology. But 
technological change both creates and destroys jobs. Rapid growth in employ-
ment is occurring in both North and South in business services (for example 
consultancy, design, software and data processing) and financial services (see 
Freeman et al. 1995). There seems to be no clearcut evidence that the net 
employment effect of the IT revolution has been negative in the North, where 
it has been mainly concentrated (Eatwell, 1995; Singh, 1995). No significant 
positive impact of the IT revolution has yet been detected in terms of growth 
of output or total factor productivity (the so-called productivity paradox). If 
the technology revolution were the source of increasing unemployment, then 
one would expect labour productivity to accelerate as labour displacement 
occurred. The figures for industrialized countries, however, show a slowdown 
in the growth of labour productivity during the last decade compared with the 
1960s (Table 7.8). One must either conclude that 'revolution' is in fact too 
strong a term for the economic impact of the changes in information techno-
logy or, as believed by many students of technological change, that the major 
labour productivity effects will corne only when the revolution is well under-
way, since their full impact will be delayed until institutional adjustments have 
been made. These adjustments are being hindered by the rigidity of the Fordist 
mass production system and efficiency-reducing forms of oligopoly (Oman, 
1994). Other factors may also have been at work, such as the decline in 
innovative activity since 1970, especially in the United States, where R&D 
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Table 7. 8 Productivity growth in OECD countries (percentages) 
USA Japan EU OECD 
Total factor productivity1 
1961-702 2.5 6.1 3.3 3.3 
1971-80 0.6 1.8 1.7 1.3 
1981-90 0.8 1.8 1.4 1.2 
1991-953 0.4 -0.3 0.9 0.5 
Labour productivity 
1961-702 2.6 9.2 5.4 4.8 
1971-80 0.9 3.7 3.1 2.3 
1981-90 1.1 2.9 2.2 1.8 
1991-953 0.6 0.7 1.5 1.0 
Capital productivity 
1961-702 2.3 -2.8 -0.9 0.0 
1971-80 0.1 -3.9 -1.2 -1.1 
1981-903 0.1 -1.4 -0.1 -0.3 
1991-953 -0.1 -3.4 -0.4 -0.8 
Notes: 
1. Measured as a weighted average of the growth in labour and 
capital productivity, with the sample period averages for capital 
and labour shares as weights. 
2. 1962 for Japan. 
3. 1994 for Japan. 
Source: OECD (1997). 
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expenditure has fallen (Eatwell, 1995; Thurow, 1992). lt might, therefore, be 
that unemployment in the North would have been higher had labour pro-
ductivity risen faster (see Chapter !). 
Regardless of the outcome on the labour productivity front, there is little 
doubt that technological change has affected the composition of labour 
demand in favour of skilled workers, and is thus a natural suspect in the 
declining relative (and sometimes absolu te) wages of Jess skilled workers. The 
employment consequences of globalization will also derive in part from 
organizational innovations at the firm, interfirm and industrial levels that 
are often associated with technological innovation. Flexible specialization and 
more innovative patterns of organizing tasks and job functions may lead to 
structural unemployment in both developing and industrialized countries. 
The developing countries have thus far participated far Jess extensively in 
the information revolution than has the industrial world, and most of the 
developing-country participation occurred in a handful of NIEs, mainly 
those of East Asia. The experience of this region contrasts with that of the 
OECD countries and all other developing regions: high technology importa-
tion and absorption has led to rapid growth in labour productivity. According 
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to the World Bank (1993b), rapid growth in physical and human capital bas 
accounted for two thirds of the region's growth, the remaining one third being 
explained by increases in efficiency or total factor productivity. Total factor 
productivity growth in East Asian countries during 1960-89 is estimated as 
follows: Taiwan, 3.7; Hong Kong, 3.6; Japan, 3.4; Korea, 3.1. Such growth bas 
also tended to be above average in South-East Asia: Thailand, 2.5; lndonesia, 
1.2; Malaysia, 1.1; and Singapore, 1.2 - all of which greatly exceed the 
estima tes for Latin America (0.1) and Sub-Saharan Africa ( -0.99) (ibid, p. 64). 
The ESEA experience also shows that the adoption of high technology can, 
under at least some circumstances, lead to or be consistent with a rapid 
growth of employment, while also contributing to international competitive-
ness. Freeman et al. (1995) show that even when investment and employment 
shifted to countries such as China, the decline in manufacturing employment 
in Hong Kong and Taiwan was more than offset by a rise in employment in 
services.7 Unlike in ESEA, employment bas not grown rapidly in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, nor in South Asia (see Chapter 4). UNECLAC 
(1995a) time series data show that urban unemployment increased in Argent-
ina, Brazil, Colombia, Panama and Peru between 1980 and 1994. It declined 
somewhat only in Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Honduras, Mexico and Parag-
uay. The widening wage and income gaps, together with the modest growth of 
employment in this region, may be due to the fact that at low levels of 
technology technical change can be substantial and thus labour displacing. 
However in the case of OECD countries with an already fairly high degree of 
capital intensity, further technical changes may lead to no more than incre-
mental changes in technology, which would be less labour displacing. 
Globalization bas been facilitated by developments in communications 
technology and by open markets for goods and capital. However labour 
markets are not characterized by the same degree of openness as the product, 
capital and financial markets. ln several sectors, employment in the countries 
of the North bas declined while rising in the South, especially in the rapidly 
growing economies of ESEA and to a lesser extent Latin America. It remains 
a moot point whether these gains and losses resulting from globalization have 
been equitably distributed among countries and regions. 
The net effect of globalization on employment will thus depend on many 
factors, notably the capacity of the economies to absorb information techno-
logy, organizational innovations, the speed and direction of technological 
change, and industrial restructuring in both domestic and global industries. 
The employment impact of globalization, as noted above, can differ markedly 
by type of worker. Both skilled and unskilled employment are likely to 
grow quickly under conditions of rapid economic growth, as demonstrated 
by the experience of ESEA. ln practice, however, economic growth during 
the past decade bas been slow in most regions, except Asia, particularly 
East Asia. 
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Slow economic growth and reduced demand in the OECD countries may 
be far more important explanations of high unemployment rates than either 
globalization or technological change (see Eatwell, 1995). Be this as it may, 
the duality of labour markets and the Jack of labour mo bility, particularly of 
unskilled labour, suggest that social policy is not keeping pace with globaliza-
tion. The result is a mismatch between jobs and available skills and people's 
job expectations. 
There are wide variations in the development and use of information 
technology between different regions. This is reflected in expenditure on 
R&D as a proportion of GNP (Table 7.9) and in the data on the use of 
communications technology (Table 7 .10). Among the developing countries, 
the R&D ratios are lowest in Africa and highest in Asia. For the Asia-Pacific 
region, average growth in IT investment during 1984-90 was 10--25 per cent 
per annum (Kraemer and Dedrick, 1994). Rapid investment growth is not 
peculiar to East Asian NIEs: in India investment growth is reported to be over 
22 per cent per annum, though from a smaller base. Similar data for Africa 
are difficult to procure, but Moussa and Schware ( 1992) report wide varia-
tions in computer spending (including complementary investment in software, 
training, parts, service and maintenance) as a percentage of GDP within 
Africain 1988. Computer spending is much higher in Francophone Africa 
than either West Africa or South Africa. 
East Asia (excluding China) and Latin America use more information 
technology than do South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (Table 7 .10). Infor-
mation technology (combined with an increase in imports of labour-intensive 
goods, particularly from Asia) has been blamed for growing economic 
inequalities in many industrial countries. But such a tendency is 
clearly avoidable. Take the case of Korea during the past 20 years. This 
Table 7.9 Research and development expenditure as a share of 
GNP, by region (percentages) 
1970 
World 2.04 
Developed countries 2.36 
Europe 1.70 
North America 2.59 
Developing countries 0.32 
Africa 0.33 
South, East and South-East Asia 1.02 
Western Asia 0.31 





















Sources: UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook: Expenditure and 
Experimental Development (various years); UNCTAD (1994). 
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Table 7.10 Use of communications technology, by region 
Radios TVs Telephone lines Fax machines 
(per 1000 (per 1000 (per 100 (per 100 
persons) persons) persons) persons) 
Sub-Saharan Africa 144 23 1 
South Asia 87 33 0.8 
East Asia 212 38 2.1 
East Asia exc. China 680 156 24.2 
Latin America & the 345 162 6.5 0.1 
Caribbean 
Industrial countries 1048 533 37.2 1.7 
World 349 151 9.9 
Source: UNDP (1996), p. 211. 
period has seen a rapid introduction of the new information technologies, 
supported by a powerful science and technology base. It has coincided with a 
rapid increase in the importance of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in 
the economy. Much of this increase is accounted for by the growth of sub-
contracting by large firms to smaller ones (see Berry, 1997c). Throughout the 
period Korea has not suffered any increase in inequality, but rather an 
improvement. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Taking a longer view, the experience of the ESEA economies (particularly 
Hong Kong, Korea, Japan and Taiwan) shows that growth and equity can be 
achieved simultaneously in a situation of high levels of trade (globalization), 
rapid technological change and limited job creation in the public sector. In all 
of these countries SMEs play an important role in manufacturing, export 
activities and the economy in general. All have a relatively equitable income 
distribution. And of course ail have competed very successfully in world 
markets and grown rapidly. 
Theory and records suggest that both rapid technological change and 
rising trade ratios can, by themselves, increase levels of inequality, but 
that outcome can be avoided if the variance of wages and labour productivity 
is not too great. Likewise the involvement of SMEs in export activities, 
directly or indirectly, through subcontracting or other links with exporters 
can help to prevent such an outcome when trade is substantial and growing. 
For this to happen across a wide range of industries, large firms must 
have confidence in and be willing to work with SMEs, as is the case in the 
ESEA economies mentioned above. These large-scale links are less 
A.S. Bhalla and Albert Berry 187 
established in Latin America, as noted emphatically by Japanese businesses, 
advisers and observers. For SMEs to make their full contribution under these 
conditions, the technological and human capital gaps between them and 
the larger firms must be of modest proportions. When this is the case, the 
dissemination of new information technologies should occur quickly and 
neither the variance of productivities nor the inequality of earnings should 
become too large. 
Even when these conditions are reasonably well satisfied there may still be 
some danger of distribution becoming more unequal, since under rapid 
technological change so many firms - large and small - will be raising labour 
productivity that it may require a high level of investment and rate of growth 
to keep labour demand high. 
The employment impact of globalization, as noted above, can be both 
positive and negative. Both skilled and unskilled employment is likely to 
grow rapidly in conditions of rapid economic growth, as has been demon-
strated by the experience of ESEA. However, in practice growth during the 
past decade has been slow in most regions except East Asia. Slow growth and 
reduction in demand in the OECD countries may be far more important 
factors than technological change in explaining high unemployment rates. 
This volume, like most studies of globalization, has focused more on the 
growth of trade in goods and services than on the increasing financial flows 
and interconnections. The recent financial crisis in South-East Asia reminds 
us that this aspect of globalization should not be forgotten. At the time of 
writing, there is a significant concern that the region's growth may slow down 
over a period while the problems are addressed. It lays to rest any simplistic 
idea that the pitfalls associated with globalization apply only in certain 
regions of the world. It may suggest that the net benefits to a free flow of 
capital will be modest, if indeed positive at all, in much of the Third World. 
Short-term flows cannot become the basis of solid long-term investment and 
growth. The arguments for some degree of control on short-term flows are 
strengthened with each new experience of this sort. Yet it is clear that as with 
the rules governing trade, the developing countries have little clout in the 
deliberations. It is to be hoped that this condition is at least somewhat 
modified in future so that the main sources of danger for these countries 
can be taken more seriously. 
APPENDIX 7.1 GROWTH RATES OF EXPORTS OF GOODS AND NON-FACTOR SERVICES, GDP AND 
EXPORT/GDP RATIO BY, REGION 1970-94 
1970--80 1980-90 1990-94 
GDP Exp. Exp./GDP GDP Exp. Exp.!GDP GDP Exp. Exp./GDP 
Low- and middle-income 
economies, by region 5.2 3.9 -1.2 3.1 7.3 4.1 1.9 n.a. n.a. 
Sub-Saharan Africa 3.8 2.8 -1.0 1.7 1.8 0.1 0.9 2.1 1.2 
East Asia 6.9 9.5 2.4 7.9 9.7 1.7 9.4 12.7 3.0 
South Asia 3.5 3.6 0.1 5.7 6.1 0.4 3.9 13.1 8.9 
Latin America & Caribbean 5.4 -0.1 -5.3 1.7 5.4 3.6 3.6 6.3 2.6 
Low-income 4.3 3.3 -1.0 5.8 5.7 -0.1 6.2 10.4 4.0 
In dia 3.4 4.3 0.9 5.8 5.9 0.1 3.8 13.6 9.4 
China 5.5 8.7 3.0 10.2 11.5 1.2 12.9 16.0 2.7 
Other 4.4 1.9 -2.4 2.9 2.5 -0.4 1.4 3.0 1.6 
Middle-income 5.5 4.0 -1.4 2.2 n.a. n.a. 0.2 n.a. n.a. 
Lower middle-income 5.1 n.a. n.a. 2.2 n.a. n.a. n.a. -2.3 n.a. 
Upper middle-income 5.9 2.2 -3.5 2.2 7.1 4.8 3.4 7.8 4.3 
High-income 3.2 5.4 2.1 3.2 5.1 1.8 1.7 3.41 1.7 
World 3.6 4.0 0.4 3.1 5.3 2.1 1.8 3.92 2.1 
Notes: 
1. Estimate based on World Bank data for the major high income countries, weighted by their 1992 dollar exports (World Bank, 
1996a, pp. 209). 
2. Estimate based on the figure for high-income countries described in 1 and an estimate for the low- and middle-income group' 
based on World Bank data (1996a, p. 209) and estimates for the two missing categories, 'Europe and Central Asia' and 'Middle 
East and North Africa'. With the lower and upper limit estimates we used, this figure would range from 1.8 to 2.3. 
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Notes 
1. Current price export/GDP ratios for the world rose in the 1970s but not in the 
l 980s (Table 7 .1 ), while the ratio in constant prices did not rise significantly in 
the l 970s but has risen at a little over 2 percent per year since then. Thus for the 
world as a whole it is appropriate to date the recent surge of globa!ization from 
the 1980s. The increase in the ratio was due exclusively to the developing coun-
tries however, since the rate of increase actually slowed for the high-income 
countries in the 1980s, while that of the low and middle-income countries rose 
from -1.2 percent to 4.1 percent (see Appendix 7.1). 
2. The export to GDP ratio is a somewhat misleading point of comparison between 
countries ofunequal size, and hence between regions whose member countries are 
of different average sizes. The small size of man y Sub-Saharan African countries 
no doubt contributes to the high export ratio. 
3. The shares of manufactured exports for South Asia and East Asia (East and 
South-East Asia, according to our definition in this volume) call for some com-
ment. The data supplied by the World Bank and presented in Table 7.2 seem to 
underestimate the East Asian shares (see the much higher shares based on the 
World Bank data base, which are more consistent with the country estimates 
presented in Chapter 5). The estimates are probably biased downwards by the big 
weight of China and Indonesia. The shares for Latin America presented in Table 
3.2 are much higher than those given here; this probably reflects a different 
definition of 'manufactured'. 
4. Comparable data for individual countries of South Asia are presented by Khan in 
Chapter 4. 
5. The human development index is defined by the UNDP as a composite measure 
of human progress based on three elements: national income, life expectancy and 
educational attainment (for details see UNDP, 1990). 
6. Their empirical tests are, however, not at ail convincing. They use four compo-
nents (the ratio of FDI to GDP, the share of manufactures in exports, the 
country's credit rating, and tariffs) to fonn an index of integration, but only 
one ofthese is a policy variable. Unsurprisingly this index is positively correlated 
with GDP growth and other macroeconomic performance variables. What this 
implies for policy instruments within the government's control is Jess clear. 
7. A positive correlation is considered to exist among the countries of Asia and the 
Pacifie between investment in information technology and growth in GDP and 
GDP per worker (see Kraemer and Dedrick, 1994), but the methodology of this 
study is suspect and should not be taken as refuting the 'productivity paradox' 
within the Asia-Pacific region. 
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This volume has considered the benefits and costs of globalization - of free 
trade and of FDI - for both the North and the South. Our main concern has 
been the developing countries, whose integration into the global economy has 
been fraught with greater adjustment costs especially during the transition 
period. 
Free trade does not automatically lead to higher growth and income 
equalization. In Chapter 1 Streeten notes that adjustment to changing com-
parative advantage means that 'trade policy becomes a policy for tramps', 
and that it imposes constant dislocation and hardship on people. These costs 
of dislocation need to be weighed against the extra income that results from 
international trade. Acceptance that there are both costs of and benefits from 
free trade implies that it will have to be managed so that the costs are 
minimized or reduced. International agreement on the management of the 
global economy may be another means of reducing the pressures of globaliza-
tion. Whether the WTO is up to this task remains to be seen. 
Controversy continues to surround the process of globalization. Protagon-
ists argue that globalization is good for growth; antagonists, on the other 
hand, suggest that the adjustment costs of integration into the global eco-
nomy can be too high, and that poverty and inequalities have grown during 
the accelerated globalization of the 1980s and 1990s (see Chapters 3-6). 
We conclude that the protagonists may be overstating their case, both for 
the speed of globalization and for the positive impact that it has on individual 
economies. 
Lack of agreement on the consequences of globalization on growth and 
marginalization arises from the usual problem of identifying causal factors 
when a number of forces are at work simultaneously. Together with global-
ization, information technology is advancing rapidly and is reinforcing glo-
balization, as we have noted in this volume (see Chapters 1-3 in particular). 
Domestic policies have an important influence on growth, poverty and mar-
ginalization, independently of globalization. As we noted in the Introduction, 
often one cannot be certain whether globalization is the cause or the effect of 
liberalization and domestic policy changes. Similarly one cannot be sure, or at 
least not on the basis of the available empirical evidence, whether the rising 
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incidence of poverty, for example in South Asia, Latin America and Africa, is 
due mainly to the process of globalization or mainly to domestic policies. A 
number of causal factors interact and reinforce each other. The separate effect 
of each is often difficult to detect, especially in the absence of disaggregated 
empirical evidence. 
The polemics in the literature on globalization arise in part because of 
this problem of identification. It also reflects the fact that globalization 
has been a continuous process of change that is still evolving. Under 
the circumstances, one cannot invoke a counterfactual to help isolate the 
effects during the pre-globalization and post-globalization periods. This 
volume has argued that waves of globalization in the form of trade liberal-
ization and direct investment have been occurring over a long period 
(see Chapter l, in particular). To represent the l960s and l970s as a pre-
globalization period, as some do, is misleading. The l 980s and l 990s simply 
witnessed an acceleration of a wave that started in the early postwar period 
and was preceded by a major wave in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. 
Lack of agreement on the impact of globalization is also due to the absence 
of good micro-level research based on disaggregated and detailed data. In this 
volume we have made a beginning by providing a quantitative picture of 
poverty, growth and unemployment during the l980s and l990s. A good deal 
more research is needed before any definitive conclusions can be drawn about 
the positive and negative effects of globalization. 
Below we discuss a few promising areas of research of a microeconomic and 
policy-oriented nature, which will hopefully narrow the gap between theory 
and reality. 
GLOBALIZATION, GROWTH AND PRODUCTIVITY 
The protagonists of globalization argue that it is good for growth. However, 
actual evidence reveals that the growth rates of most countries and regions, 
with the exception of Asia (particularly East and South-East Asia), have been 
considerably slower in the l 980s and l 990s than in the l 960s and l 970s. 
Rigorous, empirical, country-specific and country-comparative research is 
needed to explain why this is so. If growth does not accelerate with globaliza-
tion, the incidence ofpoverty becomes greater, as is shown in Chapters 4 and 
5 of this volume. 
The determinants of investment are not yet well understood. Khan (Chap-
ter 4) shows that investment rates were quite high during the import-substitu-
tion phase in South Asia. In this subregion, despite its various inefficiencies, 
the import-substitution strategy provided a strong incentive to invest. It is 
argued that the weakness of the growth impulse from globalization in the 
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region arises from the failure to create an alternative system of incentives to 
attain or maintain a high investment rate. The infrastructure in South Asia is 
woefully inadequate compared with that in East and South-East Asia. This 
may in part explain the failure of the South Asian countries to attract high 
levels of foreign direct investment (FDI). And in the absence of FDI, inter-
national competitiveness is difficult to achieve in some industries. East and 
South-East Asia have escaped this vicious circle by attracting FDI and 
channelling it skilfully through approriate incentives and strategic industrial 
policies for technological modemization. Latin America's case parallels that 
of South Asia in that the high rate ofinvestment under ISI has not continued 
un der the new strategy. 
One key research question, therefore is what incentives are needed during 
the era of globalization to stimulate greater investment and thereby accelerate 
growth? Is lack of FDI a major constraint on growth? What role does 
total factor productivity (TFP) play in explaining the high growth rates in 
East and South-East Asia? The experience of OECD countries with declining 
TFP rates (see Chapter 7) suggests that this factor may be as important as 
the inadequate political structures and lack of good governance noted in 
Chapter 4. 
A related research issue is the link between exports and FDI under export 
orientation and globalization compared with that under import substitution. 
Are FDI inflows essential for developing countries to increase their exports? 
It has been argued that exports and FDI were substitutes under import 
substitution but are complements under globalization. 'Tariff jumping', 
encouraged in a situation of high tariff barriers, may now be less important 
because of the current decline in average national tariff levels. The above 
hypothesis deserves further empirical testing. 
While FDI may be good for growth, it may also involve some adverse 
effects on host countries, for example manipulation or distortion of consumer 
preferences, lack of technological spillovers due to restrictions imposed by 
transnationals on the export or R&D activities of their subsidiaries (see 
Chang, 1996), and the introduction of excessively capital-intensive technolo-
gies and high salaries, which together limit employment generation in the host 
countries (see Chapter 7). Research evidence on the effects of capital inflows 
(FDI, financial flows, loans and so on) into developing countries is much less 
abundant than that on the effects oftrade. In the 1960s FDI and TNCs were 
considered by most developing countries to be of questionable value. Today 
the pendulum has swung to the other extreme and FDI often seems to be 
considered a panacea for all ills. 
Empirical investigations are needed to determine the pros and cons of 
the role of FDI, financial flows and TNCs under the current global condi-
tions. To what extent do movements of short-term capital cause macroeco-
nomic instability, exchange rate appreciation and decline in exports and 
A.S. Bhalla 193 
the overall rate of growth? What are the efficiency and distributional effects 
of financial liberalization? What are the implications for developing countries 
of monopoly/oligopoly power in the global financial markets? (See Berry 
et al., 1996.) 
GLOBALIZATION AND INEQUALITY 
Very little research has been done on the relation between growing income 
inequality and specific economic reforms and technological change. At pres-
ent not much is known about the precise effects of trade, FDI and financial 
flows and increasing international competition on the allocation of rj?sources 
between and within countries, on efficiency and growth and on inequalities 
and unemployment. 
Inequality between Nations 
Consider first the inequalities between North and South. Recent research 
has concentrated on the impact of trade on North-South income inequalities 
and the distribution of jobs (see Freeman, 1993, 1995; Krugman and 
Lawrence, 1994; Lawrence and Slaughter, 1993; Wood, 1994, 1997). Chapters 
1 and 7 note the considerable controversy surrounding the impact of exports 
from developing countries on the labour market in the North. The role 
of technological change and the extent to which it is contributing to 
the growing income gap between countries also remains rather unclear. 
Uneven dispersion and utilization of information technology would tend 
to influence the dispersion of wages between skilled and unskilled labour. 
If the benefits of new information technology are being exploited by the 
more developed of developing countries and larger enterprises, does it suggest 
a widening of these gaps both within the South and between North and 
South? 
Further empirical research of a disaggregated nature can throw adequate 
light on the relative importance of different factors behind the growing 
inequality between the North and some parts of the South. It is also 
worth exploring whether the North-South dichotomy is still meaningful 
with the rapid integration of East and South-East Asia into the global 
economy. 
Critics of globalization argue that integration into the world economy 
<livides the world into rich and poor countries, with the rich gaining at 
the expense of the poor. This hypothesis needs detailed empirical testing. 
Krugman and Venables (1995) present a simple model in which regional 
differentiation is driven by an interaction between scale economies and trans-
port costs. They present a two-stage analysis under which a decline in 
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transport costs in the first phase of global integration may lead to the rich 
countries gaining at the expense of the poor. However in the second stage, 
when integration accelerates and transport costs decline further, benefits to 
the rich countries in the form of increased income may be eroded and the poor 
countries' income may start to grow at the expense of the rich countries. Thus 
the first phase is one of divergence and the second is one of convergence in 
incomes and economic structures. No empirical validation of the above model 
has yet been provided. 
Much theory assumes complete globalization under which all factors of 
production - both labour and capital - are freely mobile. In practice such 
globalization is not taking place; free flows of capital are not accompanied by 
freer flows oflabour and the integration oflabour markets. The simple theory 
th us fails to provide a reliable prediction of the impacts of globalization. It is 
possible that the existing international inequalities in the distribution of 
income are being aggravated by the incomplete nature of globalization! 
Inequality within Nations 
The effects of trade liberalization and globalization on inequality within 
nations have remained relatively unexplored. In Chapter 2 of this volume, 
James refers to the issue and speculates that the gainers from globalization are 
large-scale, foreign-owned, urban-based firms rather than small-scale rural 
ones. This hypothesis needs to be empirically tested for different countries 
and regions. Clearly it is less likely to hold in countries with a high degree of 
linkage between large and small firms. 
Research should thus be directed towards the causal factors underlying 
inequality within nations. In what ways and to what extent do trade liberal-
ization and the spread of information technology contribute to wage and 
income inequalities within developing countries. How does globalization 
influence firms, workers, consumers and producers? Does it lead to a reduc-
tion in product prices, which would be welfare enhancing and favourable to 
consumers? Which social groups - rural or urban, high income or low income 
- are likely to benefit? 
The relationship between poverty and income distribution in the context of 
globalization deserves further analysis. In Chapters 4 and 5 Khan notes that 
the incidence of poverty (measured by the headcount indices), which had 
shown a steady decline during the 1970s and 1980s, has increased in countries 
such as India and China during the l 990s, the period of accelerated globaliza-
tion. The incidence of poverty in India increased after the introduction of 
economic reforms. This coincidence of liberalization and poverty increase is 
explained by a rise in the relative price of food and a reduction in the gap 
between domestic and world food prices as a consequence of trade liberal-
ization. Are there other explanations for this increase in the incidence of 
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poverty? Do trade liberalization, inflows of FDI and economic reforms 
largely explain the increase in poverty, or do domestic agricultural policies, 
for example, also have arole to play? 
GLOBALIZATION AND EMPLOYMENT 
The impact oftrade liberalization on employment in the North has been the 
subject of many studies, as noted above, but far fewer studies have been 
conducted on the direct and indirect effects of trade liberalization, FDI and 
global financial flows on employment generation in developing countries. 
Globalization is likely to have a significant influence on the global distribution 
of jobs and the nature and quality of employment (see Chapter 7). The 
comparative advantage of developing countries could, in principle, be 
enhanced through increasing global competition if their low labour costs 
could be combined with relatively high worker skills. But it is often argued 
that the advent of new information technologies and their use in industrial 
countries in such labour-intensive industries as textiles and clothing may erode 
the comparative advantage and export competitiveness of developing coun-
tries. At present there is no conclusive evidence to suggest that the location of 
some of these industries will shift markedly back to the North. However if 
such trade reversai were to occur in the future, developing countries could lose 
billions of dollars of export income a year, and thereby employment. 
Global competition can have a net negative effect on traditional jobs, 
especially since it is mainly the modern and large-scale manufacturing sectors, 
and to a lesser extent services, that are being globalized (see below). Such 
competition would then exert a downward pressure on wages and social 
security for workers in the organized or formai sectors of both industrial 
and developing countries. The question is whether fuller employment can be 
achieved at a wage level that is high enough to stimulate demand appreciably 
and sustain it over time. 
Research on the impact of globalization on employment requires analysis 
of the following: 
• The impact on relative factor prices and the costs of capital and labour. 
• The employment-intensity of export products (additional employment gen-
eration through exports requires not only labour-intensive growth but also 
labour-intensive exports). 
• The role of FD 1 in explaining levels and composition of trade and the direct 
and indirect employment effects that it produces. 
• The determinants of competitive advantage of countries, for example 
human resource base, cost/price advantage and ability to absorb new 
information technology. 
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GLOBALIZA TION AND SMALL ENTERPRISES 
ln principle, trade liberalization and freer imports of finished goods and raw 
materials can have both favourable and adverse effects on small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs). The effects may be beneficial if such trade liberalization 
improves these enterprises' access to scarce material inputs, capital equipment 
and technology. On the other hand, the effects may be adverse if finished 
goods are imported at below-cost prices (dumping) with which the SMEs 
cannot compete. In Chapter 3 Berry notes that small and medium enterprises 
may be especially vulnerable in the short run to accelerated import competi-
tion resulting from trade liberalization and globalization. These enterprises 
are generating a good deal of employment, so if they disappear in the face of 
foreign competition, an important source of employment generation will be 
lost. A decline in the demand for the products of SMEs may also occur 
through a shift in the consumption pattern towards imported goods and 
away from domestic goods. In Asia, Sri Lanka's liberalization experience 
suggests that such a shift in the consumption pattern has occurred, that the 
SMEs have been unable to compete in price terms because of dumping, and 
that the large firms have benefited from the liberalization of raw material 
imports and forced a number of small enterprises out of business (see ILO-
AR TEP, 1987; Osmani, 1987). 
Research is accordingly needed on the impact of trade liberalization on 
industrial structures in developing countries. Does globalization benefit only 
large-scale industry, which has initial advantages of economies of scale and 
export orientation? What has been the mortality rate of SMEs during the 
wave ofliberalization in the 1980s and 1990s? Can this mortality be explained 
by increasing global competition and the withdrawal of protection from these 
enterprises? If it is true that globalization favours large industry, will it widen 
the gap between the modern and non-modern or informai (generally small-
scale) sectors? What implications will this have for wage and income inequal-
ities within developing countries? 
GLOBALIZA TION AND TECHNOLOGY 
This volume has emphasized the two-way relationship between globalization 
and technology. First, technology is one of the main driving forces behind 
globalization. In turn, globalization of the world economy is transforming the 
way in which technology is generated and diffused. In Chapter 2 James notes 
two opposing tendencies - the dispersion of R&D and its concentration by 
transnationals in their home country. The globalization of technology can be 
defined in several ways, including (1) the exploitation of national innovations 
in global markets, (2) the sharing of costs and risks of industrial research 
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across national borders by public and business institutions and (3) the gen-
eration of innovations across countries (see Archibugi and Michie, 1997a). 
While there is agreement on (1) and (2), controversy surrounds (3). 
Globalization of Technology? 
lt is generally believed that transnationals are globalizing R&D to take 
advantage of economies of scale, since information technology enables world-
wide control of R&D and sourcing of scientific and technological knowledge 
(see Cantwell, 1995). lt is also argued that the spread of information techno-
logy and globalization are enabling the transnational corporations to disperse 
their activities worldwide to cater for the global market, rather than regional 
or national host-country markets. On the other hand many writers (Freeman, 
1995; Patel, 1995; Pa tel and Pavitt, 1991) argue that the globalization of R&D 
is not taking place on any appreciable scale. Patel (1995) shows that the bulk 
of the patented inventions of over 500 of the world's largest enterprises took 
place in the firms' home countries. Tentative estimates show that the 'R&D 
activities of the US companies outside the United States amount to less than 10 
percent of the total, whilst those of the Japanese companies are much lower -
less than 2 percent' (Freeman, 1995, p. 17). Sorne of these R&D activities 
outside the United States and Japan are in other industrialized countries. Thus 
developing countries may not benefit from the location of this research. 
One of the reasons for the above controversy is the lack of empirical 
industry-specific and product-specific studies, particularly with regard to the 
implications of technology globalization for host developing countries (see 
Chapter 2). At present it is not clear how this phenomenon will change the 
nature of innovations by transnationals in developing countries. Are these 
transnationals concentrating more on 'global' products to cater for the global 
markets than on domestic products? If so, what implications does this strat-
egy have for R&D and product development within developing countries? 
Are these countries likely to be excluded from the benefits of the technology 
innovation and generation process? Our understanding of how globalization 
affects the nature and location of innovations is still rather rudimentary. 
The Role of National Technology Policies 
What is the precise role of national technology policies in a globalized 
economy? Many authors argue that despite globalization, technology remains 
largely country-specific and is conditioned by national skills, capabilities and 
cultural characteristics. On the other hand the increasing role of transnational 
corporations in R&D for global products, as noted above, might suggest a 
decline in the relevance of national technology policies. lt is argued that the 
benefits of government-supported innovation in industry are likely to be 
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transferred to other countries under globalization. Hence, there may be little 
incentive for a national technology policy to promote national innovations. 
This may be one of the reasons why many industrial countries are now 
shifting their emphasis from the generation of technology to the regulation 
of intellectual and industrial property rights in order to guarantee sufficient 
returns from existing technology in international markets (see Archibugi and 
Michie, l 997a, p.17). 
With increasing globalization and domination by transnational corpora-
tions, national technological capabilities may become less important than 
capabilities at the firm /evel to compete internationally. Increasing competi-
tion in the international markets seems to be inducing firms to put a higher 
premium on quality than on profitability, price and cost. The role of an 
industrial and technology policy in future will therefore be more in the nature 
of government incentives to firms to introduce quality-enhancing innova-
tions. Despite techno-globalism, infrastructure, education, communications 
and university-industry partnerships are some of the areas in which national 
government action will continue to be essential. 
Global Markets and Innovations 
It is not clear whether technological innovations are more likely or less likely 
to occur under the integrated and global market structures resulting from the 
process of globalization. According to the neoliberal view, a competitive 
environment in national and international markets will induce innovation. 
Government intervention is assumed to lead to greater inefficiencies than 
those resulting from market imperfections. However the historical experience 
of many developing countries (for example Korea and Taiwan) shows that a 
significant amount of innovation also took place during import-substituting 
industrialization under protective environments. How and to what extent 
competitive market forces spur innovation will, inter a/ia, depend on the 
nature of the industry and the market structure. Sorne industries are more 
globalized than others, and may thus suffer from greater global competition. 
Increasing knowledge-intensity of production is also raising firms' production 
costs and uncertainty (Mytelka, 1994). 
GLOBALIZA TION AND GOVERNMENT POLICY 
Severa! chapters in this volume (particularly Chapters 1 and 3) argue that 
globalization combined with laissez faire may be especially harmful to devel-
oping countries. Under certain circumstances, globalization may be accom-
panied by greater government and public services rather than less. In Chapter 
1 Streeten argues that, contrary to expectations, a positive relationship 
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between government size and globalization (in terms of trade and FOI ratios) 
may occur as a result of pressures to compensate those social groups who are 
hurt by globalization. In addition governments may have to spend more on 
public goods such as education and infrastructure when global competition 
becomes tierce. 
Thanks to globalization, both developing and developed countries are 
becoming less and less in control of their macroeconomic policies. For ex-
ample freer flows of finance and capital and open capital markets imply that 
the fiscal operations of governments are becoming increasingly interdepen-
dent, with significant effects on interest rates in many countries. Furthermore 
the growing power of global corporations and their freedom to move capital 
and production freely across national boundaries is limiting the control of the 
nation state over its industrial policy. Hence, there is a growing urgency to 
harmonize national government policies. These policies need to be aligned 
with the foreign investment strategies of the corporate world and the chan-
ging external conditions of aid and trade. This calls for institutional innova-
tions to match economic and technological ones. 
The issue of the government's role in the generation of and access to new 
information technology, particularly in the context of countries weakly integ-
rated into the global economy, is a fruitful area for further research. Despite 
globalization, some role for strategic government intervention and public 
policy may be necessary for the adaptation, development and diffusion 
of new technologies. Public policy is likely to play a crucial role in creating 
a suitable environment for this purpose. Furthermore an initial assessment 
of a country's existing technological capabilities at different levels is essential 
to determine the scope for leapfrogging. This task cannot be done by private 
firms. While micro-decisions are made by these firms on the basis of 
some notion of choice and feasibility, it is up to the central mechanism to 
examine how these micro-systems fit into a macroeconomic framework 
that will provide a basis for investment and consumption planning (Enos, 
1991 ). 
In contrasting the neoliberal and neo-Schumpeterian approaches to high 
technology policy for industrial development, Schmitz and Cassiolato (1992) 
note that far less attention has been paid to market failures than to govern-
ment failures. The recent experience of industrialized countries shows that 
markets continue to remain ineffective in compensating for technology-
induced unemployment. 
It is clear that, in the process of globalization, the corporate strategies of 
transnational and global firms towards R&D and technology development 
and transfer will increasingly determine the nature and scope of technological 
innovations. In developing countries, however, private expenditure on R&D 
remains very small and the bulk of R&D is supported by public funds. But 
with public funds declining in developing countries under globalization and 
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structural adjustment programmes, the process of innovation in developing 
countries may actually slow down. The experience of many countries, espe-
cially in Africa and Latin America, shows how serious indebtedness can limit 
the scope of investment in new technologies. Yet such investment is an 
important prerequiste for successfully meeting the challenge of globalization. 
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